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Abstract 
Comparative philosophy is becoming an increasingly important method for 
understanding ourselves and those around us. At a time when the world's 
traditions and the great thinkers from the history of humanity are available at 
our fingertips like never before, comparative philosophy provides the tools to 
understand how humanity has differed between cultures and across time 
while simultaneously bringing to light those elements we have in common. 
While comparative philosophy is well established, its method has never been 
clearly outlined and comparative philosophers have relied on rusted and dull 
tools. The aim of this work is to outline a comparative methodology that 
overcomes the issues of relativity and objectivity, both of which threaten to 
undermine the comparative enterprise. Replacing these is perspectivism, the 
principles of which are outlined throughout this work, the only alternative that 
provides comparative philosophy with a set of tools suited specifically for its 
method of analysis. This work has a tiered structure with each chapter 
focusing on one aspect of the new methodology while resting on all that 
precedes it. The largest portion of this dissertation deals with the work of 
Nagarjuna and Nietzsche and, while the areas of comparison between these 
thinkers vary, it should be remembered that the structure of this work is set 
out to emphasise and aid in the understanding of the proposed method of 
comparative philosophy. With this method, comparative philosophy may 
proceed like never before, that is, with all the tools necessary to adequately 
fulfil its function. 
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Abbreviations 
In order to assist the reader a brief list of commonly cited texts is presented 
here. Where possible, and applicable, textual references are formatted by 
title, chapter in roman numerals, and section numbers. Where this has not 
been possible page numbers of the relevant translation have been supplied. 
The titles of works by Nagarjuna are given in transliterated form and the titles 
of works by Nietzsche are given in English, as this is the most commonly used 
method of citing the works of both authors. With regards to Nietzsche's works 
a `13 ' after the initial title abbreviations refer to prefaces and forewords, where 
applicable, as well as the 'Prologue' to Z. 
Nagarjuna's works have been abbreviated as follows: 
Acin Acintyastava 
Bod Bodhicittavivara ri, a 
Loc Lokatitastava 
Lugs Lugs kyi bstan-bcos shes-rab sdong-po 
MK MOlamadhyamakakarika 
Rat Rajapartikatha-ratnamala or Ratnavali 
Suh Suhrllekha 
Nietzsche's works have been abbreviated as follows: 
A 	The Anti-Christ 
BGE Beyond Good and Evil 
BT The Birth of Tragedy 
D 	Daybreak or The Dawn 
DD Dithyrambs of Dionysus 
E 	Ecce Homo 
GM On the Genealogy of Morals 
GS The Gay Science 
HAH Human, All Too Human 
HC Homer's Contest or Homer on Competition 
TI 	Twilight of the Idols 
PTG Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks 
SL 	Selected Letters of Friedrich Nietzsche 
UM Untimely Meditations 
WLN Writings from the Late Notebooks 
Z 	Thus Spoke Zarathustra 
Full bibliographical information can be found under "References". 
The Philosophy of Comparative Philosophy 
This work is first and foremost a critique of the methods of comparative 
philosophy so far proposed. It is necessary to state this at the outset, as the bulk 
of the material presented deals with the works of Nagarjuna and Nietzsche. It is 
imperative that the reader does not loose sight of the prime concern. The critique 
focuses on how both objectivity and relativity, each in their own way, undermine 
the effectiveness of any comparative enterprise. 
Objectivity and relativity can be conceived as either opposite extremes of the 
same plane or as being views travelling in different directions, intersecting briefly 
like the join on a cross. Either way, at the intersection, or midpoint, is a position 
that mediates between both extremes without holding them as mutually 
exclusive. This, if you will, is the middle path between an extreme that cannot be 
realised and another extreme that undermines both its own possibility and the 
possibility of any meaningful discussion. This middle path admits the uniqueness 
of each and every position . from which the world is viewed while situating all 
possible viewpoints within a boundary common to possible viewpoints. This is 
what is here termed perspectivism. 
Perspectivism, when taken up within the domain of comparative philosophy, 
provides the necessary foundation from which a meaningful comparison can be 
developed. A meaningful comparison is one that is able to show where two or 
more points of view converge, diverge, confirm, or contradict each other without 
resigning oneself to the incomparability of any two positions. Perspectivism is not 
syncretic; its value is in the subtle distinctions it shows in varying kinds of 
difference. The first chapter is dedicated to explicating the problems undermining 
comparative philosophy and the full benefit of taking perspectivism as the 
foundation for a comparative methodology. 
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Comparative philosophy is an important method for analysing texts and thinkers. 
It could even be said that all philosophy is really comparative philosophy, with its 
simplest form being a comparison between the reader's views and text under 
analysis. While there is no intention to pursue this claim, it does highlight the 
breath of what may come under the term of comparative philosophy, as Masson-
Oursel (1951: 6) attests to in writing that "the scope of comparative philosophy is 
universal history and cosmos". Comparative philosophy is generally used to bring 
together seemingly disparate texts and examining where they converge and 
diverge. One must be careful not to reduce one text to another, for this halts and 
undermines the comparative enterprise. When this is kept in mind, comparative 
philosophy can be utilised to examine familiar texts and problems from a different 
vantage point, with the potential to gain a deeper understanding of one or all of 
the texts or problems compared. This is supported by Rosan (1952: 56), who 
writes that "the key to comparative philosophy is ... the contrast of basic 
philosophical attitudes". Any attempts to criticise comparative philosophy in 
favour of some other form of cross-cultural interpretation or non-comparative 
cross-cultural philosophy are still doing comparative philosophy, having only 
dressed it up under a different name. Krishna (1986: 59) criticises comparative 
philosophy as being "in effect the comparison of all other societies and cultures in 
terms of the standards provided by the Western societies". Yet, Krishna (1986: 
68) concedes that "an objective universality of human reason ... ensures that 
there would be a fair repetition amongst the problems seen and the solutions 
suggested". Thus, irrespective of how one refers to it, comparative philosophy is 
crucial, not only for comparing and contrasting materials, but for widening one's 
conceptual schemata resulting in a deeper analysis of the texts and thinkers 
analysed. 
Part of the proposed methodology is bias, particularly personal bias. The full 
extent of the role of bias will not yet be apparent. It will be necessary here to 
detail my bias with regard to this work. The function of bias is acknowledged so 
the reader can acknowledge the development of this work in the same way bias 
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is acknowledged for each thinker within the case study. The most apparent 
aspect of the author's bias is that of underlying unity or absolute interconnection. 
The pre-Socratics couched unity in terms of water, being, becoming, or the prime 
aggregate, to name a few instances. In the Hindu doctrines it arises as Brahman 
saguna and is central to advaita Vedanta. In Islam it is the doctrine of tawhid. 
This should suffice to show that an acceptance of unity is not unfounded. In the 
following chapter it will be argued that a rejection of the interconnection of all that 
exists, with preference for relativity, removes the possibility of meaningful 
communication. For these reasons the author works from the acceptance of the 
interconnection of all that is, hence the acknowledgement of underlying unity. 
The ramifications and application of the solutions proposed in the first chapter 
are played out through a case study, which forms the bulk of this work. The 
reader will notice the contiguity of each topic as the work proceeds yet some 
general outline is necessary. The case study begins with an examination of 
superficial differences, that is, aspects of each thinker's work which, at first sight, 
appear to be in conflict with the other thinker's work. While there are differences, 
they are shown to be only surface ones. Superficial differences are often the 
result of differing heritages and historical locations. This clears the ground, so to 
speak, for an analysis of similarities and congruencies between the thinkers, 
providing the content of chapter three, which, in turn, makes possible the study of 
real differences in chapter four. 
The case study used within this work does not purport to develop either a 
comprehensive or an exhaustive study of the real differences between Nagarjuna 
and Nietzsche; again the focus is directed and specific topics are discussed so 
that the varying degrees of difference can be highlighted. This is so that the 
reader can understand how the methodological issues relating to difference can 
be applied and, when done so, how this application brings forth a deeper and 
more fruifful understanding of both thinkers. The reader is encouraged when they 
strongly disagree with a particular interpretation of either thinker used within the 
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case study to focus not on the analysis of these particular thinkers but rather on 
the manner in which this comparative methodology works to provide a greater 
depth in the analysis of any thinker, especially when comparing two or more from 
varying times, cultures, perspectives, etc. 
It is necessary to make some comments on the manner in which the works of 
Nagarjuna and Nietzsche are approached. In Nietzsche's case this is easier as 
there are more details available to us regarding the manner and production of his 
various works than there are with regard to Nagarjuna's existent works. I read 
Nietzsche's works chronologically. This way we can attempt to understand why 
Nietzsche turned in one particular direction rather than another or why he 
adopted a different stance and dismissed an earlier one. Nagarjuna, on the other 
hand, wrote for varying audiences, including, but not limited to, royal patrons and 
Buddhist and non-Buddhist dialectical adversaries. Judging from the differences 
in expression it is possible to see that Nagarjuna's works are directed to 
individuals at varying stages of development and realisation. This is important, 
for Nagarjuna's advanced works do not eclipse those directed towards 
beginners, while Nietzsche's later works do, to some degree, supplant his earlier 
ones. No attempt is made to completely justify either approach. However, the 
value of such reading should become apparent through the comparison. 
On the issue of translation, it is necessary to stifle one possible criticism of the 
comparison of Nagarjuna and Nietzsche. A criticism that could be asserted is that 
the comparison presented here is of minimal value because the author 
understands little of the original languages, within which the thinkers compared 
wrote, and that the study is a comparison of translations rather than original 
texts. While it can, to some degree, be accepted that the value of the comparison 
and the insights gained are to some extent based on the quality of the 
translations used, this in no way undermines this dissertation. Organ (1975: 13) 
argued that it "does not follow" that an "ignorance of the original language 
disqualifies one as [an] interpreter". This is drawn from the examples of Max 
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Muller who knew Sanskrit and whose "writings on Indian philosophy are not 
reliable" and of G. R. Malkani who "is a reliable authority on Indian philosophy" 
without knowing Sanskrit (Organ 1975: 13). Raju (1992: vii) wrote that "the 
language barrier is likely to confront every writer on comparative philosophy" and 
as such we must accept our "dependence on translations as inevitable for any 
treatment of comparative philosophy". 
Furthermore, good translations have plenty of room for several varying 
interpretations, as do the originals. While it is accepted that "the way a text is 
translated in turn determines how it will be read", that is, reflecting the 
understanding of the translator, it is not necessary that there be "an infinite 
number of equally bad translations and no good ones" (Garfield 2002: 247). To 
accept this position would render all communication, let alone the possibility of 
learning another language, impossible, due to gross misunderstanding. This is 
not to deny these issues, merely to acknowledge that, when pursued to their 
logical conclusion, these views are seen to be absurd. The translations used 
here have been widely used for many such purposes. Beyond this, the 
translations used have been widely accepted within the academic community 
and, where possible, original texts have been consulted with the aid of native 
speakers, so that the analysis is as close to what the thinkers presented as 
possible. 
The method of comparative philosophy proposed here differs from other 
comparative methods in two key areas. The first is the development of 
perspectivism as the basis for comparative study. Perspectivism bypasses the 
contradictions inherent in both objectivity and relativity, providing a foundation for 
comparative philosophy whose structural integrity is more solid than previous 
methods. This is because the basis of previous comparative methodologies, 
when examined, threaten to undermine the whole comparative enterprise. The 
second, following from perspectivism, is a more developed understanding of 
difference with a distinction between superficial differences and real differences. 
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The result of these differences is a method of comparative philosophy that is 
better equipped than previous methodologies to compare and understand where 
any number of thinkers or traditions converge and diverge. A case study has 
been included to show how the proposed methodology may be applied. It is 
intended that the principles developed here will provide future endeavours with 
the groundwork from which fruitful comparative studies can be made. 
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Chapter 1 - The Methodology of Comparative Philosophy 
Comparative philosophy addresses content, context, and form. It requires a 
sound methodological basis. Comparative philosophy, founded on either the 
acceptance of relativity or the pursuit of objectivity, is both flawed and incapable 
of providing the necessary stability for any comparative enterprise. This chapter 
is not a comprehensive analysis of all the methodological issues of comparative 
philosophy. Rather, my focus is on relativity, objectivity, bias, context, and the 
affect these have on comparative enterprises. In doing so, it will be argued that 
perspectivism, and the understanding of difference that it entails, avoids and 
resolves the main issues within the domain of comparative philosophy. 
Some comparative methodologies contain the assertion that objectivity is 
paramount for a neutral and meaningful analysis. One reason that objectivity is 
stressed is to overcome individual bias. This is especially problematic for 
comparative philosophy as there is, in one sense, a 'double dose' of bias. This 
'double dose' arises on the one hand from the original materials compared and 
on the other hand from the individuals making the comparison, increasing in 
complexity the wider the analysis. Bias, irrespective of the amount, will affect any 
work, especially the work of comparative philosophers. There is no point 
attempting to hide from it or, even worse, to undermine the value of an entire 
methodology merely because something unavoidable appears unmanageable. 
Rather, by acknowledging the existence of bias it becomes possible to see the 
influence and purpose it has within any work. 
Masson-Oursel acknowledged the existence of bias when developing the 
material for an early work on the methodology of comparative philosophy. He 
wrote that "the [comparative] methodologist will find no difficulty in remarking that 
everything more or less resembles or differs from everything else in accordance 
with the disposition or ingenuity of the observer; and that the most capricious 
similitudes and unexpected differentiations present themselves to our gaze, 
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provided we know how to vary appropriately the angle of vision from which the 
fact is perceived" (Masson-Oursel 1926: 39). This is problematic as it may lead to 
the author of the comparison merely reading their own implicit bias into the 
material compared producing the "capricious similitudes and unexpected 
differentiations" through an artificial and forced "angle of vision". This too is 
informative because it illustrates the subjectivity of the author, but this was not 
Masson-Oursel's concern. 
Masson-Oursel does not explore the possibility that any appropriate "angle of 
vision" could merely be the biased position of the observer. This is 
understandable in light of his (1926: 66) positivist background. This meant that 
the "angle of vision" was scientifically determined and the comparative 
methodology was scientifically objective. Masson-Oursel made his positivism 
explicit in only a few places, and even then only mentioned in passing. His 
positivism is perhaps a product of its time, something Masson-Oursel (1951: 8) 
later came to doubt. Positivism is problematic because it unnecessarily narrows 
the scope and application of philosophy and comparative philosophy. Positivism 
opens the door to more contentious issues, such as 'human relativity' discussed 
below, merely because other possibilities are not verified by the domain of 
science. 
Panikkar also realised that bias is inevitable, pointing out that when bias is 
examined it is done so through the bias of another. He (1989: 121) stated that "a 
critical comparative philosophy will have to ask about the kind of philosophy or 
philosophical attitude it assumes when doing comparative philosophy". 
Comparative philosophy requires a 'doubling back', meaning that after 
developing a fruitful 'angle of vision' that 'angle of vision' itself must be analysed 
to determine why it was done so. Panikkar (1989: 122) stated this succinctly, 
writing that comparative philosophy "appears as a philosophy that studies the 
possible conditions of its own philosophising". In studying the possible conditions 
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of its own philosophising, comparative philosophy requires itself to examine the 
possible areas where bias affects the analysis it makes. 
Bias can, and does, have the capacity to undermine the value of any 
comparative analysis. Panikkar (1989: 123) felt that "comparative philosophy 
cannot accept a method that reduces all those visions to the view of one single 
philosophy". I agree that such a method is more likely to inform the reader of the 
author's bias, rather than furthering the understanding of the philosophies 
compared, being nothing more than a syncretic reduction of the materials 
compared. Bahm (1977: 26) attests to this in stating that if one is only familiar 
with their own views then one "must judge the other in terms of what he [or she] 
already knows" to the effect that one's bias becomes their standard with an 
inability to "appreciate how well [other philosophical systems] can function as 
standards". However, this can be a double edged sword in that this should not 
overlook the possibility that unity may be found within differing philosophical 
traditions despite differences in form, expression, language, and application as 
such congruent elements manifest themselves uniquely according to the tradition 
within which they are found. Furthermore, it is not possible to conceive of a 
position without bias, or as Panikkar (1980: 258) calls it "a neutral ground in the 
human arena", as "the very notion is self-contradictory because such a ground 
would not be human". The outcome of this is that comparative philosophy "is not 
philosophically neutral [enough] to perform the role of a truly comparative 
philosophy" (Panikkar 1989: 125). Panikkar seems to argue that comparative 
philosophy is caught between syncretic reductionism and inhuman objectivity, a 
rock and a hard place. Yet, if bias is inevitable, then for Panikkar comparative 
philosophy is necessarily doomed from the beginning. However, this conclusion 
can only be accepted if emphasis is placed on overcoming bias in pursuit of 
objectivity. The methodology proposed here does not accept this conclusion. 
Tuck (1990), in agreement with Panikkar, argued that objectivity, within 
comparative philosophy, is unachievable. However, he (1990: 9-10) went further 
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by saying that the pursuit of objectivity is misdirected. According to Tuck, 
isogesis is inevitable in all comparative methodologies. lsogesis is "a 'reading 
into' the text that often reveals as much about the interpreter as it does about the 
text being interpreted" (Tuck 1990: 9-10). Unlike Panikkar, Tuck (1990: 10) was 
not deterred by the fact that this is in unconscious phenomenon, nor found it 
problematic, because isogesis, or bias, is "inevitable in all readings of texts: it is 
not a failure of understanding but the evidence of it". Tuck's use of isogesis is 
useful for comparative philosophy, for in realising the inevitability of a 'reading 
into' it is possible for the interpreter to make explicit their bias, thus minimising 
the 'double dose' of bias. While Panikkar (1989: 125) undermines comparative 
philosophy due to its lack of philosophical neutrality, for Tuck comparative 
philosophy is only possible due to its lack of neutrality. According to Tuck, 
comparative philosophy cannot be objective, yet a fruitful study will result if the 
reader is informed of the interpreter's bias. The acknowledgement of bias 
ensures a better understanding of the position and intention of the comparison. 
Furthermore, doing this reduces a misrepresentation of the thinkers and texts by 
placing it back on the interpreter. Tuck's argument redeems comparative 
philosophy from the pursuit of objectivity. 
Relativity is another issue threatening to undermine comparative philosophy. It is 
especially problematic for comparisons of vastly disparate traditions and thinkers, 
such as the comparison proposed in the following chapters, but it is also relevant 
to thinkers within the same tradition that differ by time, location, culture etc. The 
argument for relativity rests on the fact that between any two or more thinkers 
there are major differences such as culture, language, moral values, historical 
background, etc. The argument asserted is that such differences are not 
reconcilable, thus there is no common ground. Garfield (2002: 232-233) takes 
this position, stating that "to the extent to which we consider traditions to be 
radically distinct from one another, it is hard to see how productive cross-cultural 
interpretation can take place at all" while overlooking the fact that he does cross-
cultural comparisons without any attempt to overcome this issue. It will be argued 
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that this is problematic for comparative philosophy because it undermines all 
attempts to make any common points between thinkers and traditions. Examples 
of where relativity has been incorporated into comparative philosophy will be 
discussed and the argument developed intends to show that each attempt a) 
limits the potential of the comparative analysis and b) that it is possible to avoid 
incorporating such a position. After a discussion of relativity it will be argued that 
perspectivism bypasses the problems of both mild and extreme relativity. 
Masson-Oursel accepted relativity. His reason was that "comparative method 
consists neither in identity nor in distinction" which is problematic because it 
would either "infer like laws from a multiplicity of facts" or it would "specify the 
irreducible originality of empirical data" (Masson-Oursel 1926: 44). Again, the 
alternatives are either syncretic reductionism or inhuman objectivity, both of 
which, as has been shown, are untenable. Yet, Masson-Oursel (1926: 42) claims 
that two seemingly distinct concepts or ideas can share identity, somewhat like 
family resemblance. Shared identity would be established if the disparate ideas 
had analogous functions and positions within their respective philosophies. This 
is Masson-Oursel's tentative solution to syncretic reductionism. For each idea, 
identity remains distinct, due to expression, culture, and philosophical tradition. 
For, without such a distinction, all cultures and all philosophical traditions 
throughout the history of humanity would be exactly the same. Within this 
dissertation it will be proposed that two concepts or ideas from differing 
philosophical traditions are more than merely analogous, as Masson-Oursel 
(1926: 44-51) would like to claim. 
Pei and Geertz use the existence of multiple languages in support of relativity. 
Pei (1962: 109) states that language is a "highly relative phenomenon", because 
it "assumes a multiplicity of forms". Yet, Pei (1962: 109) contradicts this by 
asserting that "the purpose of language is absolute" as its function is always to 
"transfer meaning from one human mind to another", which in turn would 
establish a "community of understanding" (Pei 1962: 110). Geertz (1973: 14) 
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supports Pei's conception of a `community of understanding' as seen by the 
assertion that cultures are "interworked systems of construable signs" and that 
"meaning varies according to the pattern of life by which it is informed". That 
language is a "highly relative phenomenon that "varies according to the pattern of 
life" shows that both Pei and Geertz accept relativity, if not generally, at least 
within the domain of language. However, both did not fail to notice the 
commonalities that allowed `communities of understanding' to be established. 
This is akin to those who "from a multiplicity of paths ... try to conclude the non-
existence of a single and invariable doctrine, or even any doctrine at all" (Guenon 
2001a: 87). This would amount to acknowledging dialectical variances and 
denying the existence of a language common to a people in the same breath. 
However, if relativity of language is not accepted then there is another possible 
solution. Neither Pei nor Geertz explicitly drew out this solution, but it can be 
argued from their premises. From the fact that languages differ, while 
acknowledging that their purpose is the same, we can conclude that language is 
perspectival. 
There is an easier and more effective way to reject relativity. Schuon (1975:7) 
states that "relativism consists in declaring it to be true that there is no such thing 
as truth" which is self-refuting and thus contradictory. Relativism is false "for on 
what grounds would it be possible to judge when one denies, implicitly or 
explicitly, the possibility of objective judgement" (Schuon 1995: 16). Guenon 
(2001: 31) shares this view, stating that "it is not for us to justify the 
contradictions that seem inherent in `relativism' in all its forms". The contradiction 
lies in the fact that to assert relativism "then the definition of relativity is equally 
relative, absolutely relative, and our definition has no meaning" (Schuon 1995: 
36-7). Schuon (1975: 16) felt that the contradiction of relativism is highlighted for 
the individual by "becoming aware of its own ontological dependence in relation 
to that one and only Being from Whom it is itself derived and Whom it manifests 
in its own way". Bahm (1977: 30), in documenting various kinds of relativism, 
hints at the possibility that the advocates of relativism are implicitly "advocating a 
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kind of universalism". While this appears like Schuon's view, this universalism is 
that of the absolutely relative and we must conclude that Bahm either choose to 
ignore this or was unaware of the self-refuting nature of relativism in all its forms. 
Bahm does not provide a solution to the problem of relativity within the domain of 
comparative philosophy. It is the acceptance of this dependence by all 
individuals, to use Schuon's words, that gives rise to what is here termed 
perspectivism. However, Schuon does not call the position he outlined 
perspectivism. 
It has been argued that the pursuit of objectivity and the acceptance of relativity 
are both untenable and unnecessary within comparative philosophy. Both 
undermine the possibility of a comparative philosophical methodology. Objectivity 
places too strict, and unachievable, demands on the methodological approach, 
rendering comparative philosophy impossible. Relativity strips away all possible 
subject matter on the grounds that comparison is untenable, leaving comparative 
philosophy to be a field devoid of content. A solution to these two issues can be 
found through the position of perspectivism. Perspectivism states that all possible 
perspectives exist within common limits, thus differences cannot be irreducible, 
yet each perspective occupies a space that is separate and distinct from all other 
possible perspectives, thus an objective 'space' is unattainable. The common 
limits provide the domain within which meaningful comparisons can occur, in that 
the conclusions drawn will potentially have meaning for all perspectives, in as far 
as each perspective approaches these limits, while acknowledging that the 
variation that occurs gives insight into the particular perspective, rather than 
undermining the analysis altogether. Thus perspectivism is not undermined by 
the inhumanness of objectivity, nor is it self-refuting like relativity, but provides a 
position from which comparative philosophy can meaningfully compare materials. 
It may be useful to furnish this outline of perspectivism with a few examples. In 
one sense we could say "one must not consider only the point of arrival, which is 
always the same, but also the point of departure, which differs according to the 
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individual" (Guenon 2001a: 86). This is reflected in language for when we say 
that two people, one from the North Pole and one from the South Pole, meet at 
the equator we say they are meeting at the same equator not different ones. For 
a relativist it would be acceptable to say that the reader holds that two plus two 
equals four while the author holds that two plus two equals three. Within the 
relativist doctrine both are true and cannot be fruiffully argued about. For the 
perspectivist it is acceptable to say that both the reader and the author holds that 
two plus two equals four but in thinking about this equation the reader is thinking 
of apples and the author of oranges. The difference of apples and oranges is one 
of position while the agreement on the equation is part of the totality each of us 
takes part in. 
Perspectivism is necessary for the method of comparative philosophy. It provides 
the domain within which a meaningful comparison can take place. To rephrase 
this, we may say that it provides the "common horizon that can be a background 
for genuine collaboration and conversation in a joint philosophical venture" 
(Garfield 2002: 169). Perspectivism exists implicitly within comparative 
philosophy, its elements of perspectivism are evident in most methodologies but 
these remain largely peripheral and unexamined. In examining where elements 
of perspectivism are evident it will be shown that a) perspectivism is inherently 
useful for comparative analysis and b) that previous comparative philosophers 
implicitly drew on principles of perspectivism. 
The principles of perspectivism are evident in the work of Masson-Oursel, 
Radhakrishnan, Mukerji, Liat, and Panikkar. Evidence of Masson-Oursel (1951: 
8) moving away from relativity towards perspectivism is in the shift of focus from 
part to whole, stating that "each mind is ... a 'total part' of humanity". Here, the 
focus is on the essential relationship between part and whole, with "each mind" 
being connected through "humanity", similar to the way that each perspective 
relates to the total limits of all possible perspectives. Radhakrishnan (1951: 4) 
gave weight to the 'common ground' in stating that "the fundamentals of human 
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experience, which are the data for philosophical reflection, are everywhere the 
same". This does not imply that everyone has the same experience but, in 
accordance with perspectivism, the limits of human experience make up the 
common ground, the result of which is that we can share and relate to others 
through similar experiences. From another angle, it is agreed that "there is no 
convention-independent reality ... which could be truth-making" (Garfield 2002: 
52), just as there are a common range of conventions. Mukerji (1952: 5), despite 
being an advocate for contextualism, implicitly adhered to perspectivism in 
stating that "human reason has an identical pattern, and, consequentially, the 
universal laws of reason cut across the boundaries of diverse cultures with their 
conflicting ramifications". This is seen to be implicit perspectivism because 
Mukerji's argument bordered on the idea that, despite many real differences 
between any two thinkers, human limits exist, which do not change, irrespective 
of the position of the thinker. 
Liat (1951: 11) followed a similar line of argument when writing that "though the 
central problems of philosophy may be universally human and timeless, the 
setting of the problems and their solutions are determined by historical, 
sociological, and cultural patterns". Liat provided the most weight for 
perspectivism in acknowledging the universality of the problem and the 
uniqueness of the context. The result is that such problems are dealt with in a 
way such that they can "keep in constant touch with living men [and women] and 
be understood" (Liat 1951: 11). Perspectivism is partially evident and support for 
it can be found in the work of most comparative philosophers, in one form or 
another. These comparative thinkers each lend weight to the validity of 
perspectivism as the basis for any comparative enterprise. However, by not 
developing the perspectival method within their works they could not draw on the 
full value of this comparative method. 
However, by leaving perspectivism implicit, comparative philosophy falls prey to 
issues resolvable only through perspectivism. We may take Liat as an example 
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because the argument for perspectivism is most evident. For Liat (1951: 13) the 
possibility that comparative philosophy "may be biased" is problematic. To avoid 
this, the "comparison must do justice to every item compared", meaning that both 
the similarities and differences are given equal weight (Liat 1951: 13). He argued 
that the importance of examining differences is in avoiding the "false conviction 
that all philosophy or religion is essentially the same". This almost directly 
contradicts his (1951: 11) prior assertion that "the central problems of philosophy 
may be universally human and timeless". This contradiction arises because Liat, 
unlike Tuck, did not consider that bias makes comparative philosophy possible. 
Had he realised this, the necessity of perspectivism would have been 
established. Thus, by falling short of perspectivism, his methodology contained 
an irresolvable contradiction, which undermines the possibility of a fruitful 
comparison. 
Panikkar also edged towards perspectivism without fully realising its implications. 
Panikkar (1989: 129) made a crucial step by asking, "if truth is one, how can 
there be a plurality of philosophies, each of them claiming ultimate truths"? Yet, 
he leaves this question unresolved, with the feeling that it is unresolvable. While 
this question is too big to provide a definite answer here, a tentative answer is 
possible through perspectivism. Someone who accepts perspectivism would 
respond that, although truth is one, it may be expressed in many different ways, 
where differences of expression, and more generally, of vantage point, should 
not compromise the idea of truth itself. Thus, perspectivism is able to resolve the 
relationship between the one and the many, or the absolute and the contingent, 
where Pan ikkar could not. 
Krausz's work on multiplism that is closest to perspectivism, yet the implications 
of multiplism fall short of covering the breadth of perspectivism. Multiplism states 
that "objects-of-interpretation characteristically answer to a multiplicity of ideally 
admissible interpretations" (Krausz 1997: 415). This is akin to perspectivism in 
that both accept that object can be observed and understood from more than one 
22 
perspective correctly. Krausz (1997: 415) continues to assert that "among 
multiple admissible interpretations one may have good reasons for rational 
preferences", again something affirmed by perspectivism. Also, we are told that 
according to multiplism "objects-of-interpretation are co-created by text and 
interpreter" (Krausz 1997: 416) and perspectivism affirms this in holding that the 
significant objects are determined by the position of the perspective in relation to 
the common ground. However, we are already beginning to see the divergence 
between perspectivism and multiplism. An important component of perspectivism 
is the acceptance that all possible perspectives are formed within a common 
ground. These common limits allow all perspectives to be comparable. The 
common limits also mean that there are views that are inherently 'wrong' in as far 
as they purport to outside the common limits. While both perspectivism and 
multiplism agree that some interpretations are 'better' than others, only 
perspectivism situates all perspectives within set limits, giving it the ability of 
determining whether any given interpretation is admissible or not. In this sense 
we can say that perspectivism includes multiplism but not vice versa. 
Common to these moves towards perspectivism is an attempt to understand the 
role of difference within comparative analyses. Some philosophers, like Krishna, 
Fleming, and Scharfstein, have argued that the role of comparative philosophy is 
to examine differences between philosophical systems in order to show the 
originality and richness of the various intellectual traditions that have cropped up 
throughout the history of humanity. Others have argued that an analysis of 
differences will result in a greater acceptance of other intellectual traditions and 
the potential for a wider and deeper understanding of our intellectual heritage. 
While these outcomes may be beneficial in their own right, it will be argued that 
such treatments of difference unnecessarily limit the function of difference within 
comparative philosophy. The proposal made here is that, building from the 
contextual/decontextual distinction, a study of levels of difference within 
comparative philosophy can yield a greater understanding of the similarities and 
differences between texts and thinkers. Furthermore, such an analysis of the 
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levels of difference makes it possible to understand why some differences 
necessarily occur. 
Krishna and Fleming offer two alternative examinations of difference. Krishna too 
(1986: 68) moved towards perspectivism in an attempt to understand difference, 
stating that "of course" there is a universality of human problems and that this is 
of only "momentary interest except for those [whose aim] ... is to prove that all 
worthwhile things originated with them and were borrowed by others". Following 
this, Krishna (1986: 69) argued that it is important to focus on differences 
because it "makes one look afresh at the world with a renewed sense of wonder 
and novelty". However, this position unnecessarily narrows all possible 
comparative analysis as it can equally be argued that the universality of human 
problems and their solutions can provide a renewed sense of wonder when it is 
realised that those problems, and their solutions, arose independently in different 
intellectual traditions, while sharing many crucial points. Krishna's emphasis on 
difference undermines the value of an analysis of similarities, resulting in a 
narrow conception of difference within comparative philosophy. 
On the other hand, Fleming felt that an analysis of difference within comparative 
philosophy would result in a greater understanding of self and other. For Fleming 
(2003: 260), the aim of comparative philosophy is to develop a better 
understanding of two or more philosophical systems or intellectual traditions. In 
doing so, the natural starting point for such a comparison is interpreting "the new 
and unfamiliar by comparing it with that with which we are already familiar" 
(Fleming 2003: 260). In other words, the other is, at least initially, understood in 
terms of the self. It is not until both similarities and differences are identified that 
a better understanding of each can be established. According to Fleming (2003: 
260-61) this would widen our conception of that with which we are familiar. This 
outcome, while idealistic, is admirable. 
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However, Fleming did not hold a consistent view regarding the proposed 
outcome of comparative analysis. He (Fleming 2003: 265) went on to write 
"comparisons of very different philosophical cultures and communities cannot be 
expected (even in theory) to culminate in pure philosophical homogeneity: it is 
arguable that such philosophical (and cultural) homogeneity is not even a 
desirable goal, diversity being the spice of life and thought". While it is agreed 
that "pure philosophical homogeneity" is untenable and that diversity is "the spice 
of life", it can still be argued that the essential similarities between diverse 
philosophical systems and intellectual traditions are informative as to what it 
means to be human. Furthermore, differences can show the range of possible 
human expression. Realising this would contribute to widening our acceptance of 
other philosophical systems and intellectual traditions, even more than Fleming's 
methodologically narrow treatment of difference. 
Scharfstein's approach to difference is different again; one that shows how 
informative an analysis of difference can be for comparative philosophy. For 
Scharfstein (1989: 86) "the question is not whether the differences exist, because 
they do, but what we should make of them". Scharfstein (1989: 86) went on to 
assert that a study should examine why differences between philosophical 
systems and intellectual traditions exist and how such differences have affected 
the content or form of the text or thinker studied. Support for this approach is 
within the idea that throughout the history of humanity, philosophers have not 
been discussing the "same old problems", but they have "spent a great deal of 
time discussing recurrent problems" (Copleston 1980: 120). The discussions 
surrounding recurrent problems will differ with each subsequent discussion. What 
is of interest for the comparative philosopher is a) why such problems are 
recurrent and b) how and why the differences in discussion occur. In doing so 
"the very perception that discloses uniqueness discloses similarity", which allows 
experience to be cumulative, so that it may be learnt from (Scharfstein 1989: 86). 
This approach, and understanding, of difference makes possible a greater 
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comparative analysis and, in doing so, Scharfstein went further than Fleming's 
attempt to widen what we are familiar with. 
The question for comparative philosophy now is how to treat and understand the 
differences that arise between the philosophies compared. However, many 
comparative philosophers disagree exactly how and what differences should be 
analysed within comparative philosophy. Many comparative philosophers agree 
that for an understanding of a philosophy one must understand the context within 
and through which it arose. However, beyond this there does not seem to be 
much agreement, especially with regards to what should be included in context 
as well as how to proceed, once the context is established. As Garfield (2002: 
152) has pointed out, "comparative philosophy often imports hermeneutical and 
philosophical methods to the study of non-Western texts that succeed in 
distorting or simply missing the significance of those texts ... in the context of 
their home cultures". These disagreements have a large impact on the results of 
any comparative study. This affects the value of the research and the depth of 
analysis. 
Thinkers who have tackled the issue of the methodology of comparative 
philosophy, such as Liat, Dasgupta, Mukerji, Geertz, Panikkar, and Tuck, all 
agree that an understanding of the context within which the text occurred or the 
thinker wrote must be considered. For Liat (1951: 15), a "closer and more 
adequate evaluation may be attained" if comparative philosophy incorporated an 
examination of "social conditions and cultural patterns on the development of 
philosophical thoughts" in its methodology. For Geertz (1973: 9), "most of what 
we need to comprehend a particular event, ritual, custom, idea or whatever is 
insinuated as background information before the thing itself is directly examined". 
Panikkar (1980: 370) asserted that "comparative studies have to be historically 
situated and temporally understood". Furthermore, Tuck (1990: 10) asserted that 
thinkers and texts need to be treated within their "historical, cultural, and 
intellectual context" in order to add depth to the analysis and reduce 
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misrepresentation. This lends weight to the value of perspectivism which values 
context due to its influence on historical, cultural, and intellectual perspectives. 
Two examples of where a context-based analysis has been emphasised are 
those of Dasgupta and Mukerji. Dasgupta (1952: 3) argued that "it is only when 
we study [texts] in their historical perspective that the details of differentiation and 
their magnificent richness appear in their true perspective". Mukerji (1952: 4-5) 
follows on from this with the idea that "the problems of philosophy and their 
solutions are intimately connected with the spirit of the age in which they made 
their appearance" and that "it is positively dangerous to offer a modern theory for 
the solution of an ancient problem" or visa versa. This is understandable 
considering how seemingly periphery as issues and events contribute to the 
expression, propagation, and solutions proposed to the predominant problem. It 
is positively dangerous to try to give validity to the religious doctrine by 
attempting to verify it scientifically because its acceptance, and 'validity', hangs 
on the acceptance of the theory it is 'validated' by l . Perspectivism, in 
acknowledging the uniqueness of each position, realises that context is important 
for the understanding of texts and thinkers. Yet, to assert that it is only when 
historical context is considered ignores the fact that decontextualisation is, even 
minimally, inevitable and, to some extent, necessary for a wider understanding. 
Further, to assert that modern solutions to ancient problems are positively 
dangerous does not include the possibility that a shift in perspective provides a 
better understanding of both the historical context and the contemporary 
environment. On top of this, it is not clear exactly what items need to be included 
in an analysis of context. It remains unclear as to how Liat's 'adequate 
evaluation', Geertz's 'comprehension of a particular', and Tuck's 'reduced 
misrepresentation' are to be achieved. 
1 This is not to deny the value that may be gained by bringing science and religion together. 
However, it should be kept in mind that to scientifically verify a religious doctrine, more often than 
not, reduces the doctrine to its merely physical aspects, and, not to deny these aspects, remains 
ignorant of the stereological and symbolic value of such doctrine. 
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Nasr (1972: 56) pointed out that a serious comparative study "must be a study of 
ways of thinking and of the matrices for determining different sciences and forms 
of knowledge in reference to the total vision of the universe and the nature of 
things". This is necessary for, if the analysis is going to be more than just a 
comparison of word forms, concepts carry with them social, political, and 
historical values that are not readily evident in the word forms used to convey the 
concept. In comparing philosophical systems it is vital that the intellectual 
traditions of each system, or in his (1972: 57) terms "the source of the 
'philosophy' in question", be understood so that their foundations can be 
compared. By starting with a contextualised analysis it is possible to examine 
and compare the aspects of a text or thinker on which the philosophical systems 
depend. With this, a major downfall for comparative philosophy, discussed by 
Nasr (1972: 58), is avoided, namely overlooking "the nature of the experience 
which the 'philosophy' in question is based and the total world view in which 
alone it possesses [full] meaning". It is necessary to insert 'full meaning' into this 
sentence as decontextualisation is to some degree inevitable and, meaning can 
still be extracted, according to the worldview within which the philosophical 
system is examined, though it must be acknowledged that it does not retain the 
full richness of its original context. Any attempt to deal with either similarities or 
differences must begin with a contextualised analysis. 
Of those commentators discussed above, only Geertz's (1973) discussion 
attempts to develop a concrete criterion for an analysis of context. While Geertz 
is discussing the process of anthropology his conclusions remain useful for 
comparative philosophy. Geertz (1973: 9) stated succinctly that "analysis, then, is 
sorting out the structures of signification". The structures of signification are the 
implicit bodies of meaning, contained within the social, political, and historical 
implications of the materials compared. Acknowledging such structures makes a 
deeper analysis possible, Geertz and Liat would agree on this issue. This method 
of analysis presupposes that texts "in some way form an integral structure" 
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(Sefler 1980: 257). This may be problematic, particularly for an analysis of 
thinkers who claim to be anti-systematic or who claim to make no assertions of 
their own. Yet, their self-consistency forms the integral structure, providing the 
structure of signification. By examining the structures of signification, 
comparative philosophy can show why certain expressions were necessary, or 
preferred, and how the context of the material influenced the content, form, and 
audience. 
It is important to examine texts and thinkers within their context, for not to do this 
would ignore key aspects of the material compared, limiting comparative 
philosophy. I think that Liat, Dasgupta, Mukerji, Geertz, Panikkar, and Tuck limit 
any possible comparison if their methodology does not also examine the 
components of a philosophical work within the boundaries of that work, to some 
degree independently of its historical, cultural, and intellectual context. 
Decontextualisation is, to some degree, inevitable because the condition under 
which a text is read is a separate context to the one it was written under. While 
this may seem trivial, to ignore this would be an oversight. Scharfstein (1989: 86) 
made this clear by arguing that "taking things out of context is essential" if it is to 
be understood. Interestingly, this supports Tuck's (1990: 10) view, that, to gain 
any understanding, individuals must relate what is to be understood in terms of 
themself. The reason for this is that anyone who wants to expand their 
understanding can only do so in terms of what they already understand. The 
result is that, irrespective of the source, the material to be understood will be, at 
lest initially, decontextualised. Scharfstein (1989: 84) went further in asserting 
that, in order to understand, material must be detached from its context and 
related to the contemporary background within which it is to be understood. This 
is important because, while a contextual analysis will aid in the understanding of 
the work as a whole and the significance of particular elements, a decontextual 
analysis can highlight the internal structure of a work and the relationship 
between its various elements. 
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Decontextualised analysis has received less attention from comparative 
philosophers. Decontextual analysis examines and compares the framework of 
philosophical systems. These relations cannot be examined when the analysis is 
strictly contextual. A decontextual analysis is better suited for examining aspects 
of a philosophical system such as thesis, elements, and the relationship between 
thesis and elements. Sefler (1980: 256) stated that "elements can be logical 
entities, linguistic categories, epistemological constructs, metaphysical principles, 
etc." but they should also include presuppositions, descriptions, prescriptions, 
problems examined, the standpoint taken, and the solutions suggested. As 
"different problems arise from different standpoints", the choice of premise 
determines whether "a problem may become significant or not" (Broccard 1982: 
246)2 . Comparative philosophy should not only examine the problems, methods, 
and solutions of various thinkers, but also delve deeper, comparing the reasons 
for the specific problems, methods, and solutions tackled by such thinkers. There 
are many elements that can be discussed, as well as the interrelation of 
elements, with the focus depending on the thinkers compared. 
Scharfstein rejected the emphasis on a context-based analysis on similar 
grounds to those used for rejecting relativism. Scharfstein (1989: 94) argued that 
"if we assume that nothing can be understood outside of its particular context, the 
same must be true of the doctrine of contextualism ... and so on". Like relativism, 
contextualism is self-refuting. That is, if context is all important, then so is the 
context of the contextual analysis, neither of which can be fully conveyed, which 
leads down a self-perpetuating path, limiting the success of any comparative 
analysis. Mukerji's (1952: 5) emphasis on context is loosened in stating that a 
useful comparative approach would be to take "the Eastern and the Western 
2  While these quotes are from discussions on structuralism and systematology respectively, I am 
arguing neither for or against these types of analysis. There is neither the time nor the space 
within the scope of this study to adequately examine reasons for or against both structuralism and 
systematology. It is sufficient to state that the aspects discussed are beneficial for comparative 
philosophy and it is for this reason only that they have been considered. 
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philosophical systems and supplement the arguments of one by those of the 
other, thus helping the clarification of issues appearing in either of the two 
outlooks", which to some degree pre-empts Scharfstein's view. This is not to 
suggest that context is not important, just that context is not all-important. It 
would be optimal to treat context as more important for some areas of analysis 
and less important in others. This relates to the aforementioned limit in the 
methodology of Liat, Dasgupta, Geertz, and Tuck. Both contextual and 
decontextual modes of analysis bring something to the study of texts and 
thinkers that neither mode of analysis can cover individually. Thus, to avoid these 
limits, and to give the greatest potential to any comparative enterprise, it is 
necessary to alternate between contextual and decontextual modes of analysis. 
If a contextualised analysis looks out from the philosophical system and 
understands that system within the context it occurs, then a decontextualised 
analysis looks into the philosophical system in order to understand that system in 
terms of its parts. An analysis of the parts of a philosophical system aims to show 
how that system works as a whole. This has many implications for comparative 
philosophy. A comparative contextual analysis would show how and why 
differences between systems occur and how differences in context can produce 
some common aspects within two differing systems. A comparative decontextual 
analysis would show how and why two seemingly similar aspects of differing 
philosophical systems work in vastly different manners within their respective 
systems as well as how and why two seemingly different aspects of differing 
philosophical systems share a common purpose within the structure of their 
respective systems. Rosan (1962: 240) proposed a similar approach, arguing 
that a multifaceted approach is better suited as it yields a more comprehensive 
analysis. By attempting to examine thinkers and texts both from a contextualised 
and decontextualised position, comparative philosophy can provide a greater 
depth to the understanding of the thinkers and/or texts compared. 
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Following Tuck, the usefulness of a decontextualised analysis can be developed. 
Tuck's (1990: 10-11) claim that there is a "difference between declaring that 
something essential and immutable has been 'discovered' about the ideas 
contained in these texts [used for comparison], on the one hand, and, on the 
other, constructing a context in which two intellectual traditions can be 
understood together". While the distinction between contextualised analysis and 
decontextualised analysis is important, these two tasks are not necessarily 
mutually exclusive. This was not acknowledged by Tuck. A comparative 
methodology that aimed at discovering something essential and immutable and 
then attempted to show that this discovery brought two intellectual traditions into 
a position where they could be fruitfully understood together would be in grave 
danger of producing nothing more than an exposition of the interpreter's bias. 
However, a comparative methodology that aimed at constructing a context in 
which two intellectual traditions could be examined together may indeed prove 
fruitful for the discovery of something essential and immutable. The combination 
of a contextualised and a decontextualised approach would provide such a 
context in which two intellectual traditions can be examined together. 
Perspectivism, in recognising the common ground of all perspectives, allows for 
a decontextualised analysis, while recognising the uniqueness of each 
perspective, allowing for a contextualised analysis. 
Fleming also supported the joint contextualised/decontextualised approach. As 
can be seen from his (2003: 259-60) comment that the "endeavour to see [texts] 
in their full context" is "an admirable if unachievable goal". While he 
acknowledges the value of contextual analysis, he admits that an analysis that is 
solely and completely contextualised is unachievable, like an objective position of 
analysis. Any time a text is read it is read, other than when it was written, it is, to 
some degree, out of context. While this may appear obvious it is important, it 
means that any attempt tà completely contextualise a text or thinker would 
inevitably result in some decontextualisation. This parallels and supports 
Scharfstein's argument in that it acknowledges the intrinsic value of 
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decontextualised analysis in the study of any work. For an attempt to examine a 
text or thinker both within their context and without their context may have a 
blurred boundary. This is because a contextualised element, such as place, may 
be brought to bear on a decontextualised element, such as the function of a 
particular idea, or vice versa, without this being explicitly acknowledged. This 
blurred boundary does not detract from the attempted analysis. While a strict 
demarcation between the two is not possible, by admitting that both forms of 
analysis are useful, each be brought to bear on the comparative study and a 
more comprehensive analysis is possible. 
Nakamura developed a criterion for contextual/decontextual analysis, arriving at 
similar conclusions. Nakamura (1974: 187) pointed out that "when we evaluate 
an idea or a concept, we have to do it in relationship to relevant or similar ideas 
or concepts". This is important because it can be carried out with both 
contextualised and decontextualised comparative analysis. However, he (1974: 
187) is unjustified in believing that "by means of this method we can evaluate 
[texts] objectively". The main reason for this, as Tuck stated, is that bias is, to 
some degree, inevitable. Furthermore, the re-contextualisation of a text, that is 
the context it is read under, differs according to the reader, ensuing that an 
objective evaluation is not possible. Another problem in Nakamura's (1974: 185) 
discussion is that parallel developments are too narrowly defined as "similar 
problems" and "similar concepts" that lead to "more or less similar solutions". 
This definition is problematic for the methodology proposed here as it limits 
comparative philosophy to the analysis of only that which is superficially similar, 
whereas an analysis of superficially different problems or concepts can be shown 
to have deeper similarities within the respective traditions. Nakamura (1974: 187) 
did make the important point that "similar assertions or similar wording may play 
different or even contrary roles in different historical contexts". Yet, he did not 
further say that different and contrary assertions or wording may play similar or 
even congruent roles in different historical contexts. 
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Comparative philosophy must recognise both contextual and decontextual 
methods of analysis. The result is a better understanding of where the texts or 
thinkers compared come together and diverge. Contextualised analysis can show 
where intellectual traditions had similar influences on the development of 
philosophical systems and where these influences differed. Furthermore, such an 
analysis would help to show why particular expressions were used. 
Decontextualised analysis can examine how differing elements within 
philosophical systems parallel the function of elements in other such systems. 
This type of analysis can also compare and contrast the premises, theses, 
results and solutions of separate philosophical systems. These are but a few 
examples of where both contextualised and decontextualised analysis can 
highlight similarities and differences within comparative philosophy. 
It is necessary to explain why an attempt to pursue an exclusively contextualised 
or decontextualised analysis is impossible, and fruitless, for comparative 
philosophy. On the one hand, it is impossible to occupy two different time 
periods, for two philosophical systems to be compared they must, to some 
degree, be separated from their original context. Comparative studies relate 
philosophical systems to the author's time and context, which means that an 
exclusively contextualised study is impossible. However, for comparative studies 
to gain a deeper understanding of the philosophical systems compared it is 
necessary for such systems to be understood in light of their intellectual 
traditions. Thus, an exclusively decontextualised analysis would also be fruitless. 
Realising this shows that there is no definite boundary between contextualised 
and decontextualised analyses. This does not invalidate this approach it merely 
shows that both approaches are mutually reinforcing and intimately connected. In 
fact, without such an explicit distinction the value and depth of all comparative 
studies would be reduced. 
The process of translation is akin to drawing similarities between texts and 
thinkers. The aim is to find some kind of congruence, between the original script 
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and the new language in the case of translation, or between one philosophical 
system and another such system in the case of comparative philosophy. In both 
cases the search is for corresponding equivalences. Panikkar (1989: 125) shared 
this view writing "translation means finding the corresponding equivalences 
(homomorphic equivalents) between languages". The goal is to show that an 
element within one language or philosophical system holds the equivalent 
position or function as an element within another language or philosophical 
system. However, it must be recognised that no attempt will be made here to 
'translate' one philosophical system into another, as this is liable to be nothing 
more than a syncretic reduction. Such reduction results in the "dramatic distortion 
of alien traditions through the imposition of hermeneutic and doxographic 
frameworks ... entirely foreign to the traditions themselves" (Garfield 2002: 169). 
This is because there are real differences between philosophical systems that 
are quite often more than just differences in their respective intellectual traditions. 
As a result of such differences, a search for homomorphic equivalences between 
philosophical systems should not be attempted. 
Krishna rejected the extreme pursuit of homomorphic equivalence. Krishna 
(1986: 65) was right to highlight the fact that, for any comparative philosophy, to 
translate one conceptual structure into another limits the potential understanding 
of and insight into the materials compared because it reduces one work to 
another. This problem is increased where there are differences of language and 
tradition. It would not even be possible to examine the same term in two or more 
occurrences within the work of one thinker as the possible change/gain/loss in 
meaning between two instances of the same word. However, the issue is liable to 
be unresolvable. Krishna's (1986: 65) solution was to examine the two concepts 
from within their respective positions, without privileging either, and if a parallel 
could be seen and understood then this would count as an informative 
comparison. This solution does bring comparative philosophy back from an 
untenable abyss and realises that this methodology may be informative. Yet, this 
is not an explicit criterion as to what it is to say that two elements from two 
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separate philosophical systems are similar, parallel, or even congruent. It would 
be informative to add that, while the form of an idea may differ, it can be said that 
the ideas are congruent if they occupy the same position or serve the same 
function, within their respective structures of signification. 
The blurred boundary between contextualised and decontextualised modes of 
analysis requires that difference, within comparative philosophy, be broken down 
into two distinct kinds, namely superficial and real. Superficial differences are 
differences between that are only apparent and, on closer examination, can be 
reconciled. Real differences are irreconcilable and show divergences between 
the materials compared. Without superficial differences no comparisons could be 
attempted, only contrasts. Without real differences there could be no 
demarcation of one system/tradition or another. While the sources of both kinds 
of difference are often the same, the way that each kind of difference is utilised 
within comparative philosophy is of vital importance for a comprehensive and 
meaningful comparative study. 
An important aspect of the study of difference is to understand where each kind 
of difference occurs. When comparing two or more thinkers or texts, it is possible 
to identify differences in a multitude of places, some contextual and decontextual. 
Some contextual differences include time, place, language, and culture. Culture 
is an umbrella term, covering elements such as history, heritage, religious 
background, philosophical background, economic background, political 
background, ethics and morals, and the social structure, to name but a few. 
Some decontextual differences include medium, style, purpose, audience, the 
prescriptions made, the problems tackled, and the interrelation of elements within 
the philosophical system. These are not meant to be exhaustive lists and only 
begin to hint at the possible areas in which differences occur. 
There is ambiguity regarding whether differences are superficial or real. A 
seemingly paradoxical solution to this ambiguity is to assert that most differences 
36 
are both superficial and real. In as far are there is a distinction between these 
kinds of difference, we can say that the content of these differences overlap. 
While a brief attempt to resolve this issue is made here, it should be understood 
that this distinction, and the relation between these types of difference, will 
become apparent through the remainder of this work. Each of the following 
chapters focuses on a separate aspect of the following argument. Materials often 
appear disparate, and many of the aspects of these materials that make them 
appear dissimilar, on closer inspection, can be seen to be closer than was 
previously thought. An analysis of superficial differences gives rise to the 
possibility of similarities between materials, the depth of which would not be 
possible without an understanding of superficial differences. It is only after an 
analysis of superficial differences that the analysis of similarities becomes, which 
in turn highlights real differences. 
The two types of difference, superficial and real, have vastly different functions 
and yield different results. Superficial differences do not undermine real 
differences. A main function of superficial differences is to show that materials 
can be brought together yielding a fruifful comparison, rather than discarding the 
project and feeling that the material is simply too different to compare. The study 
of superficial differences provides the groundwork for the study of similarities, 
which, in turn, makes possible the study of real differences. An examination of 
where separate materials converge reveals where they actually diverge. Such an 
analysis and understanding of difference is highly valuable for studies such as 
the one proposed here, of Nagarjuna and Nietzsche, where these thinkers are 
separated by large gaps in time, place, culture etc. While the solutions to the 
issues of comparative philosophy discussed here will be put to specific use within 
the comparison to follow, these solutions can be successfully applied to any 
study within the field of comparative philosophy in order to avoid the problems 
mentioned in this chapter. 
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Superficial differences and real differences occupy the same space. Both can be 
derived from the same material. Like the contextual/decontextual distinction, they 
are not mutually exclusive and their boundaries are somewhat indistinct. This 
may be considered problematic for some, but this is not an issue because the 
use each type of difference is diverse and each adds to the depth of the analysis. 
A quick example will help illustrate this point. Nietzsche wrote in German, also 
drawing from Greek, Latin, French, and other languages for emphasis, while 
Nagarjuna's texts were written in Sanskrit, with some texts only available in 
Tibetan and Chinese. This analysis, for both thinkers, draws on English 
translations. When their texts are translated into a common language, such as 
English, it can be seen that the words and concepts of primary importance to 
each thinker are not represented by words or concepts common to both 
thinkers3. It may appear that there is no common ground on which these thinkers 
can be compared. However, by remembering that separate intellectual traditions 
have separate conceptual schemata, the analysis can be shifted from how words 
and concepts are used to the form they take. The differences in the words used 
may, when the analysis considers why a particular form is given preference, be 
shown to be only superficial. Yet, at the same time, these concepts, whose 
respective functions are similar, may take separate, or even contradictory, forms 
for specific reason, which would mean that the difference is real. Thus the space 
of real and superficial differences is not mutually exclusive. 
So far, the treatment of the similarity between philosophical systems within the 
field of comparative philosophy has only been hinted at throughout this chapter. 
Yet, it remains elusive. A major reason for this is the difficulty in showing two 
separate things to be the same or even analogous. It is made even harder when 
the arguments of Goodman and Rudner are applied to discussions about the 
sameness of meaning. Goodman (1949: 1) began his discussion by asking, 
3 To my knowledge, there is no translator common to both of these thinkers. If there is, they have 
not been used within this study. While this may be taken up as an issue, particularly where there 
is a common translator, the methodological solution proposed here would not loose its value. 
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"under what circumstances do two names or predicates in an ordinary language 
have the same meaning"? Even though Goodman's concerns are strictly to do 
with language, and not philosophical systems or intellectual traditions, his 
discussion does raise issues that are of concern for the comparative philosopher. 
Goodman (1949: 2-3) examines two criteria for assessing the sameness of 
meaning a) "that two predicates have the same meaning if and only if there is 
nothing possible that satisfies one but not the other" and b) "that two predicates 
have the same meaning if and only if they apply to exactly the same things". 
In the field of comparative philosophy both criteria would undermine the 
application of a comparative methodology because a) the distinction between 
superficial and real differences would make the first criterion untenable and b) 
the fact that two philosophical systems have different foci would favour the 
interpretation that each system applies to different things which does not fulfil the 
second criterion. From this one could, with Goodman (1949: 6), conclude that "if 
difference of meaning is explained in the way I have proposed, then no two 
words have the same meaning". Rudner (1950: 117) built on Goodman's work to 
assert that "there are never different occurrences of the same word, and no two 
occurrences of the 'same' word can have the same meaning". This bodes ill for 
the comparative philosopher. 
However, both Goodman and Rudner overlook a crucial point. The focus of their 
task was to examine "ordinary language" (Goodman 1949: 1). Within ordinary 
language, people use words interchangeably, as if they were the same. This 
occurs so frequently that, using ordinary language, while a referent may be 
constant, the way that it is referred to changes. Rollins (1950: 40) incorporated 
this into the criticism, rejecting Goodman and Rudner, writing that "normally when 
4 It is interesting to note that this position can be rejected in the same manner, and for the same 
reasons, that Krishna rejected the pursuit of homomorphic equivalences, as discussed above (pp. 
32). Furthermore, Goodman and Rudner seem to be asserting an extreme form of relativity, 
which has been already rejected (pp. 17). 
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we assert that two words have the same meaning we are asserting the same 
kind of thing about their respective occurrences". It is conceivable that I can have 
two separate discussions on a given topic, one with a university professor, the 
other with a school child, and that while the two conversations cover the same 
material, each utilised vastly different expressions. The shift from form to function 
is important for maintaining the validity of comparative philosophy. 
The shift from form to function has practical implications for comparative 
philosophy. While it is accepted within this study that thinkers and texts say 
different things because they use different words, it must be recognised that 
some of the time these differences in form are merely superficial. It will be argued 
that by examining the function and position assigned to certain concepts within 
one philosophical system or intellectual tradition, the comparison of this with 
another philosophical system or intellectual tradition will show that the same 
aspect is evident in both though under a different sign in each. This approach 
can fall prey to a shallow analysis of the material by reading into the material a 
conceptual similarity rather than showing an actual similarity. However, while this 
is an actual concern for comparative philosophy, one dealt with throughout this 
chapter, it does not undermine the value of the comparative approach, nor does 
it detract from the possible depth of analysis achievable through the approach 
suggested here. It must be kept in mind when delving into comparative 
philosophy because the analysis of any philosopher "is always read against an 
interpretive backdrop provided by the philosophical presuppositions of the 
interpreter" (Garfield 1995: vii). It is difficult to develop a criterion illustrating how 
the same concept can take on different forms. Yet, without this type of approach 
comparative philosophy is reduced to the analysis of superficial similarities. 
Furthermore, the assertion that a concept can take on a multiplicity of forms is 
consistent with perspectivism, which holds that one thing can be seen from many 
different angles. The importance of this type of approach for comparative 
philosophy is most aptly seen through specific examples. I will illustrate this 
through the comparison of Nagarjuna and Nietzsche. 
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Comparative philosophy is undermined by both the pursuit of objectivity and the 
acceptance of relativity. Perspectivism was proposed as a solution to the 
problem of finding the 'space' where comparative philosophy is not marred by 
either a bias-free or self-refuting foundation. The acceptance of perspectivism 
entails an understanding of the distinctions between contextual and decontextual 
form of analysis and superficial and real differences. An understanding of these 
distinctions, as has been made throughout this chapter, results in a more 
comprehensive comparative study than would otherwise be possible. Despite the 
multiplicity of problems that comparative philosophy suffers, these issues do not 
reduce the value of the approach to materials made possible by this field of 
study. An attempt has been made to find solutions to these problems, particularly 
solutions that maintain the possibility of a comparative approach, rather than 
undermining this field of study. The concern of this chapter has been primarily 
theoretical, but the methodological suggestions take on a renewed importance in 
the following chapters as they are put into practice through a comparison of 
Nagarjuna and Nietzsche. 
Throughout the remainder of the work each chapter will focus on one aspect of 
the proposed methodology. Starting with superficial differences, moving onto 
similarities and congruencies, and finally to real differences, each chapter, 
utilising the joint contextual/decontextual analysis, will illustrate how each of 
these aspects are crucial to developing a meaningful comparative philosophy. 
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Chapter 2 — Superficial Differences 
The remainder of this dissertation will, through a case study of Nagarjuna and 
Nietzsche, illustrate how the methodology outlined in the previous chapter can 
be applied, with each subsequent chapter focusing on one aspect of the 
methodology in order to highlight the intricacies of its application. This chapter 
deals with superficial differences, that is, differences that are only surface 
deep. An examination of these differences is important because these 
differences are accepted as real differences, the misdiagnosis of which can 
halt any deeper analysis. 
For comparative philosophers, the emphasis on context requires a grasp of 
the relation of the work to the culture that surrounded it. Oldmeadow (2007: 
53) emphasises this, stating that it is "highly desirable that scholars, equipped 
with the proper tools and cognizant of the profound differences between 
traditional civilizations and the modern West, should illuminate the similarities 
and contrasts between the doctrines of different religious traditions". With this 
in mind, we can pursue an examination of context, mindful of this distinction. 
Nietzsche is easier than most other thinkers, due to the wealth of information 
available. Born Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche on October 15, 1844, to a 
Lutheran minister in Saxony, he studied theology, philology, and philosophy at 
the University of Bonn, became the professor of classical philology at Basel at 
the young age of twenty-four. With a scandal surrounding his first publication, 
along with ill health, Nietzsche left his professional post. This led to his 
frequent movement across Europe, writing incessantly, he produced a large 
body of work. He collapsed in the streets of Turin in 1889 and remained under 
constant care until his death on August 25, 1900. 
These facts, available in varying detail, roughly outline Nietzsche's life. 
Nietzsche's biography is frequently used to furnish an understanding of his 
philosophy, a point raised especially by Kaufmann (1956: 30 — 60), Nehamas 
(1985), Chamberlain (1996), and Cate (2003). Nietzsche even proposed that 
an individual's philosophy is "an instinct for a personal diet" and perhaps 
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"nothing other than the intellectual circuitous paths of similar personal drives" 
(D § 553) and is known to have "incorporated into his work numerous 
autobiographical elements" like "the figure of the philologist to symbolise the 
Faustian frustrations of the modern world" (Marchand 1996: 26). Parkes 
(1994: 8) writes that "Nietzsche came upon the idea of philosophy as 
autobiography early, and it informs the rest of his career". The most solitary 
figure that is Nietzsche can be seen to permeate throughout his writings and 
is read this way by numerous scholars. The life and times of Friedrich 
Nietzsche are a reasonable place to start the study of his work and it is a 
bonus that the information and resources are fairly fresh and accessible. 
On the other hand, Nagarjuna almost occupies the other extreme. Where 
information on Nietzsche is readily available, scholars of Nagarjuna cannot 
come to a consensus on when he lived. Most scholars agree that Nagarjuna 
approximately lived in or around the second century CE (Garfield 1995: 87, 
Walser 2005: 1, Williams 1989: 56). However, Nagarjuna has been placed as 
early as 33 BCE (Pandeya 1988: xi) and as recently as the fourth century CE 
(Walleser 1990: 15). Estimates regarding a particular duration range from 
about 113 — 213 CE (Robinson 1967: 22), 150 — 250 or 100 — 200 CE 
(Tachikawa 1997: 1), with the greatest degree of consent being 150 — 250 CE 
(lnada 1993: v, Kalupahana 1994:161, Nakamura 1992: 255, Yu-Kwan 1993: 
1). 
Beyond this, there is some difficulty as to what any scholar should make of 
the accounts of Nagarjuna's life. What is generally agreed upon is that 
Nagarjuna was born into a family of the Brahman caste in south India 
(Kalupahana 1994:161, Corless 1995: 526, Ramanan 2002: 25), but there is 
also the contradictory belief that he hailed from a "northern Deccan Brahman 
family" (Thapar 1966: 130) probably in the Andhra region (Williams 1989: 56). 
His parents sent him away as a child because astrologers had predicted his 
premature death at the age of seven (Walleser 1990: 6) with another account 
prophesising he would live seven years, seven months and seven days 
(Walleser 1990: 8). It is uncertain if he was specifically placed in a monastic 
order (Williams 1989: 56). He is believed to have acted as a sort of advisor to 
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a king (Corless 1995: 530, Kalupahana 1994:161, Ramanan 2002: 27, 
Walleser 1990: 7) who was "most likely to have lived in the Eastern Deccan" 
(Walser 2005: 81). It is generally accepted that he was a major contributor to 
Mahayana Buddhism and the founder of Madhyamika School. There is much 
disagreement between scholars about the life of Nagarjuna, not only as to 
differences between accounts but also as to how they should be interpreted. 
One difficulty arising from the various accounts is why the founder of the 
Madhyamika school of Buddhism is known as Nagarjuna'. Almost all 
accounts of his life, to some degree, involve his interaction with a species of 
serpent people known as the Nagas. Walleser (1990: 7) writes that it was "on 
account of his connections with the Nagas that he received the name 
'Nagarjune. It is recounted that the Nagas attended his sermons, that 
Nagarjuna used the Nagas as workers, that he travelled to their domain to 
give them direct instruction, and that while there he procured many texts 
(Walleser 1990: 6-11). Similarly, the Chinese sources derive his name from 
the fact that "his mother gave birth to him under an arjuna tree" and "because 
a dragon perfected his wisdom" (Corless 1995: 531). In Chinese Nagarjuna is 
known as Long Shu with the Chinese long, meaning dragon, being equivalent 
to the Sanskrit naga (Corless 1995: 525). 
These tales, as well as other miraculous events sited in the Tibetan and 
Chinese sources on the life of Nagarjuna, are almost completely absent within 
scholarly accounts of Nagarjuna's work. Scholars either deal with Nagarjuna's 
life so briefly or avoid it altogether so that they do not have to acknowledge 
the difficulties that traditional biographies/hagiographies pose for modern 
scholarship'. There is no intention to discuss why such information has been 
left out, nor pursue it further, merely to note the absence and difficulty 
regarding such materials. The intention was to point out the difficulty of 
comparing the lives of two thinkers when many scholars, for the most part, 
1 	i It s interesting to note that even Tuck (1990), whose work deals specifically with the 
scholarly biases incorporated into the interpretation of Nagarjuna's work, completely 
overlooked this issue. Bloss (1973) has produced an interesting analysis of the symbol of the 
naga and its relation to Buddhism, yet does not make reference to Nagarjuna. 
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banish the existing biographies of one of those thinkers to the realm of myth. 
Thus, while it is necessary to begin a comparative study with a contextualised 
analysis, it is not always an easy task. 
The issues relating to an accepted biography makes Nagarjuna's work difficult 
to place. As a result, only a brief comparison of each thinker's cultural 
backdrop will be attempted. In doing so, broad overviews of India, circa 100 
BCE to 250 CE, and Germany in the 19 th century will be made in order to see 
if any cultural congruencies can be found. It will be shown that while a 
contextualised analysis is necessary, to rely solely on context within a 
comparative study unnecessarily limits any attempted comparison. It will be 
seen that the dual contextual/decontextual approach does not suffer these 
limits. This dual approach is necessary for in one and the same material it can 
be seen that "what may serve as a descriptive statement from a philosophical 
point of view can simultaneously be understood as having an injunctive 
function from an institutional point of view" (Walser 2005: 10). An attempt will 
be made to show the historical and cultural flavour underpinning both thinkers 
and a comparison will be built on to this. It will be shown that an analysis of 
thinkers limited to this manner of analysis is unsatisfying and shallow. This is 
not the result of the author merely pruning the subject matter in this way. An 
actual comparative attempt will be made. However, it will be seen that 
comparative philosophy that rests to a large degree on context limits itself with 
regard to both content and methodology. 
There is a difficulty in any attempt to characterise the era of Nagarjuna. This is 
partly due to the lack of specific, and consistent, information about the 
historical figure of Nagarjuna. More so, this is a result of the fact that "between 
the death of the Buddha and the rise of Mahayana ... we are dealing with 
centuries of doctrinal change combined with geographic dispersal over a 
subcontinent" which was "in reality a gradual shift not experienced ... by any 
one person" (Williams 1989: 7). This means that, due to the complexity of 
Nagarjuna's cultural backdrop, only a general overview may be possible 
within the scope of this work, an overview drawn from numerous and 
inconsistent sources. While Walser (2005: 264), who has done the most to 
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locate Nagarjuna, has perhaps succeeded in his "aims to demythologise 
Nagarjuna", he conceded that we are still "looking for a 'best fit" (Walser 
2005: 268) solution to place Nagarjuna within a historical context. An attempt 
to supersede Walser's account is not considered, for to do so would draw 
away from the point of this work. The point is that contextualisation is harder 
the sparser the material. This also impacts on all comparative studies. 
Contextualising Nagarjuna is difficult as a result of few and inconsistent 
sources. In an attempt to understand Nagarjuna's context, an examination of 
India, circa 100 BCE through to 250 CE, will be made. While difficulties 
abound in characterising the politics of medieval India, there is a general 
consensus that between 300 BCE and 1700 CE the country was littered with 
"both formal state structures ... and a civil society that was still localized", 
meaning both self-contained kingdoms and self-governing communities (Stein 
1998: 25). This does not provide the information as to which Nagarjuna lived 
under. Walser (2005: 268) stated that "there is no reason to assume that 
Nagarjuna spent his entire career in one place". From the varying accounts of 
his residence, it can be hypothesized that Nagarjuna would have passed 
through, and experienced, both. 
Within this era of varying political structures, between 200 BCE and 300 CE, 
trade throughout India started to boom. One impact of this was that "the 
religions supported by the merchants, Buddhism and Jainism, saw their 
heyday" (Thapar 1966: 109). This passage of trade, coupled with Buddhist 
missionaries, opened up access to some of the remotest areas of the 
subcontinent (Thapar 1966: 107) with both groups going as far as Southeast 
Asia (Thapar 1966: 113). Another reason for the boom of Buddhism is, 
coupled with increased access, that political and military forces "actually 
affiliated themselves with Buddhism" and gave generous support as well as 
gifts such as caves (Ichimura 201: 41). This made it possible for the first 
Buddhist missionaries to arrive in China in 65 BCE (Thapar 1966: 120). 
During this time Roman ships were the "most profitable of overseas trade" in 
south India (Thapar 1966: 114). This may shed some light in the miraculous 
accounts of Nagarjuna saving communities in times when crops were 
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insufficient (Walleser 1990: 9), namely through newly established trade with 
far off places that was previously impossible due to the closed nature of many 
communities throughout India. 
Interestingly, trade was not limited to physical objects. Interaction with other 
highly developed cultures, such as the Romans and Chinese, would have 
resulted in the exchange of knowledge. An example is the Buddhist 
missionaries in China. It is certainly true in the case of Nagarjuna, whose work 
was exported in the first few centuries after his death to areas such as Tibet 
and China. With regard to India's importation of knowledge it is worthy noting 
that "the interest in alchemy developed [in India] in the early centuries [CE], 
presumably when both mercury and sulphur were available and their 
properties familiar" with some reports that "Nagarjuna was an alchemist" 
(Walser 2005: 75) or at least "conversant with alchemy" (Thapar 1978: 96). 
This would mean that Nagarjuna was not only conversant in and familiar with 
the traditional areas of Indian knowledge, but was also up-to-date with new 
areas of knowledge, either being developed in India or arriving through the 
new found interaction with other cultures. 
While it may be that attributing alchemical knowledge to Nagarjuna may have 
been "to sell the Nagarjuna legend to an Indian audience or ... to export the 
legend to a Chinese audience" (Walser 2005: 75), the image of an individual 
with knowledge of, or interest in, contemporary trends remains. Beyond this, 
Walser's point a) misses the soteriological aspect of Nagarjuna and his work 
and b) takes a purely materialistic conception of alchemy. Alchemy takes a 
base material and attempts to transform it into something valuable, like lead to 
gold, and its symbolic value has soteriological significance, for the 
unenlightened to be transmuted by enlightenment. 
Beyond this cross cultural pollination, there is another event that supposedly 
occurred during the time of Nagarjuna. It was during the first or second 
century CE that the fourth Buddhist council was summoned (Puligandla 1975: 
69). The Buddhist councils were summoned, the first according to some 
schools occurring shortly after the death of the Buddha, in order to 
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standardise the Buddhist canon and to authenticate the Buddhist teachings. 
This time the Buddhist council was summoned to "systematise the 
fundamental doctrines of the Sarvastivada" school of Buddhism (Puligandla 
1975: 70). Nagarjuna's attendance at the Buddhist council is not recorded. 
However, the ramifications of the Buddhist council would have reached across 
the Buddhist world. It would be safe to postulate that, if Nagarjuna did not 
attend, he would have at least been aware of the events that transpired. 
Nagarjuna also occupied an important position within the development of 
Buddhist thought. Along with the convening of the Buddhist council, there was 
much philosophical activity among the various schools of Buddhism that 
shaped Indian culture during the time of Nagarjuna. Between the death of the 
Buddha and the rise of Nagarjuna there was such an expansion and maturity 
of Buddhist thought that no other period within Buddhist history "could ever 
match or come up to the level of activity" (Inada 1993: 6) with "Nagarjuna and 
his thoughts [coming to] occupy an important place at the crucial crossroads 
in the subtle beginnings of the Mahayana as against the Theravada tradition" 
(Inada 1993: 4). Even though the same fundamental philosophy of the 
Buddha remained intact there was a division between schools that was 
"initially based on different disciplinary codes ... [which] gradually developed 
distinctly different doctrinal views" (Hamilton 2001: 85). Through competition 
and the desire of each school to differentiate themselves from the others the 
literature became "too complex and abstract for ordinary Buddhists to follow" 
(Inada 1993: 7). 
Nagarjuna worked against the increasing complexity of the Buddhist 
teachings to "present a concise and systematic view of thoughts crystallized 
over the five or six centuries since the Buddha" as well as making literature 
accessible to both scholars and laypersons (Inada 1993: 5). Nagarjuna, with 
the assertion 'dependent arising is emptiness', is "in contrast to the methods 
of [the earlier school of] Abhidharma Buddhism which had sought to define 
the world as existent" (Tachikawa 1997: 1-3). The methodology of the 
Madhyamaka tradition can be seen as being against Abhidharma Buddhism in 
that it argues against the view that things have "a real and enduring status" 
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which is considered to be an ontological aberration (Hamilton 2001: 105). 
Nagarjuna marked a turning point in the history of Buddhism in that he 
disengaged the squabbles that threatened to reduce the religious tradition to 
scholarly disagreements and reoriented the tradition so that it could once 
again grow among the multitudes. Running parallel to this the cultural turmoil 
within India also resulted in a renewal of growth both within and outside of its 
cultural confines. 
An attempt can now be made to grasp the climate of India, or at least the 
Deccan region, during the supposed time of Nagarjuna. While India may have 
had some previous stability, the instability of the era within which Nagarjuna 
lived allowed the population and culture of India to grow, expand, and explore. 
As one can imagine, there would have been much turmoil and unrest as a 
once relatively closed culture and closed communities began intermixing with 
and expanding into the foreign cultures that surrounded them. On the whole 
this seems to have been of great benefit. After the Buddha's death, Buddhism 
initially fragmented into many sects and schools. It was during Nagarjuna's 
time, beginning just before, that the crystallisation into definite groups and 
schools occurred. Nagarjuna arrived and, whilst being a major contributor to 
the Mahayana school, founded the Madhyamika School, amidst this formative 
stage. Thus, the flavour of India between 100 BCE and 250 CE is primarily 
one of much outward expansion and interaction, coupled with reduced inward 
isolation. 
Germany during the 19 th century was also a tumultuous place. Yet, the turmoil 
was fuelled by vastly different events than that of first and second century 
India. Germany, as it is currently known, did not yet exist. Even as late as 
1860 it consisted of 39 states, each of which resisted unification and 
"jealously guarded their power against each other" (Morgan 1966: 11-12). The 
two biggest of which were Austria and Prussia, where Nietzsche was born 
and raised. The issue of unification dominated the political and cultural scene 
into which Nietzsche was born, and influenced his early life. The new King of 
Prussia, Frederick William IV, instated in 1840, "spoke often and 
enthusiastically of his pride in the 'German nation - raising the issue of 
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unification to the highest level (Carr 1991: 25). So, above all, the issue of the 
unification of Germany dominated the political agenda for over the first quarter 
of Nietzsche's life. 
There were many factors contributing to the issue of German unification. One 
of these was the rapid expansion of the German economy, particularly in 
relation to the rest of Europe. An example of this expansion is that "in the 
1840's Germany broke the British monopoly and began to supply her own 
needs" (Carr 1991: 28). Furthermore, during the 1850's Germany "made a 
significant step forward towards becoming an industrial state" with "new 
factories, rapid expansion of the railway network, widespread introduction of 
steam-driven machinery and the concentration of production in the new 
factories" (Kitchen 1978: 87). During this time the government was intent on 
keeping the railway under control. This was achieved by amalgamating a 
number of small private railways, after their purchase by the state, into the 
state system, which meant, "by the 1860's Germany had the largest railway 
network in Europe" (Kitchen 1978: 98). It is interesting to note that, despite 
coming some time later, around 1890, Nietzsche's "sudden popularity ... 
came in the context of German's rapidly advancing industrialisation" (Thomas 
1983: 2) where the adage 'become what you are', from Zarathustra, had 
significance for both the individual and the culture as a whole. These issues 
illustrate the sudden and rapid infrastructure expansion within and across the 
many states under the pressure of unification. 
Such turmoil and the preoccupation with unification resulted in war. Prussia 
was involved in three wars between 1860 and 1871; in 1864 and 1866 against 
Austria and 1870 against France. In all three it was proposed that "German 
unification was at stake ... in '64 and '66 in order to release Germany from 
Austria and that the military effort of '70 against France was needed finally to 
overcome the division between north and south Germany" (Ramm 1981: 280). 
The conquest of France in the Franco-Prussian war in 1870-71, in which 
Nietzsche willingly served as a medical orderly (Kaufmann 1956: 34, 
Hollingdale 1965: 60), led to a "wave of white-hot patriotic" fever throughout 
Germany and helped cement its unification (Carr 1991: 115). Nietzsche, living 
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through all three wars, was deeply affected by these events and their 
ramifications can be seen within his philosophical development 2 . 
It is informative to place Nietzsche within the philosophical tradition, and in a 
wider context than the political and economic events previously mentioned. 
Sutton (1974: 2) called the German philosophical tradition one of the "only 
three continuous, relatively independent traditions in [European] philosophy", 
with the other two being the British and the French. Some of the major 
thinkers within the German tradition of philosophy include Kant (1724 — 1804), 
Hegel (1770 — 1831), and Schopenhauer (1788 — 1860). Within this tradition 
Nietzsche is seen as "important for his influence upon subsequent European 
literature" as well as "for an understanding of the age we have lived through" 
(Sutton 1974: 83). Part of Nietzsche's "subsequent influence" was his 
misappropriation in the first and second world wars by German and British 
propagandists, with some going so far as to regard Nietzsche as "having 
helped cause it" (Thomas 1983: 1). This may seem, in part, as a result of the 
pre-war youth movement being "heavily influenced by Nietzsche's insistence 
upon desiccation of scholarship when not directed to enhancing life" and 
criticising "the scholarly community for destroying vitality and meaning" 
(Marchand 1996: 313). Nietzsche's influence can also be seen in the works of 
many 20th century French intellectuals, such as Sartre, Foucault, or Deleuze, 
as well as throughout the postmodernist movement. Nietzsche is seen as a 
turning point in the history of European thought, synchronising with a turning 
point in the history of Europe. 
According to their cultural contexts both thinkers came from formative stages 
within the history of their respective cultures. Nagarjuna existed at the 
beginning of a period in the history of India that, once established, determined 
the development of the continent until the British conquest over a thousand 
years later. Even though Germany did not last in the same manner, the 
This is specifically acknowledged by Nietzsche where he writes in his "belated preface" of 
1886 to his first published work that "the time which it [BT] was written, in spite of which it was 
written", being "the exciting time of the Franco-Prussian War of 1870/71", bears witness to the 
"deeply personal" nature of the subject matter (BTp § 1). 
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events that happened during Nietzsche's lifetime were the starting point for 
much that occurred during the first half of the 20 th century. While both India 
and Germany were experiencing rapid growth, the kind of growth within each 
culture was vastly different. India experienced an outward growth in the form 
of cultural expansion and growth into surrounding areas while Germany 
experienced inward growth in the form of internal unification and 
strengthening of the interior structure 3 . 
Within a comparative study it is important to examine the influence, if any, of 
one source on the other. This is important because it shows a) how the focus 
shifts according to the context, b) how open a thinker is to utilise, and 
acknowledge, other material, and c) when misunderstandings occur, how and 
why they arose, and the impact on subsequent work. It is obvious that 
Nagarjuna had no knowledge of, or influence from, Nietzsche. However, there 
is some controversy over Nietzsche's knowledge of non-European, or non-
western, philosophies leading some to argue that Nietzsche's "trans-
European eye was more European than 'trans - (Sprung 2003: 253), while 
others argue that Nietzsche was "one of the best read and most solidly 
grounded in Buddhism for his time among Europeans" (Elman 1983: 673). I 
will now proceed to discuss this controversy with the aim of ascertaining what, 
if any, knowledge Nietzsche had of Nagarjuna. 
While it is consistently acknowledged that Nietzsche had some knowledge of 
Asian philosophies, the degree to which Nietzsche was aware remains 
unconfirmed. One of the potential sources from which Nietzsche could have 
gained insight into Indian philosophies is Paul Deussen (1845 - 1919), one of 
the foremost Sanskrit and Vedanta scholars of his time, with whom Nietzsche 
3 While it is expressed in similar terms, these differing modes of growth have nothing to do 
with and cannot be extended to the metaphorical distinction of internal/vertical versus 
external/horizontal spiritual growth. If it was to be seen in this manner then the respective 
modes of growth would be reversed in that the religious concerns of India were penetrating 
deeper into the continent as well as extending into Asia rekindling spiritual awareness as 
opposed to German fulfilment of base desires in their strengthening of political, economic, 
and industrial awareness which inturn dampened spiritual awareness and desire. 
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"established a friendship which was to last a lifetime" (Rollmann 1978: 125). 
Despite the length of their relationship, it seems that Nietzsche did not 
capitalise on the expertise of his friend. This may be because, according to 
some, their relationship was "maintained, but not deepened" by time 
(Rol!mann 1978: 126). In the few letters between them, Nietzsche "succeeds 
in giving the impression he is dissatisfied with Deussen's progress" 
(Hollingdale 1965: 62). It is as if Nietzsche, in assuming the role of the 
mentor, limits the amount of knowledge he feels comfortable with learning 
from his 'student'. Even with Deussen making accessible philosophical texts 
from India, "Nietzsche seldom quotes from an Indian text" even while alluding 
to them with frequency "enough to arouse the presumption that it [Indian 
thought] was alive in [Nietzsche's] mind" (Sprung 2003: 249). This indicates a 
poor grasp of Indian, especially Buddhist, thought on the part of Nietzsche. 
Nietzsche had more opportunity than simply relying on his friends in 
developing his understanding of non-European thought. It is known that 
Nietzsche had some familiarity with Asian thought from an early age. It was 
during his 'high school' days, around the age of seventeen or eighteen, that 
an essay of his included comments on "two basic documents of Indian 
literature and religion, the Mahabharata and the Ramayana" (Figl 1991: 52). 
Nietzsche also attended university lectures and, from his notes relating to 
these studies, it can be deduced that Nietzsche was exposed "at this early 
stage to Indian thought in a fairly comprehensive manner" (Figl 1991: 60). 
However, what Nietzsche chose to expose himself to also informed, or 
misinformed, his understanding of non-European thought. Smith (2004: 37) 
notes that with regard to the Laws of Manu "Nietzsche's choice of version 
shows ... ignorance of both scholarly and popular writing on India". Smith 
(2004: 38) has shown that Nietzsche's preferred translation, in French by 
Jacolliot, was superseded by the earlier German translation by Huttner and 
was in disrepute during his lifetime. Beyond this, it can be seen that his 
interest in this area did not diminish in later years, if his personal library is 
anything to judge by, especially those books within his library on Indian 
thought and Buddhism that contain varying amounts of notes dispersed 
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throughout many of them (Brobjer 1997: 673, 2004: 33 - 35). This still does 
not help to understand what knowledge, if any, Nietzsche had of Nagarjuna. 
So far, Nietzsche's knowledge of Indian philosophies other than Buddhism 
has been discussed. This has shown Nietzsche to have had at least a minimal 
understanding of Indian philosophies. With specific regard to Buddhism, it is 
known that "the tenets of Buddhism became known in Europe during the third 
and fourth decades of the nineteenth century" (Abelsen 1993: 255). This 
means that the study of Buddhism was relatively new to Europe, even during 
Nietzsche's lifetime. It has been argued that Nietzsche took his conception of 
Buddhism completely from Schopenhauer (Dumoulin 1981: 469, Sprung 
2003: 256), a thinker who "at times even called himself a 'Buddhist - (Abelsen 
1993: 255). In this regard it is important to note "the intellectual culture of the 
Chinese was accepted in the west earlier than the Indian" (Dumoulin 1981: 
457). This is important as it has been asserted that it is the philosophy of 
Nagarjuna "upon which the metaphysics of the principal schools of Chinese 
Buddhism is built" (Dumoulin 1981: 461), an example being that of Chiti who 
regarded Nagarjuna as his master (Saunders 1923: 266), which is not to deny 
other non-Buddhist, especially Taoist, influences. It is from this source that 
Hegel derived his knowledge of Buddhism (Dumoulin 1981: 461) and 
presumably Schopenhauer followed suit. This is important evidence that, 
while Nietzsche may not have had explicit knowledge of Nagarjuna, his 
knowledge of Buddhism was implicitly influenced by the work of Nagarjuna. 
Knowing that the study of Buddhism in Europe was relatively new during the 
nineteenth century is crucial in understanding Nietzsche's position on 
Buddhism. A central doctrine of Nagarjuna's school of Buddhism is gOnyatil, 
now translated as 'emptiness' but "earlier western commentators had 
rendered [it] as 'nothingness" (Elman 1983: 682). This mistranslation led 
Schopenhauer and Nietzsche to "inaccurate views of Buddhism" (Elman 
1983: 683), especially pessimistic and nihilistic views of this philosophical 
system. This mistranslation, and the misconceptions that it led to, helps to 
explain how in one and the same sentence Nietzsche can vehemently oppose 
Buddhism while affirm and agree with Nagarjuna. Mistry (1981: 195) notes a 
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similar occurrence, as "Nietzsche to be sure opposes his view of art and 
power to Buddhist nirvana; his perspective, however, strikes us as an 
approximation of the Buddhist ideal". Parkes (1996: 357) acknowledges that 
the translations available during Nietzsche's time are mainly of a "poor 
quality", with Mistry (1981: 120) citing that "misconstruction is attributable to 
the lack of adequate information available to Nietzsche, corroborating the 
reasons behind Nietzsche's misinterpretation of Buddhism. This evidence 
supports the methodology proposed here. That is, any comparative study that 
limits itself to the form of words used, instead of examining the meaning that 
arises as a result of their context within a system, is limited to a merely 
superficial comparison. 
Throughout his life Nietzsche had much to say on the subject of Buddhism. 
Elman (1983: 686) went so far as to assert that "Buddhism lies at the centre of 
any attempt to understand Nietzsche's thought in its entirety". Elman's belief 
is that Buddhism implicitly contributes to the major concepts within 
Nietzsche's philosophy. Yet, it is difficult to either attempt to develop an 
overall understanding of Nietzsche's position on the subject or to discuss any 
particular views Nietzsche expressed as being definitive. These difficulties 
occur because Buddhism is mentioned sporadically throughout his many 
writings and because the views held shift and change according to the context 
or the point being made. While these are issues that any scholar attempting to 
discuss Nietzsche's view of Buddhism must grapple with, there are some 
interesting and informative points that can be discussed. 
One of the key concepts in Nietzsche's work is nihilism. Buddhism is often 
derided within his work because of his diagnosis that this tradition has many 
nihilistic tendencies. For Nietzsche nihilism means that "the highest values are 
devaluated' (WLN 9[35]). In this sense it can be understood that both 
Nagarjuna's and Nietzsche's work might be considered nihilistic. But beyond 
this, if nihilism is to mean that not only are the highest values devaluated but 
also all values eradicated, as the word is commonly used (especially with 
regards to commentaries on both thinkers), then the charge of nihilism could 
not hold for either Nagarjuna or Nietzsche. This will be raised again in chapter 
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three where it will be shown that both Nagarjuna and Nietzsche are labelled 
Nihilists for similar reasons. 
Nietzsche, however, continues beyond his definition to separate out "active" 
and "passive" forms of nihilism with the former being a "sign of strength" and 
the latter "a sign of weakness" (WLN 9[35]). Nietzsche said that the "most 
celebrated form" of passive nihilism, in that it has become a "weary nihilism 
that no longer attacks", is Buddhism (WLN 9[35]). However, this attack on 
Buddhism may be understood as a result of Nietzsche having a very 
Schopenhauerian understanding of Buddhism (WLN 14[123]). Another reason 
for the nihilist conception of Nagarjuna's work, and Madhyamika Buddhism in 
general, is that Schopenhauer4 and Deussen, along with many scholars, 
viewed it from a Vedanta perspective. The charge of nihilism arises as a result 
of the Madhyamika assertion that selfhood is empty whereas in Vedanta 
atman (self) has an intrinsic value and its denial is taken to be a denial of any 
sort of intrinsic reality. While this is certainly not the case within Madhyamika 
Buddhism this point does illustrate how a superficial difference, when 
misdiagnosed as a real difference, can both drastically misconstrue the 
intentions of a philosophical system as well as severely limiting further 
analysis. 
This close association may also explain Nietzsche's belief that "Indian 
Buddhism does not have a fundamentally moral development behind it, which 
is why in its nihilism there is only morality which hasn't been overcome" (WLN 
2[127]). While this is categorically wrong, and Nietzsche is severely 
misinformed, this quote does make sense in light of Schopenhauer's reading 
of Buddhism. Nietzsche rejects Schopenhauer and Buddhism on the same 
grounds. Furthermore, it has been said that Nietzsche only knew of Buddhism 
4 This is not to say that Schopenhauer did not have any understanding of, or insight into 
Buddhism. As NanajTvako (1988: 5-6) is keen to point out, there has developed a "standard 
formula", intended to undermine Schopenhauer's understanding of Buddhist texts to such a 
degree that it "grants to Schopenhauer the privilege of standing at a level of intelligence just 
above that of an idiot as far as he was able to realize his own problem, but not of inquiring 
about its reasons, or even looking for help". 
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through Schopenhauer (Sprung 2003: 256) so the close association of the two 
is understandable. Given these two things, this may be more of critique of 
Schopenhauer than it is of Buddhism. This shows that Nagarjuna and 
Nietzsche may both be superficially termed nihilistic, but for different reasons. 
Also, it can be seen that while there is some validity to such superficial 
categorisation, it is possible to analyse this aspect on a deeper level. 
The poor quality of translations available during Nietzsche's time can be seen 
to have an explicit impact on Nietzsche's understanding of Buddhism. In a 
further note on nihilism Nietzsche wrote "the most extreme form of nihilism: 
nothingness ('meaninglessness') eternally" (WLN 5[71]). The modern 
translation of 80nyata as 'emptiness' rather than 'nothingness', a key to 
Nagarjuna's thought, leads to a more sympathetic view of Nagarjuna whereas 
the earlier rendering provided good evidence for those early European 
scholars who felt his views to be nihilistic. It is little wonder that Nietzsche 
disdained central aspects of Buddhist thought because for him 'nothingness' 
equalled 'meaninglessness'. Furthermore, there is little in the work of 
Schopenhauer that would have dissuaded him from this view. Nietzsche's 
rejection of Buddhism, while, at times, advocating for similar solutions, is 
understandable, in light of the comparative methodology advocated for here, 
as being a good example of how a seemingly real difference is seen to be 
actually merely a superficial one. 
The realisation that some differences, appearing to be real, are merely 
superficial is beneficial for comparing the key concepts from two or more 
vastly different philosophical systems. Two of the prominent ideals within the 
philosophical systems of the thinkers compared here are Buddhahood within 
Nagarjuna and the Obermensch within Nietzsche. At a cursory glance these 
appear to be totally different, both in form and function. This can be seen even 
after the form and function of these ideals are elucidated and they are held 
side by side. However, from the comparative approach presented here it can 
be seen that an analysis of key concepts, limited to such differences, does not 
do justice to the thinkers compared. After examining Buddhahood and the 
Obermensch an attempt will be made to show how, through a simultaneously 
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contextualised and decontextualised comparative analysis, these ideals 
spring from a highly similar view of human physiology and psychology. 
Furthermore, this type of analysis shows that, while there are many 
congruencies, the ideals of Buddhahood and the Obermensch do have some 
real differences. By accepting the existence of superficial differences, and not 
limiting comparative analysis to these differences, it is easier to show where 
ideas converge and diverge. 
Buddhahood occupies an ambiguous position within the philosophical system 
of Nagarjuna. While Nagarjuna repeatedly accords the highest esteem and 
position for those who have attained Buddhahood, the actual state attained is 
seldom discussed. This is understandable as Nagarjuna, through his works, is 
attempting to provide individuals with the means to raise themselves to this 
state of being rather than being concerned as to what it is or with those who 
have attained it. Nagarjuna's aim is to aid individuals with their progression 
along the bodhisattva path. The bodhisattva is an individual who "seeks to 
realise the wisdom that constitutes Buddhahood" (Ramanan 2002: 297). 
Nagarjuna expresses this in writing that the bodhisattvas "strive to represent 
the lineage of the Buddhas" (Bod § 104). Zimmer (1951: 535) writes that "in 
the Mahayana tradition the term designates those sublimely indifferent 
compassionate beings who remain at the threshold of Nirvana for the comfort 
and salvation of the world". It must be recognised that "the bodhisattva ideal 
rests on the premise that every living being has within it the potential of 
becoming a Buddha, and this same premise underlies the entire edifice of 
Madhyamika thought" (Huntington and Wangchen 1992: 20). 
Furthermore, it is informative to understand the literal meaning of bodhisattva. 
The term literally means "one whose essence (sattva) is (virtually) 
enlightenment (bodhl)" (Zimmer 1951: 539), where sattva is built on the 
principle sat, meaning "being; as it should be; good, well perfect", and sattva 
meaning "the ideal state of being" (Zimmer 1951 296). Another rendering of 
'bodhisattva' is "awakening being" (Huntington and Wangchen 1992: 19). This 
is crucial as the idea of 'awakening' implies the process through which one 
awakens. The stages of the bodhisattva constitute the path that one much 
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transverse to arrive at Buddhahood. In focusing on the stages Nagarjuna is 
attempting to provide the means to realise Buddhahood. It must be stated 
explicitly that according to Nagarjuna Buddhahood exists. This might be 
obvious but unless it is recognised one misses a central aspect of 
Nagarjuna's philosophical system. That this state of being remains attainable 
is important when it is compared to the Obermensch. 
Individuals require a teacher who can guide them along the bodhisattva path. 
For someone to become a teacher they must have attained the degree 
relevant to being a teacher before they are able to effectively guide any 
prospective students, as it is acknowledged that anyone "who teaches must 
first of all clearly understand" (Walleser 1990: 28). Nagarjuna explicitly states 
this in writing; it is "the sons of the Buddha [who] are active in developing 
enlightenment" in others (Bod § 85). From this it is possible to see that for one 
to pass on the knowledge of enlightenment one must first become a 
successor of those who have attained Buddhahood. This is important as the 
authority to confer initiation "assured the effective legitimacy" of both the 
teaching and the teachers (Guenon 2001b: 23). The teacher validates the 
teaching, showing that it is tried and tested and, at the same time, providing 
an example of the goal of the teaching. 
Nagarjuna received the titles `arya' (Williams 1989: 55) and 'acatya' (Walleser 
1990: 12). The title 'atya' equates to 'noble being' and denotes one who has 
direct perception while the title `acarya' equates to 'master' or 'teacher'. The 
combination of these two titles designates Nagarjuna as a teacher of the 
highest degree. It is also recognised that Nagarjuna's indoctrination and 
guidance came from numerous teachers, the two most prominent being Sri 
Saraha Bhadra and Acarya Rahula (Walleser 1990: 7-9). Under the direction 
of Saraha, Nagarjuna became a monk and later became the High Priest after 
his teacher's death (Walleser 1990: 7-8). Rahula placed Nagarjuna under 
rigorous discipline "due to the little compassion which Nagarjuna showed 
towards living beings" in order to perfect and further Nagarjuna along the 
bodhisattva path (Walleser 1990: 9). Such discipline is necessary as the 
bodhisattvas "strive to represent the linage of the Buddhas" and show 
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compassion to all living creatures (Bod § 104). It is also said that Nagarjuna 
received instruction in the Vedas from earliest childhood, that "there was 
nothing that he had not thoroughly fathomed" in the known sciences (Walleser 
1990: 27). This illustrates that Nagarjuna received adequate teaching, had 
appropriate knowledge, and is recognised as fulfilling the requirements for 
being a teacher of the bodhisattva path. 
Furthermore, Nagarjuna was recognised as a remarkable teacher during his 
time. In his capacity as High Priest, Nagarjuna's teachings almost completely 
obscured the Hinayana teaching within the district and saw the conversion of 
thousands to Buddhism under his influence (Walleser 1990: 7). While it is 
recognised that Nagarjuna had a large following, many scholars agree that his 
principal disciple and student was Aryadeva (Huntington & Wangchen 1992: 
33, Walleser 1990: 24, Williams 1989: 55). Nagarjuna's teaching of Aryadeva 
can be recognised in the student's work, which mirror's the views and 
methodology of his teacher, writing "if one makes no claims to existence, non-
existence, or both, it will never be possible to defeat him" (in Huntington & 
Wangchen 1992: 98). Candrakirti (1992: 194) looked to Nagarjuna as one 
who had taught and explained the path to and qualities of Buddhahood. Thus, 
Nagarjuna was recognised as having attained both the status of Buddhahood 
and the qualities necessary to successfully pass on the means for others to 
attain Buddhahood. That Nagarjuna entered into a tradition, was accepted by 
a master of that tradition, strove to attain the highest ideal of that tradition, 
and, according to the teachings of that tradition, is accepted as an authority 
who achieved said ideal has added significance when compared with 
Nietzsche, who created his own highest ideal, had no one to guide him 
towards that ideal, nor any means to achieve his own ideal. 
With Nagarjuna's qualifications established, the qualities of Buddhahood will 
now be discussed. Candrakirti (1992: 149) has said that "every Buddha is 
[themself] born from a bodhisattva", meaning that the bodhisattva path is the 
gestation period for Buddhahood. This necessitates an examination of the 
bodhisattva path in order to see the qualities developed in the attainment of 
Buddhahood. The qualities acquired along the bodhisattva path "far exceed 
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the range of speech" (CandrakTrti 1992: 190). However, of the qualities that 
can be communicated, those crucial for the current discussion will be detailed. 
Among the qualities that are indicative of Buddhahood, CandrakTrti (1992: 
151-89) details the "complete exhaustion of craving and hostility" (i.e. 
impatience and anger have been conquered), "balanced concentration", 
freedom from "reified concepts", "perfect morality". Most importantly is the 
realisation of the unity of the two truths, emptiness and dependent arising 5 . 
This realisation is significant because it is central to Nagarjuna's whole work 
and more generally it means that the individual who has realised it has access 
to the true nature of existence. 
Buddhahood requires the realisation of 80nyata, which is the "absence of 
constructs", where "a 'thing' is a construct" (Bod § 44). Freedom from reified 
concepts, or 'things', a consequence of 80nyata, is central to the realisation of 
the two truths, another prime quality of Buddhahood. A 'thing' becomes thus 
due to its differentiation from other 'things', making each thing, to some 
degree, separate and independent of everything else, meaning that it is 
neither empty nor dependently originated. Nagarjuna states that "dependent 
co-origination; just that is what you maintain to be 8Cinyata", showing that the 
realisation of the interconnected nature of existence is connected to freedom 
from reification, as "whoever awakens to this is called Buddha" (Acin § 40-1). 
This illustrates that it is in the realisation of the unity of the two truths that 
leads to Buddhahood. These are some of the effable qualities of Buddhahood. 
Nagarjuna's combination of emptiness and dependent arising, while 
innovative, governs the moral value of action6. For one who is yet to attain 
Buddhahood, there are actions that are clearly moral and other immoral. 
5 There are various translations of this key term. Garfield (1995) opts for "dependently co-
arisen", !nada (1993) uses "relational origination", Ramanan (2002) has "dependent 
origination", and Tachikawa (1997) decided upon "dependent co-arising". For consistency 
'dependent arising' will be used, though these terms are interchangeable and each author's 
rendering has been kept when quoted. 
6 For detailed expositions and commentaries on Buddhist ethics see especially Nagarjuna Rat 
and Suh, 8antideva (1995), and Harvey (2000). 
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Nagarjuna has much to say about which are and are not permissible, like not 
killing, stealing, or cheating. We may hypothesise that their moral worth is 
connected with either their promoting harmony or aiding in the realisation of 
the two truths, or both. One who attains Buddhahood directly experiences the 
two truths; it is the simultaneous experience of the emptiness of ultimate 
reality and the dependent arising of all things within conventional reality. As 
Nagarjuna stated, "that which is dependent origination is explained to be 
emptiness" (MK )0(IV § 18). The combination of the two truths has a 
seemingly contradictory impact on all moral outlooks which threatens to make 
"perfect morality" impossible. Nagarjuna states that "virtuous and nonvirtuous 
actions ... are all maintained to be similar" (MK XVII § 5). Nagarjuna 
distinguishes between two kinds of actions without categorising any particular 
actions. Yet, for an action to be intrinsically moral it "requires something that 
does not ultimately exist, the subject for whom events in a life can have 
meaning" (Siderits 2007: 77). On the level of ultimate reality there are no 
moral values because they are inherently empty, whereas on the level of 
conventional reality moral values cease to have independent existence, 
meaning that there is nothing definitively good or evil. 
Seen in this light it is possible to venture that morality does not exist because 
if it did then all moral values would be completely relative. However, moral 
relativity does not necessarily follow. Nagarjuna reminds us that "the doctrine 
of the indestructibility of karma is taught by the Buddha (MK XVII § 20) as 
karma is "without essence ... not arisen" (MK XVII § 21). Karma, action, being 
not essentially arisen cannot be essentially virtuous or nonvirtuous. By 
accepting that there are no inherently moral values, it is possible that those 
who have attained Buddhahood realise that any, and all, moral action is 
intimately bound to the dependently arisen nature of existence. They are able 
to perceive what action is necessary for each situation and act accordingly. 
The result is that all of their behaviour is perfectly mora1 7. For those struggling 
7 This is parallel to Kant's early formulation to a universalizable action in Groundwork. In both 
it can be seen that, while no particular kind of action is inherently moral, certain actions, 
according to the circumstances, would be acceptable to all people. 
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along the path to Buddhahood, the permissibility of an action is important as 
"being moral is part of the training necessary for attaining Nirvana" (Siderits 
2007: 79). It follows that, while there are no inherently moral actions, the 
virtuous action for the novice is that which weakens their belief in an 
inherently existing self. This solution is more closely aligned with the doctrine 
of perspectivism, as used within this dissertation, than relativity. This is 
because, ultimately, everything is empty, and conventionally, one's view is 
dependent on the position occupied. 
Alongside the ideal of Buddhahood we can place the Obermensch. Nietzsche 
used the figure of Zarathustra to introduce the concept of the Obermensch 
and this ideal remained in the background of his subsequent works. While it is 
from Z onwards that Nietzsche discusses and elaborates on the Obermensch, 
this phrasing of the concept first appeared in GS § 143. Here, consistently 
with later elaborations, the Obermensch (or Obermenschen as it occurs here 
as a plural) is brought in as a way of moving beyond, or transvaluating, 
established values that, for Nietzsche, are a sign of sickness. While this is the 
first actual occurrence of the term, the concept itself predates its 
encapsulation in `Obermensch'. It can be seen in BT with the idea of the 
collapse of individuation, the use of history proposed in UM II, and the Free 
Spirits of HAH. The Obermensch is often translated as 'superman' or 
'overman' but both phrases can misconstrue the concept through inaccurate 
associations and as a result is kept in the transliterated form. Yet, what both 
translations do capture is the feeling of being above and beyond normal 
human existence. 
Ordinary human existence is considered a means, not an end, in that "man is 
a rope, fastened between animal and Obermensch" (Z P: 4). Nietzsche states 
that the Obermensch is the meaning of human existence (Z P: 7), and greater 
still "the meaning of the earth", as "all creatures hitherto have created 
something beyond themselves" (Z P: 3). It seems that for Nietzsche, the value 
of anything is in what it can become, its ultimate goal, and in the case of the 
human that goal is the Obermensch. Nietzsche felt that if one were to grasp 
what he was trying to present it "would raise one to a higher level of 
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existence" (E III § 1). While both 'superman' and 'overman' have connotations 
of being superior to ordinary human existence, the feelings and connotations 
associated with it are best achieved by retaining the term 'Obermensch'. 
For Nietzsche, the Obermensch is the grandest triumph that any human can 
strive towards. It designates "a type of supreme achievement" (E III § 1) that 
compared with which "whatever was so far considered great in man lies 
beneath him at an infinite distance ... none of this has ever before been 
dreamed of as essential to greatness" (E Z § 6). Compared to the normal 
human who is a river, for Nietzsche the Obermensch is a sea (Z P: 3), again 
reflecting the Obermensch as the goal of human existence, just as all rivers 
race to become the sea. All this points to the belief that no matter what any 
individual can achieve, and no matter what greatness one can achieve as a 
human, the attainment never comes close to the achievements and greatness 
of the Obermensch. Likewise, we can say, no matter how long a river is or 
how fast it flows, it is insignificant in comparison to the sea. The Obermensch 
is above and beyond the human; they are of a higher type. 
This then raises the question: how may one strive towards this higher type? 
Nietzsche's answer is somewhat obscure, though there are hints. In climbing 
higher, the Obermensch questions previously established values such as 
'happiness', 'reason', 'virtue', 'justice', and 'pity' with the result that, compared 
to established values, the values of the Obermensch are/must be considered 
madness (Z P: 3). It must be considered madness because the value would 
appear absurd to those conditioned to accepted morality. For Nietzsche, this 
type of madness is not something to lament as it is necessary for climbing 
higher and it is this "with which you should be cleansed" (Z P: 3). Through the 
questioning of established values the Obermensch finds that "all opposites are 
blended into a new unity" (E Z § 6), a new unity that does not see the natural 
world and human world as distinct but as connected beyond good and evil. As 
a result of this many would call the Obermensch "a devil" because the, so-
called, "wise and enlightened ... would flee from the burning sun of wisdom" in 
which the Obermenschen bathe (Z II: 21). These are some of the hints 
Nietzsche gives the individual who desires to strive towards the higher type. 
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Opposed to the higher type are the individuals who attempt to climb higher but 
are restricted from reaching anything beyond their present state 8 . Some are 
"despisers of the body" who "are not bridges to the Obermensch" (Z I: 4). The 
reason that the despisers of the body are not bridges to anything higher is 
because, according to Nietzsche, they deny the unity between the physical 
and the psychological, whereas in nature there is no such distinction, and 
such a separation fragments and limits the potential of the human. The 
despisers discount the body so that they may enliven the spirit. This is a 
grievous error because it is against the grain of the "new unity" and overlooks 
an idea crucial in Nietzsche's work, that opposites are intricately bound 
together and to prefer one to the other is an unnecessary and unnatural 
restraint. Therefore, not everyone may attempt to cleanse him or herself, 
climb higher, and will the existence of the Obermensch. 
While the Obermensch represents the greatest and best aspects of human 
existence and everything beyond that, Nietzsche believed that this type of 
existence within the world had not yet manifested. Nietzsche felt that, while 
prototypes of the Obermensch had sporadically manifested throughout the 
history of humanity, he could not point to any specific individual who 
represented the Obermensch as he envisaged it. Nietzsche has Zarathustra 
tell the audience in the town, as well as the reader, that they should say and 
will that the Obermensch "shall be the meaning of the earth" (Z P: 3). 
Nietzsche went so far as to say that "there has never yet been [an] 
Obermensch" (Z II: 4). Nietzsche further considers the Obermensch a "new 
star", again emphasising that he felt that this is something in humanity that 
has not yet been realised (Z III: 12 § 3). Yet, we should not feel that the higher 
type of human is an unattainable goal, as Nietzsche believed that "one day 
the Obermensch may live" (Z P: 4, italics mine). There have also been 
glimpses of its existence in that "there are cases of individual success 
8 It must be acknowledged that here, as elsewhere throughout this work, there are instances 
where parallels and conclusions could be drawn regarding master and slave morality. No 
such comparisons are drawn as they are outside the scope of this work. 
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constantly appearing in the most various parts of the earth and from the most 
various cultures in which a higher type does manifest itself: something which 
in relation to collective mankind is a sort of Obermensch" (A § 4). From this 
we can conclude that the Obermensch, as a goal not yet actualised, remains 
as a potentiality which humanity may, and in Nietzsche's view should, aspire 
to. Nevertheless, the Obermensch embodies human potential. 
The Obermensch is not Nietzsche's first attempt to encapsulate the idea of 
existence above normal human existence. Before the Obermensch there was 
the Free Spirit. Like the Obermensch, Nietzsche does not completely explain 
what the Free Spirit means, preferring glimpses into some of the qualities they 
embody. The Free Spirit has "that mature freedom of spirit which is fully as 
much self-mastery and discipline of the heart" (HAHp § 4) that can later be 
found in the Obermensch. Nietzsche also alludes to the Free Spirits as being 
"higher" (HAHp § 7). Just as the Obermensch questions prevailing views, the 
Free Spirit is called thus because "he [or she] thinks otherwise than would be 
expected, based on his [or her] origins, environment, class, and position, or 
based on prevailing contemporary views" (HAH § 225). Nietzsche notes that it 
would be difficult for the Free Spirit to live amongst their anthesis the Bound 
Spirit as the former must account for their existence in terms of the measure 
of things accorded by the latter (HAH § 229). The Free Spirits cannot account 
for themselves within such confines because they are free of all that the 
Bound Spirits are bound to, such as tradition, education, and morality. 
Furthermore, the Free Spirit sees the world as a means to an end, only 
becoming involved with it as far as it furthers the adoration of the inner world 
that cannot be impacted on by any amount of turmoil in the physical realm 
(HAH § 291). The closest tie between the Free Spirit and the Obermensch is 
that "there are no such 'free spirits' just as the Obermensch has not yet 
existed (HAHp § 2). The Free Spirit is to the Bound Spirit as the Obermensch 
is to the herd. 
A comparison of the concepts of Buddhahood and the Obermensch from the 
material above shows them to be two vastly different ideas. However, the 
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material above is a strictly decontextualised analysis and because of this can 
be seen to fall short of a meaningful comparison. The differences between 
Buddhahood and the Obermensch are only superficial. The sort of meaningful 
comparison intended proceeds because it draws from both contextualised and 
decontextualised material. 
It is possible to bring the ideals of Buddhahood and the Obermensch together 
for a meaningful comparison, yet in order to do so it is necessary to 
understand them within their respective contexts. In Nietzsche's work the 
concept of the thermensch is closely associated with the idea of "the 
transvaluation of all values" 9. The transvaluation of all values involves 
examining established values and revaluating them, not according to some 
well established virtue such as truth, the good, happiness, or rationality, but 
using their value for life as the bar against which all values are to be 
henceforth held. Nietzsche said that he was the only individual who knew how 
"to reverse perspectives" which led him to the belief that "a 'revaluation of 
values' is perhaps possible for me alone" (E I § 1) because, according to 
himself, he was the only one to have conceived of this possibility. Yet, 
Nietzsche felt that "for the task of a revaluation of all values more capacities 
may have been needed than have ever dwelt together in a single individual" 
(E II § 9). Perhaps this is why Nietzsche waited on the "philosophers of the 
future" (BGE § 42), or, better yet, maybe the arrival of the Obermensch. But 
despite Nietzsche's lack of success, the 'transvaluation of all values' is 
intimately tied to the moral outlook of the Obermensch, in that the 
Obermensch, as a creator of values, has a transvaluative morality. 
The transvaluation of all values is a difficult and complex task. The difficulty of 
transvaluating all values may be split into a negative task and a positive task. 
9 Between the various translations there is some discrepancy over the translation of this key 
term in Nietzsche's thought, generally rendered either as 'revaluation' and 'transvaluation'. 
For consistency 'transvaluation' is given preference throughout this work. However, the other 
translation has been retained in quotes, according to the preference of the author. As a result, 
both words are understood as interchangeable without any variance in the sense of the 
sentence. 
67 
The negative task involves the initial transvaluation that sets the whole project 
in motion. Of this Nietzsche has said that "we need a critique of moral values, 
the value of these values themselves must first be called into question" (GMp 
§ 6). In questioning, the task is to challenge each value's value, culling all 
moral values that are no longer relevant. The positive task involves keeping 
the project running by somehow maintaining the transvaluative process. This 
task is necessary because without it moral values would once again stagnate 
and one would lapse into taking "the value of these 'values' as given" (GMp § 
6). The positive task requires an element that keeps the whole task in 
perpetual motion, that is, an element that renews the transvaluative aspect of 
the transvaluation of all values. Either task, independent of the other, is 
strenuous enough, but taken together these tasks seem impossible to achieve 
within the lifetime of one individual. 
There is one crucial aspect of Nietzsche's attempted transvaluation, the 
importance of which is seldom emphasised. It is that it merely remained an 
attempt. It is important to know that "Nietzsche himself never achieved a 
complete transvaluation of all values" (Huszar 1945: 271) and that work on 
the proposed book "like the Will to Power before it, the Revaluation of All 
Values had been abandoned" (Hollingdale 1965: 263). This is perhaps 
because Nietzsche a) realised that a project such as this cannot become 
definitive, in accordance with its own definition, which meant that it could not 
be placed in book form and b) that this project would remain as a latent 
possibility within those who strove to 'climb higher'. Following on from this, it 
can be postulated that the Obermensch, being those within whom the highest 
potentials of humankind are realised, would be a walking, breathing, living 
expression of the 'transvaluation of all values'. Huszar (1945: 268) accurately 
realised that "to Nietzsche the transvaluation of all values is not an intellectual 
problem — it is something to be experienced". This supports the proposed 
reasons for Nietzsche's abandonment of presenting the project as his major 
work. The Obermensch seen in this light brings Nietzsche's aim closely in line 
with Nagarjuna's goal of Buddhahood, thus hinting at the possibility of an 
analysis of these ideas beyond the superficial differences discussed. 
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It is possible to understand why Nietzsche thought that the Obermensch had 
not yet come into existence. In order to see why this is, it is informative to see 
why the Obermensch remained a latent potential while for Nagarjuna 
Buddhahood was an actual possibility. It can be assumed that while Nietzsche 
may have discussed individuals such as Wagner and Schopenhauer in 
glowing terms, he never personally met anyone who would satisfy the criteria 
of being, or approaching, the status of an Obermensch. On the other hand, it 
can be seen from the accounts of Nagarjuna's life that he had many different 
teachers, both Brahman and Buddhist (Walleser 1990: 6-8, Zimmer 1951: 
519). Furthermore, Nagarjuna is recognised as a teacher of great knowledge 
who had many students. From this we can deduce that examples of 
individuals who had attained the status of Buddhahood were available to 
Nagarjuna and that, because of his teaching authority, he had attained the 
status of Buddhahood. Opposed to this, Nietzsche did not have any such 
teacher and strove to understand the Obermensch on his own terms. 
Nietzsche's goal was not realised in anyone directly available to him. As a 
result Nietzsche felt that it had not been realised in anyone, yet it remained as 
a potential. This is an example of where the joint contextual/decontextual 
approach brings to light an issue that would otherwise remain hidden if either 
method was applied independently. 
The ideal expressed by each thinker can also be seen to be partially a result 
of their philosophical backgrounds and methodologies. It was necessary for 
Nagarjuna, according to his context, to use his dialectic to deconstruct the 
extremes of realism, of Abhidharma Buddhism, and anti-realism, whilst 
simultaneously advocating for the middle path. In constructing the middle path 
the dialectic defended Nagarjuna's unity of dependent arising and emptiness. 
Similarly, Nietzsche, using his philological tools, then in vogue, traced through 
the history and development of various values. These tools developed into his 
genealogy, which allowed him to establish and support the view that so called 
progress had often led values and virtues to become ends in themselves 10 . 
10 	• It is my view that Nietzsche's genealogical method is an extension, and result, of his early 
foray into philology. Where philology examined the etymology of words, the genealogy 
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Through attacking this position, Nietzsche was able to develop the ideal of the 
Obermensch, which reinstated the central view that values are a means to 
establish, and strive to establish, something beyond our present state. 
Nietzsche sums up this sentiment as "all creatures have hitherto created 
something beyond themselves" (Z P: 3). Nietzsche's view is that "he [or she] 
who wants to create something beyond himself [or herself] has the purest will" 
(Z II: 15) and Nietzsche says, "I love him who wants to create beyond himself" 
(Z I: 17). The Obermensch, as an ideal whose impetus is to strive and create 
new values, is intimately tied to Nietzsche's methodology, which developed 
directly from his context. 
It is necessary to delve further into Nagarjuna's dialectic method to show how 
it both defeats his opposition while simultaneously defending the relationship 
Nagarjuna saw between dependent arising and emptiness. While doing so, it 
will also be shown that any attempt to use Nietzsche to undermine 
Nagarjuna's method make an attempt that is, at best, superficial. Copleston 
sums up Nagarjuna's dialectic as stating that it is incorrect to assert that x is, x 
is not, x both is and is not, nor even x neither is nor is not. For Copleston 
(1982: 53) this functions as a "clearing away" that is the preparation for 
correctly apprehending reality. Conceiving of Nagarjuna's dialectic as having 
primarily a "clearing away" function likens it to the Socratic elenchus method. 
This in turn would potentially open Nagarjuna to the same criticism Socrates 
suffered under Nietzsche's view. The elenchus method, in the hands of 
Socrates, was used to show that commonsensical views of the world were 
based on beliefs that were contradictory. 
The Socratic method, while clearing away erroneous conceptions of the world 
in order to prepare for 'real knowledge', does not, by itself, propose or 
demonstrate a correct, or better, way to conceive of the world. Nietzsche's 
rejection of the Socratic method rests on his view that it is biased against, and 
examined the etymology of morals. Through reading Nietzsche chronologically it is possible to 
see that this philosophical method developed out of the sort of extension he attempted for the 
field of philology with The Birth of Tragedy. 
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denies, the qualities and capacities of nature that humans embody, those 
generally seen as nasty and evil, in preference of uniquely human capacities, 
namely rationality and happiness. Rather, Nietzsche argued, that "in reality 
there is no such" separation between "'natural characteristics and those called 
specifically 'human - (HC: 187). Nietzsche valued both 'good' and 'evil' 
capacities because each is equally capable of providing a position from which 
to act and value life. If it were possible to show that Nagarjuna's dialectical 
method denied one or more major sources of value, as the Socratic method 
does, then it would be possible to utilise Nietzsche's rejection of Socrates to 
dismiss Nagarjuna. 
However, the Nagarjunian dialectic does not fall prey to the criticism of the 
Socratic elenchus. The Nagarjunian dialectic, unlike the Socratic, is intimately 
tied to two notions of truth. The two notions of truth, dependent arising and 
emptiness, are, for Nagarjuna, intimately connected, for "without depending 
on the conventional truth, the meaning of the ultimate [truth] cannot be taught" 
(MK XXIV § 10) and "that which is dependent origination is explained to be 
emptiness" (MK XXIV § 18). Nagarjuna is dissuaded from a strictly realist 
account of reality where emptiness is posited and similarly against a strictly 
antirealist account where dependent arising is posited. As both emptiness and 
dependent arising are two views of the same reality, it is possible, according 
to Nagarjuna's method to stave off attacks from both groups while maintaining 
the middle path between both extremes. As a result Nagarjuna's dialectic, 
unlike the Socratic, attempts to prepare the way for 'real knowledge' without 
denying the pragmatic value of conventional reality. This entails "all positive 
conceptual representations of reality" (Copleston 1982: 58), which maintains a 
position from which to act and create value. This, in turn, makes it possible to 
see that a superficial analysis perceives a great deal of distance between 
Nagarjuna and Nietzsche, whereas a fuller analysis closes this gap, showing 
these two thinkers to be closer than previously thought. 
A comparative analysis that ventures beyond the superficial differences 
shows where similarities between philosophical systems are. However, there 
should be no intention to overlook or even reconcile real differences when 
71 
they occur. One such real difference between the methodologies of Nagarjuna 
and Nietzsche will be shown. If we accept Raju's (1971: 128) claim that the 
"aim of Nagarjuna is to show that nothing positive or negative can be asserted 
of reality". This differs from Nietzsche whose aim was to show that both 
positive and negative aspects of reality intimately work together, not against 
each other, to shape our understanding of the world. In Nietzsche's early 
works the focus is on the contingent existence of contrary values and 
develops in his later works into the view of the world being beyond good and 
evil. 
Both the early and later positions of Nietzsche by themselves seem to 
disagree with Nagarjuna, in that Nietzsche's early work proposed the unity of 
the multiple aspects within the world and later proposed a world without 
positive or negative aspects. It must be recognised that both thinkers are 
tackling a similar issue from different points. Nagarjuna was taking issue with 
the unity of ultimate reality and conventional reality whereas Nietzsche was 
taking issue with the conceptualisation of conventional reality. Furthermore, 
Nagarjuna's position can be expanded to include Nietzsche's position by 
realising that the early and late positions make the same point from different 
positions and as such are akin to the two truths. Contrary to this, Nietzsche's 
position does not conceive of the relation between conventional and ultimate 
reality as Nagarjuna's position does. This means that a real difference 
between the thinkers does occur. However, it would not have been possible to 
examine this if the superficial differences were not seen for what they are, that 
is mistaking something superficial for something real. 
By acknowledging that superficial differences exist, and not assuming them to 
be real, comparative philosophy is able to proceed to a deeper and closer 
analysis of philosophical systems than has previously been possible. By 
examining key ideals from separate philosophical systems, such as the 
example of Buddhahood and the Obermensch, and distinguishing between 
superficial and real differences, it is possible to expand the study further into 
the works of the thinkers compared in order to see how similar or different 
they really are. 
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Throughout this chapter it has been shown that many seemingly irreconcilable 
differences between two philosophical systems are merely superficial. When 
treated as being irreconcilable, such differences halt any further possible 
analysis of the material compared. This may be somewhat obvious and 
methodologically insignificant at this time. However, as this work progresses it 
will be seen that the points of difference raised here, in acknowledging them 
to be superficial, become significant as they become the groundwork to a 
deeper comparison. 
Also, throughout the chapter the joint contextual/decontextual method of 
analysis has been utilised. Following on from the discussion in the first 
chapter, it has been shown that either method, independent of the other, 
unnecessarily limits the analysis of the material. 
Nowhere is it claimed that comparative philosophers have been mistaking 
superficial differences for real ones. However, as was shown in the first 
chapter, discussions of comparative methodology do not distinguish between 
superficial and real differences, and in turn overlook the function of superficial 
differences. It is necessary to observe the superficial differences because 
they open the way and explore what similarities or real differences may exist 
between the philosophical systems compared. The next chapter, focusing on 
similarities and congruencies, builds on the clarification made within this 
chapter of what constitutes a superficial difference in order to examine what, if 
any, underlying similarities and congruencies there are between philosophical 
systems now that it has been shown that some differences are merely 
superficial. 
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Chapter 3 — Similarities and Congruencies 
In continuing with the case study of Nagarjuna and Nietzsche, this chapter will 
elaborate on some of the similarities hinted at previously. The similarities and 
congruencies are so diverse and numerous that this chapter does not intend 
to provide a definitive comparison, nor is it possible within the scope of this 
work. Rather, the intention of this chapter is to show the application of one 
aspect of the method of comparative philosophy advocated throughout this 
work. The comparison made within this chapter is broad, ranging from the 
fundamentals of Nagarjuna's and Nietzsche's worldviews to their conceptions 
of language, as well as including analyses of free will, determinism, 
epistemology, ontology, suffering and pain, morality and the charge of nihilism 
levelled at both. All of this will suffice to show how the comparative method 
presented throughout this work is able to analyse similarities and 
congruencies between philosophers and their works not readily evident using 
other methods of comparative philosophy. 
It can be seen from both Nietzsche's early and late works that, according to 
him, the world is fundamentally unified. That is, there is an interconnection 
that precedes the differentiation of multiple things. Within his early works, 
especially those dealing with the Greeks, Nietzsche continually takes up the 
idea that "all things are one" (BT § 1, PTG § 3), placing emphasis on the 
interconnection. It is because of the prominence of this idea, within the pre-
Platonic philosophers such as Thales, Anaximander, Heraclitus, Parmenides, 
and Anaxagoras, that Nietzsche responds positively to it in PTG. For instance, 
it is the artistic representation of this "primal unity" that distinguishes Attic 
tragedy (BT § 1). With respect to his later work the conception of the world as 
a unity is prominent within both the will-to-power as well as the eternal return. 
Nietzsche treats the will-to-power as a unifying principle to which the 
multiplicity of things becomes subservient. Nietzsche presents the world as 
will-to-power, where the multiplicity of things, the world, is governed and 
unified by the principle of the will-to-power. 
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This is analogous to the relation between Brahman and atman within the 
Hindu teaching, in that if one realises their tman they in turn are in harmony 
with Brahman and any action that is in accordance with this realisation is 
accomplished with the authority of Brahman, or in other words the action is 
carried out with the force that can only come from the unity of the existent. 
This analogy would not be lost on Nietzsche, it is an area that he was familiar 
with and affirms his views of unity. 
On the other hand, the eternal return, too, unifies the existent multiplicity, as 
all is bound by this universal law, as if all were just one interacting with itself. 
As Zarathustra, in grappling with the eternal return, questions, "how could 
there be an outside-of-me" to which he responds, "there is no outside" (Z III: 
13 § 2). This question and answer, arising as it did as a result of the eternal 
return, shows that by realising his true nature Zarathustra came to understand 
that within unity there is no delineating of an "outside" to which the inside is 
other than or separate from l . With no distinction between the inside and 
outside an understanding of the true nature of the individual is at the same 
time an understanding of the true nature of the world. It can be seen that the 
absolute unity of the existent is fundamental to Nietzsche's conception of the 
world. 
In the work of Nagarjuna there are two possible approaches that lead to the 
realisation of unity. Within Nagarjuna's philosophy dependent 
arising/emptiness can be understood from different angles. From one angle 
dependent arising/emptiness can be treated as an epistemological claim. If 
1 On this, Stambaugh (1991: 24) wrote that for Nietzsche "it is a conception of fate, destiny, 
and necessity not as something outside or above us to which we are subject, but as 
something within us, as our innermost being". Following on from the above interpretation, it is 
correct to say that for Nietzsche fate is not a strictly 'outside' phenomenon to which our inside 
is subject. Yet it is equally incorrect to assert that fate is solely an 'inside' phenomena. As 
seen with Zarathustra's assertion about the inside/outside boundary it would be more correct 
to say that fate, as either eternal return or will-to-power, encapsulates all that is and to feel 
that there is a 'subject', an 'inside', an 'I' which is bound to, yet in some way separate from, 
this cosmic principle is the mistake from which all other mistakes about Nietzsche's 
conception of the nature of existence arise. 
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treated in this manner all the things that can be known conventionally are 
dependently arisen and by virtue of the fact that knowledge of any particular 
thing cannot be divorced from all other things there is a common unity 
between all that can be known. Nagarjuna wrote that "[there is] no object of 
knowledge unless it is being known ... but the knowing consciousness does 
not exist without [its object]", concluding that "knowledge and the object of 
knowledge do not exist by own-being" (Loc § 10). With no separation between 
the knower and the known, it follows that as conventional differentiation has 
no essential existence the thing known as well as the knower are united. 
Nagarjuna also states that "when asked if the beginning is known, the great 
sage said 'no- (MK XI § 1), concluding that "all entities are without a prior 
limit" (MK XI § 8). If all entities are without beginning then we must admit that 
they are in some way connected and thus unified by those interconnections. 
Furthermore, according to the ultimate truth the world of things is empty. This 
means that all things are inherently empty and as such all that exists is united 
by virtue of their emptiness. Thus epistemologically dependent 
arising/emptiness can be seen to have, at its foundation, a metaphysical unity. 
It is also important to note that when the epistemological aspect of the 
doctrine of dependent arising/emptiness is analysed it makes no claim to the 
ontological reality that is appended. This opens the way to an examination of 
dependent arising/emptiness as an ontological claim. Treated ontologically, 
dependent arising/emptiness again makes an explicit claim of a fundamental 
unity. If all that exists is dependently arisen then on the level of conventional 
truth then dependent arising unites that which exists through the process of 
dependent arising. As Nagarjuna wrote "one different thing depends on 
another for its difference ... it is not tenable for that which depends on 
something else to be different from it" (MK XIV § 5) with the result that "it is 
also not tenable that there is difference" (MK XIV § 4). That is, difference is 
not tenable from the perspective of ultimate truth, i.e. emptiness, and similarly 
dependent arising, i.e. conventional truth, when treated as a cosmic or 
metaphysical principle. In this discussion of unity we must clarify our position. 
In discussing Nagarjuna on unity it is not being asserted that all things are 
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one, for that would be to posit a self existent, independently originated entity. 
Rather, we are asserting the unity that, in a sense, precedes oneness, that is, 
if you will pardon the expression, the unity of zero. While somewhat awkward, 
it can be seen that it is not absurd. From zero all things may be drawn out, 
while it itself is no 'thing', in the sense that we can get one if, and only if, we 
accept negative one at the same time. Both one and minus one arise 
dependently, neither have self existence, and when observed correctly are no 
more or less than zero. Thus, it is in this sense that unity in Nagarjuna is 
being discussed. 
The establishment of a particular 'thing' is achieved through its differentiation 
from other 'things', but as Nagarjuna pointed out it will not be separate from 
what it is differentiated against. All things are intimately bound together 
without real separation, thus conventional truth requires unity. According to 
ultimate reality all is united by virtue of its inherent emptiness, as Nagarjuna 
wrote, "empty things are born from empty things" (Bod § 63). If this is not 
enough, De Jong (1972: 8) has aptly pointed out that "the Madhyamika are 
monists, not in the sense of a unique monistic reality but in the sense of a 
unique principle of explanation, which excludes all real plurality", hence unity 
as an intrinsic aspect of their worldview. 
The claim of unity applies equally to Nietzsche's doctrine of eternal recurrence 
and will-to-power as each is a "unique principle of explanation" excluding all 
real plurality2 . It is important to note that while dependent arising and 
emptiness appear to be two separate unique principles of explanation 
"emptiness (Stinyata) is defined as equivalent to dependent coarising" 
(Robinson 1972: 326) and are thus two sides of the same coin, both 
professing unity. However, whatever way dependent arising/emptiness is 
examined, it is possible to see unity at its foundation. It could be stated, by 
2 This does not contradict perspectivism in that it does not deny a plurality of positions on a 
personal level. Rather, it is confirmation of the unity in which all perspectives exist. 
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way of analogy, that emptiness as "absolute is 'necessary' Being, that which 
must be, which cannot not be, and which for that very reason is unique" and 
that dependent arising as "infinite is `free' Being, which is unlimited and which 
contains all that can be, and which for that very reason is total" (Schuon 2005: 
310). While this is not a typical reading of Nagarjuna, it does lead to an 
interesting conclusion. 
Emptiness, in that emptiness is itself empty, is absolute, in that it is self-
contained, unique, and necessary. If emptiness was not self-contained, then 
emptiness itself would not be empty. If it was not unique, that would mean that 
there was something like it, thus independent from it. If it was not necessary, 
then not everything would be empty because it did not have to be. All three of 
these conclusions are absurd, thus, we may say, emptiness is self-contained, 
unique, and necessary. Emptiness, as unique and necessary, unifies all that 
is empty. Dependent arising, covering all that has, does, and will arise, is 
unlimited, in what it covers, and is thus total. Being total, dependent arising is 
infinite and unifies all that arises. The absolute and infinite are inseparable in 
the same manner that emptiness and dependent arising are linked. Thus, 
according to this reading, from either angle, unity can be seen to function 
within the work of Nagarjuna. From this it is evident that unity is a principle 
common to both Nagarjuna's and Nietzsche's philosophies. 
By acknowledging that the world of multiplicity is underpinned by unity, both 
Nagarjuna and Nietzsche can be seen to be making claims about 
determinism. Of the two thinkers it is more obvious that Nietzsche's eternal 
return is an explicit doctrine of determinism. With a finite number of particles 
existing within infinite time endlessly moving from one permutation to another 
it is apparent that each particular permutation must both follow a necessary 
sequence as well as repeating said sequence time and time again, "it shall 
return ... not to a new life or a better life or a similar life: [it] shall return 
eternally to this identical and selfsame life" (Z III: 13 § 2). The "it" referred to 
here is any and all specific combination of particles or permutation. Thus, 
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while we may perceive that free will exists, this is due to our lack of ability to 
grasp the true nature of the world. 
Yet, while Nietzsche openly embraces the deterministic nature of the 
universe, he does not feel that this is a reason for despair, nor is the eternal 
return a pessimistic or nihilistic doctrine. For Nietzsche there are two options 
to overcome a defeatist response to the eternal recurrence. An example of 
kind of response is Danto's (1987: 48) calling the whole idea "nauseating". His 
reason for this is that knowledge of the eternal return "could, of course, 
change nothing" and that such knowledge leads to "cosmic boredom" (Danto 
1987: 48). While knowledge of the eternal return will ultimately change 
nothing, the idea (even as a necessary fiction) is meant to give a reason, and 
position, to act from and, in doing so, avoids the "despair with life" Danto 
(1987: 48) sees as characteristic of both Nietzsche's philosophy and the 
Indian view of life. Either, we can, in blissful ignorance, choose to believe that 
we still have free will or, as Nietzsche prefers, we can embrace it openly, 
crying out like Zarathustra "I love you, 0 Eternity" (Z III: 13 § 2), with such 
fervour that we experience amour fati, love of fate. The consequence of this 
would be that we accept the predetermined nature of the universe, ignorant of 
what will actually happen, and must continue to strive towards our, so-called, 
'chosen' destination, accepting, as necessary, all the pitfalls along the way. 
This determinism is a stricter more calculated form of an idea that Nietzsche 
developed within his early thoughts. In an early work Nietzsche stated that 
what we designate as uniquely . 'human' qualities, in this case free will, as 
opposed to merely 'animal' qualities, in this case their reactive and 
determinable nature, have "grown together inextricably" (HC: 187) or we may 
say "everything forever has its opposite along with it" (PTG § 5). To say that 
the qualities that raise us above the animals are 'good' and that for us to have 
the qualities that we relegate to animal nature as tad' is a fallacy and a result 
of our inability to realise that this created dichotomy is really a harmony and 
unity of all such qualities. Thus, determinism plays a crucial role within 
Nietzsche's philosophical system, following on from, and as a result of, 
fundamental unity. 
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Within Nagarjuna's philosophical system we can see determinism in a subtler 
position. Before we proceed with this analysis, it must be admitted that 
discussions of free will do not enter Buddhist thinking because of the absence 
of the notion of will. However, the intention is not to comment on Nagarjuna, 
rather to engage in the kind of conversation proposed by Garfield (2002: 169) 
to see if these views have any bearing or consequences for us. It will be 
shown that determinism is evident within both epistemological and ontological 
interpretations of the dependent arising/emptiness principle. Within the 
ontological interpretation determinism becomes apparent by examining 
successive states. By state it is here meant the occurrence, position and 
relationship between all existent things at one given moment. At any given 
moment all existent things are intimately tied together because they are 
dependently arisen. Yet, if this is the case then any two successive moments 
must depend on each other for their existence, one being unable to exist 
without the other and vice versa. Therefore, we must conclude that states too 
dependently arise. This is something that the Buddha realised in that as a 
result of the principle of dependent arising "his death was initiated when he 
was born in this world, an occurrence over which he had no complete control" 
(Kalupahana 1994: 92) However, if one state presupposes its successor and 
is presupposed by its predecessor then we could say that one state 
determines the next. 
If the principle of dependent arising/emptiness is treated as an 
epistemological claim then it does hint at the possibility of a non-deterministic 
result. By treating dependent arising/emptiness as making an epistemological 
claim the focus shifts to psychological states. Like its ontological counterpart, 
successive psychological states are determined by the states preceding it. No 
particular psychological state has independent existence and is empty of the 
ability to initiate action. In one sense Nirvaga, or liberation, can be considered 
an "absence of constraint" (Kalupahana 1994: 91). Liberation would then be a 
release from the deterministic and limited nature of unenlightened thought. 
This would then hint at the possibility of real action, real in the sense that it 
has causative value, in that it is unconstrained, rather than being merely 
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consequential, that is, depending on the state that preceded it. Unenlightened 
thought is the source of suffering because it is the result of "mental 
defilements and ignorance" (Tachikawa 1997: 19). Successive psychological 
states are the consequence of previous states within unenlightened thought 
because of one's ignorance about any particular state. 
Understanding, and thus liberation, allows for a free, or unconstricted, 
response to dependently arisen phenomena. This means that one has the 
ability to act rather than merely react. The experience of suffering, i.e. the 
psychological state, is intimately tied to the degree of understanding, i.e. the 
epistemological state. Yet, this would be blurring ontological and 
epistemological boundaries. Thought free from attachment does not result in 
independent action. Liberation is freedom and "freedom pertains both to 
human knowledge and understanding and to human behaviour" with the result 
that "the first form of freedom is a necessary condition for the second" 
(Kalupahana 1994: 91). Freedom of human knowledge and understanding 
means unconditioned reflection on one's actions, which, in turn, results in 
unconditioned behaviour. 
Liberation is possible through understanding the dependently arisen nature of 
the world. In order to understand this, it is necessary to develop a 
psychological state free of attachment. Whether or not this is actual freedom, 
or merely as close as one may come, is contentious, placing further doubts on 
the achievement of an individual initiating action, as the freedom of action 
depends on the freedom from attachment. Thus, we may extrapolate from 
Nagarjuna that, as it remains unachievable to become unattached physically, 
determinism has a large role while its implications remain implicit. 
To follow these ideas on dependent arising and the eternal return, while a 
minor digression from the proceeding, shows how these two ideas are almost 
a reflection of the same principle. A commentator on the eternal return wrote, 
"for Nietzsche, eternity, the eternal return of the Same, meant 'there is no end' 
... in the sense that it endures on and on without ever encountering anything 
to stop it" (Stambaugh 1972: 3) and "there is no 'once and for all', neither in 
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time nor outside it" (Stambaugh 1972: 4). The eternal return presupposes a 
finite quantity of material and "if finitude is understood to mean 
impermanence, eternal return is that which gives permanence to Becoming" 
(Stambaugh 1972: 13). Nietzsche's idea derived from Heraclitus who 
profoundly affirmed Becoming and realised that Becoming itself is free from 
judgement, as Nietzsche has him say "not the punishment of what has come-
to-be did I see, but the justification of that which is coming-into-being" (PTG § 
5), the ramifications of which are within Nietzsche's moral outlook. In light of 
this interpretation we can say that there is no 'once and for all' within 
dependent arising as it is a doctrine of continuing and everlasting unfolding of 
events and their constituents. 
For those who are subject to them, both dependent arising and the eternal 
return are without a goal or end. The impermanence of the 'things' they each 
influence is the result of a common lack of teleology. Both doctrines give 
permanence to Becoming by virtue of their all-encompassing nature, which 
describes the constant flux without completion. This is true of dependent 
arising, if examined in isolation. Buddhism is thoroughly teleological, as it is a 
quest for Buddhahood and Nimarja, the cessation of samsara. Similarly, the 
teleological aspect of Nietzsche's work is the arrival of the Obermensch. Thus, 
we could say that Buddhahood saves one from the "abyss" of dependent 
arising, drawing another similarity between these two ideal. Again, this 
indicates to the fundamental unity, common to both doctrines, expressed as 
permanent Becoming. Yet, while Stambaugh's views can be affirmed this far 
we must draw the line, as a result of the commonality between the doctrines 
shown here, when it is asserted, "no one ever, in the West or in the East, has 
ever made such a statement" as the eternal recurrence and concludes that 
"Nietzsche's thought is unique" (Stambaugh 1972: 5). While Stambaugh's 
focus was not on comparative issues we must admit that this claim is, at best, 
naïve, especially with regard to the method of comparative philosophy argued 
for through this work. Putting these comments aside, it still remains that there 
is some degree of congruence between dependent arising and the eternal 
return. 
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Another similarity can be shown through an analysis of the role of suffering 
and pain within Nagarjuna and Nietzsche. It becomes possible to see that 
both thinkers see pain as being intimately tied to the freedom from suffering. 
The focus is here placed on a distinction between pain, as a given and 
necessary result of interaction with the world, and suffering, which is the 
desire to be free from pain. Nagarjuna begins with the Buddhist truth that "this 
life is 'a world of suffering', and it has, as its main cause, suffering" (Suh § 
114); Nietzsche asserts that suffering's existence is something that he has 
experienced firsthand with one commentator writing that "since the time of 
The Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche upheld the unmodified insight that profound 
suffering accompanies our life" (Takeda 2001: 101). While both thinkers begin 
with the existence of suffering, Nagarjuna proposes liberation from it whereas 
Nietzsche proposes that we engage with it so that it may be transvalued. This, 
then, would appear to show that the role of suffering has opposing functions in 
each of these thinkers. 
However, it can be seen that while the form may differ, the intended outcome 
of Nagarjuna's and Nietzsche's views on suffering are closely aligned. As both 
philosophical systems accept the determined nature of the world, both 
systems concede that what happens within the world proceeds irrespective of 
the preferences, beliefs, or actions of anything within it. It can be seen that for 
both thinkers suffering occurs when we desire the world to proceed differently 
to the way it actually does. Suffering arises as a result of our inability to 
accept the determined nature of the world. Thus, both Nagarjuna and 
Nietzsche agree both on the occurrence and source of suffering. 
In order to get a deeper understanding of the role of suffering it is necessary 
to show how Nagarjuna and Nietzsche each propose to deal with the problem 
of suffering. At its base suffering is psychological, as a result of attachment 
(Nagarjuna) or as a result of one's value system (Nietzsche). Yet, Nagarjuna 
seeks liberation from suffering so that it may cease while Nietzsche seeks its 
transvaluation so that we may strive higher, presumably closer to the 
Obermensch. While Nagarjuna proceeds by reducing attachment in order to 
reduce suffering, Nietzsche suggests that we increase our suffering so that 
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we may know it better. However, it would be wrong to assert that Nietzsche's 
"affirmation of life is thus nothing other than a strong affirmation of profound 
suffering" (Takeda 2001: 101). Rather, Nietzsche writes "sickness is a 
powerful stimulant — but one has to be healthy enough for it" (WLN 18[11]). 
Sickness in this sense is a combination of pain and suffering, which is why it 
requires health, not of the physical kind but of the psychological kind. 
For Nietzsche the sign of health is the ability to endure sickness, which is the 
ability to endure pain without suffering from it. While this may seem 
paradoxical it provides us with the greatest insight into Nietzsche's 
transvaluative process and his reason for saying, "who knows how much I am 
ultimately indebted ... to my protracted sickness" (E I § 6). Nietzsche is 
ultimately indebted to his sickness because through it he could learn the 
difference between pain and suffering, and how the former is necessary while 
the latter is self-created. This equivocation on 'suffering' carries beyond 
Nietzsche's work, it can be seen in Nishitani (1990: 52) writing that the love of 
fate for Nietzsche provided the means for "a self-transformation that 
overcomes suffering through suffering", and in Deleuze's (1983: 129) 
comment that "pain is a reaction" when in fact suffering is a reaction to pain. 
Others have understood Nietzsche's intention without drawing out the dual 
role given to suffering in comments that suffering "is turned into a monster, 
wildly exaggerated, in order to make action necessary" yet "true suffering [i.e. 
pain], incidentally, is not projected elsewhere; it is the stimulus that causes 
authentic distress and provides the source of self-transcendence" (Ackermann 
1990: 41). Another example is Wicks' (2002: 88-9) comment that Nietzsche 
and Buddha "would have made good friends" because "nothing impressed 
Nietzsche more than the transience of our daily world ... with its apparently 
senseless suffering" but that "Nietzsche wanted to live with the flame of 
suffering rather than extinguish it". If the distinction between pain and 
suffering were explicitly stated there would have been no separation between 
suffering and "true", "authentic" suffering. Also, one commentator noted the 
disdain for suffering, as it is used here, without the denial of pain in writing 
"Nietzsche has certainly a contempt for pity — that is, for sentimentalising over 
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one's own sufferings" (Coomaraswamy 1924: 116-17). Nietzsche even 
acknowledges the value of Buddhism as being "a hundred times more realistic 
than Christianity" because "it no longer says 'struggle against sin' but, duly 
respectful of reality, 'struggle against suffering - (A § 20). 
Before completely solving this puzzle it is necessary to turn and examine what 
Nagarjuna is proposing to reduce. Nagarjuna proceeds to reduce suffering, as 
it is unnecessary. This is "a world of suffering" whose "main cause" is 
attachment (Suh § 114). However, this is not to say that Buddhists propose to 
reduce all feeling with the aim to anaesthetise humanity, as it would 
undermine skilful living. Liberation from suffering frees the individual from 
unnecessary pain while leaving necessary pain untouched. We may 
extrapolate from the four truths, that pain is necessary because it informs us 
about the world, providing us a basis from which we can act, whereas, 
suffering does not inform us about the world or how to proceed within, it only 
how we construct our value system. This shows that Nietzsche is 
equivocating on the word suffering without distinction between suffering and 
pain, a distinction crucial to Buddhism. Nietzsche almost acknowledges the 
distinction between, and transformation of, pain into suffering, writing of the 
"reinterpretation of suffering as feelings of guilt, fear, and punishment" (GM III 
§ 20). In doing so, Nietzsche feels that this enables us to transvalue suffering, 
realising that it informs us about the perceptions we impose on the world, thus 
we no longer suffer from it. The existence of suffering, and the necessity of 
pain, is integral to the work of both Nagarjuna and Nietzsche. Both attempting 
to relegate suffering to its rightful place within the human condition, showing a 
further congruence. 
From the above analysis it is possible to show that there is congruence 
between individuals who realise the dependently arisen nature of the world 
and individuals who accept the eternal return. Simply stated, these doctrines 
reduce anxiety, where upon realisation of these doctrines, the individual's 
psychological outlook becomes free of current, and devoid of the potential for 
future, anxiety. 
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This process, of the reduction of anxiety, is easily apprehended through an 
examination of Nietzsche's eternal recurrence and his gradual acceptance of 
it. While it was implicit in some of his earlier works, Nietzsche first explicitly 
presented the eternal recurrence by introducing it as "the greatest weight" (GS 
§ 341). Nietzsche realised that if it "gained possession of you, it would change 
you as you are or perhaps crush you" (GS § 341). Zarathustra, too, at first 
was presented with the eternal recurrence as a doctrine both ugly and heavy, 
a burden to bear for humanity. However, by Ecce Homo Nietzsche's attitude 
is lighter. This change in attitude is also captured in a letter in 1882 to Jacob 
Burckhardt where Nietzsche wrote, "I have reached a point at which I live as I 
think" (SL § 101). Gutmann (1954) documented this change calling it a 
"tremendous moment" in Nietzsche's philosophical development. The crush of 
the eternal recurrence is obvious and most commentators focus on this point, 
with Danto (1987: 48) finding it "nauseating" and Tanner (1994: 45) asserting 
that it "invests with a terrible weight what does happen". Hatab (2005: 2) 
confesses to "having been deeply challenged by this thought of eternal 
recurrence" and when faced with saying "Yes or No to life as actually lived" 
responds "I don't think I can measure up to saying Yes, but somehow I think I 
should". These commentators, to varying degrees, resist the change that may 
be brought about by the eternal recurrence and thus their comments can be 
seen to be in response to its crushing aspects. 
The primary aspect of the crush being focused on here is the existential angst 
over the purpose to strive if everything is predetermined and lived repetitiously 
over. From Nietzsche acceptance of the eternal recurrence, we can posit that 
this acceptance changed how he was and allowed him to reach a point where 
his actions, in his own eyes, reflected his thoughts. This can be seen through 
the change in the disposition of Zarathustra, his maintaining the doctrine of 
eternal recurrence, and a change of focus away from its crushing aspects. It is 
for this reason that "Nietzsche understood his task of 'transvaluation of all 
values' in close connection with the 'thought of eternal return - (Takeda 2001: 
99). AnseII-Pearson (1992: 320) recognised the transformative aspect of the 
eternal return, writing that the Obermensch "is the person who has emerged 
from the experience of the riddle of return and affirmed the importance of its 
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teaching". The importance is, for this analysis, the reduction of anxiety. 
Nietzsche realised that those who came up against it would feel the crush, 
but, if they had the strength and forbearance, then they would be changed. 
How the eternal recurrence reduces anxiety may still be unclear. We can see 
that anxiety generally arises when an individual's selfish desires are not 
realised in the manner they desired. Yet, the eternal recurrence tells us that 
we have already eaten, spent, purchased, and worn all that we ever will 
innumerable times over and will continue to eat, spend, purchase, and wear 
all that we ever will innumerable times more. All our provisions are catered for 
without increase or decrease. This means that selfish calculation, the cause of 
anxiety, is totally unnecessary. This is how the eternal recurrence will "change 
you as you are" (GS § 341). It is interesting to note that implicit in this 
realisation is a kind a freedom not previously discussed. Without anxiety one 
no longer suffers from existential angst. Here we may say that to accept the 
eternal return, or embody the doctrine of dependent arising, is to be free from 
existential anxiety. 
After realising that the eternal recurrence reduces anxiety it is possible to see 
that the doctrine of dependent arising works in the same way. Realising that 
any particular thing depends on all other things for its existence means that all 
of one's provisions are bound to the totality of all things. Dependent arising, 
as a unique principle of explanation excluding "all real plurality" (De Jong 
1972: 8), explains the multiplicity of 'things' according their interrelation with 
all other existents. This has the potential to crush anyone who attempts to 
calculate all things. That is, they would be overburdened because in order to 
determine their provisions they would have to include in the calculation all 
things in existence. The stress and anxiety involved in such a calculation 
would be too much for any individual. Yet, the contemplation of dependent 
arising rarely includes an analysis of its existential ramifications. There is 
safety in avoiding this sort of calculation and contemplation as it precludes the 
increase of anxiety. 
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If one was to delve into the ramifications of their interdependence, they may 
feel as if they have taken on the greatest weight, realising that, for one to gain 
anything, they must affect all things. Nagarjuna avoids this sort of thinking 
and, in doing so, precludes any anxiety that would come as a result of one 
knowing that it is impossible for them to change all things. Nagarjuna 
frequently used and discussed dependent arising within his works to correct 
one's understanding of causation (MK l), desire (MK VI), past and future time 
(MK XIX), etc, the result of which is a relinquishing of focus on and calculation 
of various things and types of things, such as one's provisions. The change in 
one's anxiety levels is brought about much more organically and faster. Both 
dependent arising and the eternal return have the same affect on anxiety. 
While both achieve this through different means, the result is the same. 
Furthermore, by examining this similarity a real difference regarding the 
effectiveness of both doctrines has emerged. In precluding calculations of the 
kind mentioned, Nagarjuna's method saves the individual from the crush of 
such calculation, whereas Nietzsche himself, along with others who have 
taken up his views, was deeply affected by the crush of the eternal return. 
This is a real difference, in that the former reduces anxiety while the latter 
induces anxiety which subsides as one works through it. This real difference 
would not have become apparent if the superficial differences had not been 
drawn out. If in our analysis of the eternal return we, like the scholars 
mentioned, has merely focused on the crushing aspect of the eternal return, 
we could not have seen how it changes the individual and reduces their 
anxiety, and thus would have been left with a merely superficial difference. 
For Nagarjuna and Nietzsche, their views on morality are founded on their 
acceptance of the existence of suffering. On examination it can be seen that 
both thinkers have two systems of ethics within each of their respective 
philosophies. Nagarjuna, after admitting the existence of suffering, proposes 
that one should engage in activities that minimise the suffering of other 
creatures. Nagarjuna advocates "ethical behaviour" (Suh § 4) emphasising 
that "you must make faultlessness, open-mindedness, mental clarity, and 
purity the basis of ethical behaviour" (Suh § 7) which in turn becomes "the 
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support of everything valuable" (Suh § 7). Ethical behaviour, according to 
Nagarjuna, includes, but is not limited to, "charity" (Suh § 4), "gifts" (Suh § 6), 
"patience and tolerance" (Suh § 8), the honouring of one's parents (Suh § 9), 
and giving up "hurting, stealing, improper sex, lying, intoxicating drinks and 
obsession with eating" (Suh § 10) among other things. It follows from the 
previous comments regarding attachment, that such action can only be 
considered moral if it is sincere and selfless, for selfish action only 
perpetuates suffering. 
Nietzsche, in accordance with his views on suffering, states "all morality 
allows the intentional infliction of harm ... when it is a matter of self-
presetvation" (HAH § 102) and even killing, stealing, or even lying are 
permissible for a moral being. The primary opposition to such action "is not 
'egoism' and 'selflessness', but rather adherence to a tradition or law" (HAH § 
96). Nietzsche wrote "those capacities of [the human] which are terrible and 
are viewed as inhuman are perhaps, indeed, the fertile soil from which alone 
all humanity, in feelings, deeds and works, can grow forth" (HC: 187). 
Nietzsche's reasoning for this is that seeming opposites occur in harmony 
within the world and to pursue one to the detriment of the other would result in 
one fighting against the natural order. 
Furthermore, "we don't accuse nature of immorality" (HAH § 102). Since, 
according to Nietzsche, we are bound by the laws of nature it would be 
absurd to fight them and to do so would lead only to our detriment. With 
Nagarjuna prohibiting certain behaviour and Nietzsche enjoining those very 
same actions it would appear that the moral systems of both thinkers are in 
opposition, yet both ensure the adherent's continued engagement with the 
world. 
On further analysis both Nagarjuna and Nietzsche, however, have a higher 
morality that is not encompassed by their dos and don'ts. This is the moral 
system of an enlightened being; for Nagarjuna it is the moral being of 
Buddhahood and for Nietzsche it is the morality of the Obermensch. We may 
extrapolate, from Nagarjuna's dialectic that, while there is the imperative to be 
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moral, the moral worth of any given action hinges on the circumstances that 
surround it. By this we mean that the validity of moral laws is not absolute. 
Harvey (2000: 46-7) writes that the criteria for separating virtuous from 
nonvirtuous actions includes the motivation behind the action as well as its 
direct effects and that in an action is based upon non-greed, non-hatred, and 
non-delusion then it can be considered virtuous. Thus, for one who 
understands the dependently arisen nature of existence, it is possible to 
envisage circumstances where lying or even theft be considered moral, 
contrary to Kant. In fact, the existence of a morality beyond good and evil is 
attested to by Harvey (2000: 44) where he states that there is a soteriological 
station "for whom both unwholesome and wholesome moral conduct (Oa) are 
said to be 'stopped' completely". 
Similarity, the Obermensch is to a human as a human is to an animal as 
Nietzsche wrote, "[the human] is a rope, fastened between animal and 
Obermensch" (Z P: 4). Animals have no created values and are inferior to 
humans who have values. Yet, the values held by humanity are reactionary 
and outdated because, according to Nietzsche, humans have ceased to have 
the ability to evolve their values. One of the defining features of the 
Obermensch is the ability to create values. The superiority of the Obermensch 
is its ability to create moral values according to their necessity. The 
Obermensch here differs from slave morality in the sense that the former can 
accept the nature of birds of prey whereas the latter react against the birds of 
prey and "make the bird of prey accountable for being a bird of prey" (GM I § 
13). This shows that the Obermensch, like one who has realised Buddhahood, 
has no absolute moral values, that is, no actions that are deemed to be 
always moral. Yet, both act according to circumstance, such that, irrespective 
of the circumstances, their actions must, by definition, always be considered 
moral. 
It is also possible to see parallels between Nagarjuna and Nietzsche in their 
views on language. Both thinkers show that while it is essential for 
communication, when language is taken as a means to apprehend the world it 
provides a misleading view of reality and is flawed in this manner. Nietzsche 
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wrote "the seduction of language (and of the fundamental errors of reason 
that are petrified in it) which conceive and misconceives all effects as 
conditioned by something that causes effects, by a 'subject- , concluding that 
"there is no 'being' behind doing, effecting, becoming; 'the doer' is merely a 
fiction added to the deed" (GM I § 13). Further noting, "our entire science still 
lies under the misleading influence of language and has not disposed of that 
little changeling, the 'subject - (GM I § 13). Danto (1987: 99) succinctly 
captures this argument of the flaws of language in writing, "Nietzsche believed 
that the fact we have a subject-predicate grammar has misled us into 
believing that we live in a subject-predicate world". This is akin to the mistake 
of positing the existence of independent 'things' due to the fact that language 
requires separate 'things' for its content. This can be seen from the 
Madhyamika School's views on language, that "the failure to distinguish 
between reality in itself and reality of names and forms is ignorance, which 
breeds suffering" (Puligandla 1975: 85). Martin (1991: 91) wrote, "Nagarjuna's 
dialectical analysis of the common categories by which people understand 
existence carries radical implications, somewhat comparable to those of 
Nietzsche's philosophy" as both led to "the realisation that both everyday 
existence and the categories by which we comprehend it are self-
contradictory and incoherent". In Nagarjuna, this is so if one is attempting to 
assert independent existence of one of the categories, and, in Nietzsche, this 
is so if one's mode of valuation is inherently biased to one set of values over 
others. Thus, for both Nagarjuna and Nietzsche, language, when used to 
apprehend reality, provides a misshapen view of reality and is a source of 
suffering. 
It is now possible to examine a similarity between the way Nagarjuna and 
Nietzsche have been discussed and interpreted. It will be seen that, while this 
approach is from an altogether different angle than the preceding, the 
methodology is consistent and yields interesting results. It is fruitful to 
examine the fact that both thinkers have been labelled nihilists. Tuck (1990: 
31 - 37) details how and why, from various angles, Nagarjuna and the 
Madhyamikas were, in a sense, left to the dogs and accepted as nihilists 
without any attempted defence. There was a "consensus that Buddhist 
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philosophy had little relevance to the conclusions of the great European 
philosophers" (Tuck 1990: 35) and as a result the "Madhyamika, commonly 
agreed to be the most nihilistic of all Buddhist schools, was ignored" (Tuck 
1990: 36). Evidence of this is in the oft used phrase of Northrop (1946: 348 — 
50) "the nihilistic Mahayanistic Buddhism of Nagarjuna", appearing on three 
consecutive pages. Part of this exclusion and tag of nihilism would have 
resulted from the early European Buddhist studies that drew from poorly 
translated texts. However, we may posit that part of the aversion to this alien 
doctrine is in its avoidance of reification, which is counter to much of 
continental philosophy and its discussions on historical dialectics, things-in-
themselves, or the will-to-power, to name a few. 
Nietzsche's relation to nihilism is somewhat more difficult to define and to 
detail it here would take us beyond the scope of this work. It will be sufficient 
to note that assertions such as "I commenced to undermine our faith in 
morality' (Dp § 2), "there are no moral phenomena at all, only a moral 
interpretation of phenomena" (BGE § 108), and that his assertion of the 
Obermensch is opposed to "Christians and other nihilists" (E III § 1) have led 
to commentaries that either disdain Nietzsche for his nihilism or champion him 
for it. Nietzsche's ambivalence towards nihilism is recognised and summed up 
by Hulin's (1991: 64) comment that "Nietzsche himself denounces nihilism, on 
the one hand, as the decay of the highest values of a culture ... and on the 
other he proposes it as an enterprise to be undertaken, a path that must be 
climbed all the way to the end if the transvaluation of values is to have any 
chance of coming about". Irrespective of the truth of the claims against both 
Nagarjuna and Nietzsche, both have been accused of nihilistic tendencies. 
In order to determine if this label can be justifiably applied, nihilism must be 
clearly defined. If by nihilism it is meant "something like the total rejection of 
religious or moral principles" (Elman 1983: 672) then it is clear that both 
thinkers are not nihilistic. Nagarjuna, in his smaller treatises, makes 
comments such as "there is no moral defilement equal to lust " (Lugs: 25) and 
"a short life come through killing, much suffering through harming, through 
stealing poor resources, through adultery enemies" (Rat § 14). In his major 
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treatise Nagarjuna states "self restraint and benefiting others with a 
compassionate mind is the Dharma" (MK XVII § 1). This clearly shows that 
Nagarjuna does not deny all values. 
Nietzsche's work Daybreak has the subtitle 'thoughts on the prejudices of 
morality', which shows that, while he may have disagreed on the application 
of certain moral principles, he gave credence to their existence through 
acknowledging them. Furthermore, the failed attempt at a 'transvaluation of all 
values' shows that Nietzsche did not intend a "total rejection" of moral values. 
In further support of Nietzsche as non-nihilistic it is possible to see why his 
proposed total transvaluation necessarily failed. Nietzsche had intended to 
write a several volume opus dedicated to the topic, of which The Antichrist 
was to be the first book. Yet, if Nietzsche had succeeded in capturing the 
transvaluation of all values in black and white, once it had been completed, it 
would instantaneously begin to stagnate and require itself to be transvalued. 
This is why it is necessary that this task failed and why the moral outlook of 
the Obermensch would succeed because, as a process, values can be 
continuously transvalued. The abandonment of a 'transvaluation of all values' 
encapsulated between two covers and the continued adherence to the 
Obermensch is further evidence that Nietzsche never intended to reject moral 
values altogether and is not a nihilist in this sense. Some would go so far as 
to assert "neither Nietzsche nor Nagarjuna, however, concluded that there 
was no world; neither affirmed nothingness" (Elman 1983: 685-86). Thus, no 
argument against Nagarjuna or Nietzsche could support the idea that either 
thinker was a nihilist in the sense of a total denial of moral value. 
However, there is evidence to justify claims that both Nagarjuna and 
Nietzsche adhere to a weaker type of nihilism. If we accuse each thinker of "a 
nihilism of indifference with respect to what we have become" (Havas 1995: 
1), that is, they denied the validity of the prevalent values, the values we have 
come to embody, or a nihilism that "no longer the devaluation of life in the 
name of higher values but rather the devaluation of the higher values 
themselves (Deleuze 1983: 148), where the necessity of life is not challenged, 
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but the values we use to evaluate life are, then this label has credence. To the 
decadent and the materialist, Nagarjuna must be a nihilist as he denies the 
value of wealth and possessions, seeing greater wealth in virtuous actions. As 
he states, "generosity is the best friend, and the Dharma is the most precious 
gem" (Lugs: 26), "it is wise economy to give alms, knowing that when we 
pass, our actions, like our property, abide" (Lugs: 45), and again that "giving 
alms which do no harm to others results in pleasure which cannot be carried 
away by flood, nor burned by fire, nor stolen by thieves" (Lugs: 47). 
For those who see a strict divide between right and wrong, Nietzsche, too, is a 
dangerous nihilist. Nietzsche noticed that "if we speak of humanity, it is on the 
basic assumption that it should be that which separates [the hu]man from 
nature and is his [or her] mark of distinction" adding that "in reality there is no 
such separation" (HC: 187). The title of Nietzsche's work Beyond Good and 
Evil reflects a recurrent theme within his philosophy, that opposites are not 
mutually exclusive or separate and that if one penetrates past this 
appearance then they will realise that seeming opposites are intimately linked. 
Nihilism is here a destroyer of values, so that they can be rebuilt, rather than a 
denier of values, that is a nihilism that "may be both creative and destructive: 
destroying sick values in favour of healthy ones" (Rudolph 1969: 40). 
Both thinkers challenge assumptions and, in doing so, both Naga- rjuna and 
Nietzsche, each in their own way, show how well established values may be 
toppled, and seemingly contrary values may be established on a firmer basis. 
Nagarjuna's dialectic destroys extremes while paving the middle path, 
whereas Nietzsche's approach is to smash values in order to test them, as if 
with a tuning fork. For this reason, it can be argued that Nagarjuna and 
Nietzsche are nihilists. This shows a further congruence between Nagarjuna 
and Nietzsche, namely, that if it is argued that either thinker is nihilistic, then 
both are nihilistic for the same reasons and, if it is argued that either thinker is 
not nihilistic, then both are not nihilistic for the same reasons. 
Throughout this chapter it has been argued that both Nagarjuna and 
Nietzsche propose similar or congruent conclusions. It should be repeated 
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that it was possible to show these similarities and congruencies only after first 
examining what are only superficial differences. Perspectivism, while it has 
not been explicitly discussed within this chapter, is evident throughout the 
analysis. If perspectivism was not accepted it would not be necessary to 
accept that Nagarjuna and Nietzsche are in anyway discussing similar things. 
In accepting the common limits of all perspective we can see that both 
thinkers are frequently commenting on what the limits of all possible 
perspectives are, especially in the discussions of Buddhahood and the 
Obermensch. This is not to say that both thinkers are saying the same thing or 
that both draw the same conclusions. By analysing where these two thinkers 
confirm each other it is now possible to see where they really do differ and it is 
the real differences between the works of these thinkers that is the focus of 
the next chapter. 
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Chapter 4 — Real Differences 
Previously, attention has been given to Nagarjuna's idea of Buddhahood and 
Nietzsche's concept of the Obermensch with the intention to show how both 
thinkers posit a stage of human development beyond mundane existence. While 
it has been shown that there are some interesting commonalities between these 
two ideas, especially in their respective moral positions, it should have become 
apparent that there are differences between these ideals that are not merely 
superficial. One of the primary differences is the response and role each has with 
regard to the rest of (unenlightened) humanity and even all of nature. 
Those who have attained the status of Buddhahood take on a drastically different 
position in society to those who have become an Obermensch. This difference is 
a result of each thinkers approach to compassion and service. It is recounted that 
at one point Nagarjuna, whilst travelling the path to enlightenment, had "little 
compassion ... towards living beings" (Walleser 1990: 9). In order to rectify this, 
his teacher set him the task of establishing 108 monasteries and 1000 temples 
(Walleser 1990: 9). By building temples where others could come for their 
devotions Nagarjuna was placed in the service of others allowing him to erase 
his own egotistical drive and develop compassion for those whom he served. The 
egotistical drive, being self-serving, divides the world according to self and other, 
with preference given to self. The subsequent hierarchy of values views the ego 
as, somewhat, independent of other things, in as far as it gives itself preference. 
This independence of the egotistical drive, one's 'I', is contrary to the doctrine of 
dependent arising. By eradicating the independence of the self it is possible to 
affirm the interdependent nature of the world. By serving others with compassion 
and the self-serving nature of the ego is reduced, if not stamped out. The further 
the attitudes of compassion and service towards others are cultivated, the more 
the principle of dependent arising is affirmed. Thus, compassion and service are 
crucial for the bodhisattva's interaction with society. 
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While Nietzsche had not attained the status of Obermensch it is possible to glean 
from his writings that the Obermensch did not serve humanity, or at least not in 
the same way. Zarathustra does try to show the masses that there is a stage of 
development beyond ourselves, but this is not in service to humanity. Indeed his 
whole "down-going" is out of deep felt need as Zarathustra states he is "like a 
bee that has gathered too much honey; I need hands outstretched to take it" (Z 
P: 1) and speaking to the people he begins with "I teach you the Obermensch" (Z 
P: 3). In this sense the Obermensch serves as a lamppost, with which humanity 
can mark a position ahead of us, and to which we can strive towards. Even more 
startling is Zarathustra's outright rejection of service to others. This is apparent 
when Zarathustra, who had climbed higher than anyone previously, is greeted by 
the "higher men" (Z IV: 11) who had reached his cave. These individuals were 
striving to attain the status of Obermensch. Zarathustra grew impatient with them 
and, rather than guiding them higher, decided to leave them as they were in 
preference for his own striving higher. He was "overcome by a little repugnance 
and scorn towards his visitors" (Z IV: 17 § 1) which grew into "pity for the Higher 
Man" (Z IV: 20). This shows a great difference between Buddhahood and the 
Obermensch in their interaction with others in that the former serves other while 
the latter is self-serving. 
A further difference between Nagarjuna and Nietzsche is their responses to 
compassion. For Nagarjuna, compassion and service are connected by the fact 
that the more both are cultivated, the more one forgets personal satisfaction, 
which in turn allows the interdependent nature of existence to be realised. This is 
confirmed by Harvey (1990: 209) who wires that when we see that "compassion 
is the aspiration that being be free from suffering" it follows that its development 
results in "undermining the attachment to 'I - . For Nietzsche, however, the focus 
is on pity rather than compassion. Nietzsche felt that "your greatest dangers" are 
"in pity" (GS § 271). The German word Mitleid, which has been rendered as both 
compassion and pity, is composed of mit, meaning 'with', and leiden, meaning 'to 
suffer'. This may explain Nietzsche's contempt of established morality in favour 
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of a spontaneous value creation. To adhere to a moral code is to unnecessarily 
limit oneself because, in one's interaction with others, there is a limit on morally 
permissible actions. Thus, to show compassion is to suffer merely because one 
is with others. 
It has been noted that, as the creative will is crucial for transvaluing values, "pity 
is anathema to Zarathustra because it encourages weakness and robs mankind 
of its creative will" (Grundlehner 1986: 214). Nietzsche wrote that suffering "is 
incomprehensible and inaccessible to almost everyone" because it is incredibly 
personal and that pity "strips away from the suffering of others whatever is 
distinctively personal" (GS § 338). This shows that, for Nietzsche, pity is 
superfluous and destructive in as far as it inhibits spontaneous value creation. It 
is superfluous in that pity has no benefit for either the pitier or the sufferer and it 
is destructive because it undermines the value of pain for understanding one's 
position in and interaction with the world. As the Obermensch is not in the service 
of humanity, as the bodhisattva is, Nietzsche feels that to reach down and aid 
others in their struggle for realisation, is a hindrance and distraction from one's 
own struggle. Thus, Nietzsche differs from, and almost opposed to, Nagarjuna 
with regard to pity and compassion. 
With the difference between pain and suffering in mind, it is interesting to see 
how each thinker would potentially, comment on the other's work. Nietzsche 
would argue that one would not reach enlightenment by pitying others as it 
masquerades such feelings behind the mask of service and communal benefit. 
On this point, Nagarjuna would probably agree, yet would point out that it is 
specifically action committed without sincerity that has no soteriological value. 
Nietzsche's views denying the existence of selfless actions would also weigh 
heavily on his criticism as he wrote "a weakened, thin, extinguished personality 
that denies itself is no longer fit for anything good" and that "selflessness' has no 
value" (GS § 345). Nietzsche also ties selflessness to morality writing 
"selflessness' — that is what was hitherto called morality' (E: D § 2). From this it 
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is clear that in Nietzsche's work morality, in as far as it extends compassion 
towards others, unnecessarily limits each individual's striving higher and, thus, 
"has no value". 
In response, Nagarjuna would question the value of the Obermensch and 
challenge that if it is as yet unrealised then it never will be. It is conceivable that 
Nagarjuna would apply his dialectic to the Obermensch. Nagarjuna's statement 
on time, that if "the future depended on the past, then ... the future would have 
existed in the past" (MK XIX § 1). As the Obermensch is, as yet, unrealised then, 
without prior existence, the Obermensch will not exist in the future, for "how could 
the present and the future be dependent on it" (MK XIX § 2). Furthermore, the 
possibility of the Obermensch could not arise for "without depending on the past 
... the future could not exist" (MK XIX § 3) and the Obermensch, without prior 
existence, would not have future existence. Nagarjuna could mount a further 
argument against the existence of the Obermensch. Namely, Nietzsche's 
insistence on the 'will-to-power' and 'self-overcoming' affirms an illusory 
individual identity. In this respect, the Obermensch is as far as possible removed 
from Buddhahood, not because they are 'selfish' or 'immoral', but because the 
ideal is founded on ignorance. Furthermore, it is conceivable that Nagarjuna 
would argue that Nietzsche's views are egotistical. In not showing compassion 
for other creatures, the Obermensch acts solely for their self, their 'I', as a result 
all of their actions are set up to reaffirm their ego. It seems that from Nagarjuna's 
perspective that the Obermensch will be unrealisable as long as Nietzsche clings 
to and affirms the supposed value of the ego. Interestingly, as long as Nietzsche 
is opposed to compassion and service the Obermensch will remain an unrealised 
ideal. 
There is a further possibility that the Obermensch marks a stage on the path to 
Buddhahood. At some point on the bodhisattva path one is going to be 
confronted with their limits and hindrances. For one to pass beyond these 
hindrances it would become necessary to complete the work prescribed by their 
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teacher. In this respect, one who is travelling towards, but has not yet reached, 
the status of Buddhahood could be considered selfish. They are too preoccupied 
with the illusory nature of their 'self' that they do not look beyond their 'self, 
becoming, to some degree, indifferent to others. It is in this sense that Nietzsche 
can be understood when he wrote "the masterpiece of the art of self-preservation 
— of selfishness" (E: II § 9). Nietzsche here acknowledges that selfishness is 
necessary so that one may climb higher rather than becoming absorbed by the 
needs of others, especially those with a similar struggle. At some point on the 
path to Buddhahood, the traveller on this path may appear to others as lacking in 
compassion, somewhat like the Obermensch. It is possible that this is where 
Zarathustra is at, as seen from his lack of concerned for the struggling of the 
'higher men'. Growing beyond this point means having compassion without 
'going down'. This is something Nietzsche did not conceive. This is why 
Nagarjuna is teaching throughout all of his texts and is able to have compassion 
without it being a hindrance. If this is the case the difference between the 
Obermensch and Buddhahood is not a difference in kind but a real difference in 
status. 
Another difference is in those who can potentially attain to the status of either 
Buddhahood or become an Obermensch. For Nagarjuna, compassion is shown 
to all creatures. This is consistent with the bodhisattva ideal of raising sentient 
beings so that they may achieve enlightenment. Compassion for creatures is 
unanimous as all have the potential for enlightenment. Nietzsche's opposition to 
this is in his view that his work is a "prelude to a philosophy of the future" (BGE 
subtitle) and that the Obermensch is as yet unrealised (Z P: 3). Nietzsche aimed 
•his ideas at the select few who, he thought, could attain to the higher status. One 
must admit that those who actually reach the bodhisattva ideal are, probably, as 
few as those Nietzsche felt could attain the status of an Obermensch. Yet, the 
belief in the latent potential within each member of humanity differs greatly 
between Nagarjuna and Nietzsche with the former believing that every individual 
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has the potential to be a bodhisattva, while the latter believes that only a select 
few may become Obermensch. 
Nagarjuna continually refers back to others and one's engagement with them in 
proceeding along the path. He wrote, "whosoever honours his father and mother 
will become a praiseworthy one" (Suh § 9) stressing family ties; "those who 
speak with discretion are respected by mankind" (Lugs: 4) pointing to one's 
interaction with society; while "centres of doctrine established by the previous 
king, all temples and so forth, should be sustained as before" (Rat § 318) 
emphasises the responsibility of the ruling class to their subjects. This sample 
could be greatly expanded, but it succeeds in showing that, throughout 
Nagarjuna's work, compassion for, and interaction with, others is essential. With 
Nietzsche this cannot be said. While Zarathustra can be seen to require 
interaction with others in his saying "like a bee that has gathered too much 
honey; I need hands outstretched to take it" (Z P: 1) his interaction challenges 
them. Zarathustra's challenge ostracizes his audience and they reject him, crying 
out "now we have heard enough of the tight-rope walker; let us see him, too" (Z 
P: 3). Zarathustra's challenge was reflected, the manner in which he spoke 
showed little consideration for those to whom he was speaking. It can be seen 
that Zarathustra recognised this, saying "I am not a mouth for these ears", but 
rather than seeing the fault within himself and striving to rectify it, his 
inconsiderate solution was to "shatter their ears to teach them to hear" (Z P: 5), 
showing no compassion for those he was trying to teach. 
The difference in approach to compassion and service also manifests a 
difference of moral nature. In the previous chapter we examined the idea that 
both Buddhahood and the Obermensch, because of their ontological status, must 
be considered moral, irrespective of their actions. Yet, with regards to other 
creatures both, thinkers proceed in vastly different manners. Buddhahood, based 
as it is on compassion and service, would attempt to avoid conflict, as this 
creates disharmony and is often founded on some self-serving desire, meaning 
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that it is contrary to dependent arising. One who has attained Buddhahood acts 
in accordance with necessity, that is, they act in cohesion with the way 
dependent arising unfolds in any given moment. Nagarjuna asserts that "self 
restraint and benefiting others with a compassionate mind is the Dharma" (MK 
XVII § 1) and that "the holy, though destitute, do not discard moral virtue" (Lugs: 
15). Here it is possible to see that compassion and consideration for others is the 
guiding force behind the actions of a bodhisattva. 
One may not understand the actions of a bodhisattva, or may even feel that they 
were treated unfairly. Zimmer (1951: 483) confirms this, stating that "the 
Illumined Ones behave in a way that should be rather shocking and confusing to 
any sound thinker, who from habit and firm determination, is resolved to keep his 
[or her] feet on the ground". From the prior analysis of the qualities required to 
attain Buddhahood, it follows that those who have attained Buddhahood have 
only the best intentions, guiding others in the most productive and necessary 
manner available at any given moment, with actions that are "appropriate, 
effective, and not covertly self-seeking" (Harvey 1990: 121). Thus, the actions of 
a bodhisattva, while not appreciated or understood by all, may appear to be 
unfair by some but, on further reflection, can be seen to be the most fair and 
beneficial, as these interaction have the potential to further individuals along the 
path towards enlightenment, in fact "the Bodhisattva may even do a deed leading 
to hell, if this is a necessary part of helping someone" (Harvey 1990: 121). 
Furthermore, moral transgressions made by the less fortunate, while accepted by 
most of society, such as the poor stealing food, are not permissible to "the holy", 
irrespective of their circumstances, due to the status attained. Thus, Buddhahood 
is, at all times, an icon of moral perfection l . 
Nietzsche would reject the avoidance of conflict. For Nietzsche, to will 
compassion is to deny the value of conflict, which is life denying because 
1 For detailed expositions and commentaries on the path to Buddhahood see especially Aryadeva 
(1994), 8antideva (1995), and Tsong kha pa (2002). 
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opposites have contingent existence. This is analogous to the contingency 
between creation and destruction, or human and inhuman, that Nietzsche saw as 
crucial in maintaining the tragic worldview. He notes that "in reality there is no 
such separation" between these seemingly opposing sides (HC: 187), for without 
one the other cannot exist. Similarly, to serve is to deny mastery. One cannot 
have creation without simultaneous destruction. This is why the Greeks took 
"pleasure in destruction" (HC: 187). As both are necessary for the continuation of 
life, both positions should be affirmed within one's existence. It is now possible to 
see why Nagarjuna's teaching, at the various levels to which it is directed, 
attempts to negate suffering, killing, and stealing (Rat § 14), whereas for 
Nietzsche it is acceptable when necessary to lie, cheat and steal for our 
continued existence (HAH § 102). Nietzsche believed that this is because once 
one understands "the manner in which moral judgements have originated... 
grand words, like 'sin' and 'salvation of the soul' and 'redemption' have been 
spoiled for you" (GS § 335), that is, spoiled in the sense that these words no 
longer hold authority over the actions of one who creates values. This shows 
that, while there are some similarities between the moral outlook of Nagarjuna 
and Nietzsche, there are in fact some deep seated and real differences between 
the two positions. 
Another way to highlight real difference is to conceive of a community of 
bodhisattvas in comparison to a community of Obermenschen. From the 
comparison thus far, it is difficult to conceive of either community, but for different 
reasons. A group of people who have attained Buddhahood would make for a 
cohesive community due to their focus on compassion and service. Some may 
raise the objection that a community of bodhisattvas is bound to fail, like a 
community of altruists, as each member of the community is too concerned with 
the requirements of others, with individuals neglecting themselves to the point of 
death. Yet, this simply would not occur. In being considerate of other's needs, 
each bodhisattva, or altruist, would receive gifts and consume food out of 
compassion and respect for the giver. Thus, the community would survive. The 
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role of the bodhisattva is to help others to enlightenment. Thus, such a 
community would not exist as once an individual has attained the status where 
they can aid others towards enlightenment they would be sent out of the 
community to be of service to others. Those who have attained Buddhahood 
would be predominantly in physical isolation 2 from others of similar status, as this 
is necessary for such individuals to have the greatest affect. That is, for the 
bodhisattvas to have an active role within society, and for that role to have the 
greatest possible impact, it makes sense that once one has attained 
Buddhahood they would be sent out from their teacher so that they may become 
a teacher in their own right. 
Likewise a community of Obermenschen is bound to fail, but for vastly different 
reasons. The Obermensch is too self absorbed to function coherently within a 
community of likeminded individuals. While it is possible to see in parts of 
Nietzsche's work a sort of communitarianism, especially in his commentary on 
and championing of Hellenic culture, it is at best sporadic and is not consistent 
with the Obermensch as it is most consistently proposed. Zarathustra, as the 
spokesperson of the Obermensch, states, "I need companions ... I need living 
companions who follow me" (Z P § 9) but walks out on the 'higher men' who 
indeed wish to follow him. That Zarathustra, who has climbed higher than any 
preceding him, cannot stand to be with others is a good indication that the 
Obermensch is likely to treat humanity as humanity treats monkeys. The result is 
that both the bodhisattva and the tibermensch end up physically isolated, for the 
former it is out of greater concern for those outside the community, while, for the 
latter, it is simply an inability to integrate with likeminded individuals. 
There is also a real difference in the means available for one who would like to 
attain to either ideal, if they were to work solely from the works of each thinker. 
Nietzsche, for all his grand proposals, is distinctly devoid of any method for 
2 We here say "physical isolation" as the bodhisattva has overcome the illusion of individuality 
and there is no longer a 'one' isolated from 'others'. 
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becoming an Obermensch. He may hide behind subtitles such as "a book for 
everyone and no one" (Z) which implies that everybody needs to know of the 
Obermensch and once they do none, will look back to its source as they will be 
too busy climbing higher, but this does not escape the issue. Perhaps this is why 
Nietzsche himself did not come to embody the Obermensch. He had many ideas, 
but he had no means to make them a reality. Nagarjuna, to whom Buddhahood 
has been attributed, continually advocates for specific restraints that individuals 
may impose upon themselves, to further them along the path to Buddhahood. 
The closest that Nietzsche comes to providing actual guidance on becoming an 
Obermensch is his insistence on avoiding pity. One may interject, reminding us 
that Nietzsche also promoted creating one's own values. Yet, what this entailed 
is not quite clear. In his essay "Good and Evil', 'Good and Bad - (GM I) 
Nietzsche shows how, over a period of time, two almost diametrically opposed 
sets of values developed to keep people in their place. Interestingly, Nietzsche's 
criticism is directed towards the plebs who never want more because it is 'evil', 
but it is inconceivable that the ruling noble class is equally kept in their place, 
restricted by their morality that states that it is tad' to want less. While it is clear 
that Nietzsche wants us to create our own values, and that for the underclass this 
would mean to some degree accepting ruling class virtues, it remains unclear 
what the ruling class is to do if they, too, are to become creators of value. Thus, 
apart from a few generalised statements Nietzsche does not present any 
practical means to attain the ideals he proposes. Against this, Nagarjuna not only 
provides councils on morality, he also advises on correct thinking. 
While it is possible to see similarities between the manners in which Nagarjuna 
and Nietzsche express themselves it should also be realised that the goal to 
which they each aim is different. Throughout the works of both thinkers they are 
at times poetic, conversational, elusive, elliptic, aphoristic, and to the point. 
These are a result of their differing intentions. Nagarjuna believes in the 
existence of Buddhahood where as Nietzsche feels that the Obermensch is the 
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greatest idea of which humanity has previously been ignorant, thus the view that 
it is an unrealised potential. This difference has a profound effect on the work, 
mode of expression, and direction taken by both thinkers. Nietzsche is known to 
have used particular words from various languages and various writing styles in 
order to convey his views. Nagarjuna was not merely attempting to assert his 
views; his writings have a pedagogical and soteriological function. As an 
example, among many, we can see that Nagarjuna's dialectical method confronts 
and confounds the rational mind, creating the potential for an understanding that 
is not strictly logical, yet not irrational or illogical, similar to a Zen kdan. 
The difference in the assumptions accepted by Nagarjuna and Nietzsche affects 
the target audience of each thinker. By accepting the existence of Buddhahood 
Nagarjuna is writing for those who are striving towards it, by giving advice on 
right action, i.e. no killing or stealing (Rat § 8), or on right thinking, i.e. the nature 
of action or time (MK VIII & XIX respectively). Any discussion on Buddhism must 
recognise "the Buddha's original enlightenment", as the "failure to recognise this 
fact has caused many problems in the understanding of Buddhism" (Inada 1988: 
261). The failure to recognise this, along with the accepted existence of 
Buddhahood by Nagarjuna, is an example of "distorting or simply missing the 
significance of those texts or the meaningfulness of their claims" mentioned by 
Garfield (2002: 152). In light of this, the possibility of enlightenment and 
Nagarjuna's attainment of Buddhahood underpins all of his writings. Any 
discussion of Nagarjuna's work would suffer if it failed to recognise this fact. 
Nietzsche, however, is grappling with his own ideas and by denying the 
existence of the Obermensch, while accepting its possibility, he documents his 
thoughts so that others can start where he finished. This difference has a further 
affect on the relationship between the various texts within the thought of each 
thinker. 
Within Nietzsche's works it is possible to see him grapple with various ideas, and 
over the course of time to see the different approaches and solutions that he 
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arrived at. See for instance his responses to the eternal return and the 
development from the idea of the 'free ones' into the Obermensch. We could 
accept that Nietzsche's attempt to pave the way for the Obermensch was 
"foredoomed to failure by the absence of a spiritual doctrine and discipline" 
(Burckhardt 1987: 69). By trying to make his own way his soteriology lacks 
"effective legitimacy" (Guenon 2001b: 23), whereas Nagarjuna's teachings are 
"protected by the [Buddhist] tradition ... which also supplies the necessary 
supports for the full realisation or actualisation" of his teachings (Oldmeadow 
2007: 60). 
Nagarjuna, in guiding his students, was writing for people at various stages on 
the path to enlightenment. Some texts contain material that some people, with at 
least a minimum of moral awareness, would consider them self-evident, while 
other texts are highly technical and difficult for even well versed practitioners of 
his teaching. One may like to propose that Nagarjuna's easier texts, such as 
Retrial/air and Suhrllekha, are his earlier ones and that the more difficult texts, 
including Bodhicittavivarana and Malamadhyamakakarika, represent his later 
works. While the exact chronology of his works is not known this may be the 
case, but it is unlikely. The consistency and degree of certainty shown throughout 
his literary output shows that, while unlikely, it is conceivable that Nagarjuna 
wrote them all around the same time. Thus, the ways that the ideas of Nagarjuna 
and Nietzsche are presented vary significantly, with this difference being 
intimately connected to the goals of each thinker's literary output. 
Many scholars dissect literary corpora so that they are more manageable. 
Sections of work are grouped together most consistently by topic or period. This 
is evident in Nietzsche's work where some scholarship differentiates between 
early, middle, and late periods with each supposedly marking a paradigm shift 
with particular ideas dominant in each. Prime examples of this approach are 
Young (1992) and Heller (1979: 320) who suggests that "Nietzsche's thoughts 
can be unified" according to the development of recurrent themes but still divided 
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Nietzsche's development into "three stages". While such an approach to 
Nietzsche is not given preference within this work, from the analysis given 
throughout, it is evident that such hard and definite divisions unnecessarily limit 
our understanding of Nietzsche. Within the scholarly approach to Nagarjuna 
chronological compartmentalisation of particular texts has not been proposed. 
This sort of differentiation between texts is against the nature of his philosophy. 
While Nagarjuna's texts may be grouped according to predominant themes, such 
as emptiness or ethics, these distinctions give no insight into the figure of the 
author, nor do they show 'stages' of development. While there is some truth in 
differentiating an individual's stages of development, in the available material by 
a thinker such as Nietzsche, a strong delineation of periods is arbitrary, at best, 
and, at its worst, such an approach limits the potential analysis of the work. 
For Nietzsche texts are a personal exposition. He believes that an author says 
more about himself or herself than they do about their topic. With Nietzsche this 
is unmistakably clear. His childhood, education, relationships, adulthood, and 
self-development standout in all of his writings to such a degree that, if one did 
not know his life, one could still understand his struggle, and the ideas that 
contributed to it. Marchand (1996: 125) notes that in The Birth of Tragedy there is 
more than just the two kinds of emotional turbulence affecting the writing of that 
book acknowledge by Nietzsche, namely that "mental turmoil" of "his attempt to 
come to grips with the professional position he had suddenly attained at the age 
of twenty-four". Kaufmann (1956: 30 - 60) succinctly sums this up in the chapter 
titled 'Nietzsche's life as background of his thought' and this is achieved through 
Nietzsche's attempt to "make his presence as an individual author unforgettable 
to his readers" (Nehamas 1985: 4-5). However, for Nagarjuna, if this is not 
impossible, it is extremely difficult. Other than what is evident within Nagarjuna's 
texts, such as his compassion towards all of nature, or the firm but gentle nature 
of his guidance, there is little material that gives a sense of who he was, why he 
was that way, or how he became that way. Walleser (1990) in recounting the life 
of Nagarjuna from both Tibetan and Chinese sources is devoid of any instances 
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that directly inform on the formation of his ideas, other than historical dates 
relating to meetings with people such as masters, teachers, kings, and students, 
none of which are discernable from the available works of Nagarjuna. This is 
another real difference in the approach between the two thinkers. 
For Nietzsche's ideas to have the impact he thought they should, it was 
necessary for him to document his personal struggle through his conceptual 
topography, and the psychological effects the journey had on him. Nietzsche 
shows us the affects on and effects of his journey so that others may use his 
work to strive towards the ideal of the Obermensch. This is ironic because, at 
times, his comments are too personal to serve their pedagogical role. On the 
other hand, the personality of Nagarjuna is superfluous, as long as his directions 
aid his students in attaining enlightenment. This analysis is supported by the view 
that "the outer person, the egoic self with all its attendant contingencies, is of no 
lasting significance" (Oldmeadow, 2000: 3), which amounts to saying that the 
colour of the glass is superfluous as long as it is clean and successfully carries 
water. That Nagarjuna had attained to the degree where he is qualified to guide 
others would have been enough for his students. This shows that there is a 
difference in the degree to which each thinker is contained within their texts. 
The use and absence of hyperbole within the works of Nietzsche and Nagarjuna 
respectively is another real difference. Within Nagarjuna there is a distinct lack of 
hyperbole, everything is stated as a matter of fact, whereas, Nietzsche is 
consistently hyperbolic. Compare, for instance, comments such as "view as your 
enemies: avarice, dishonesty, deceit, attachment, [etc]" (Suh § 12), "attachment 
is a small entanglement arising from desire" (Rat § 419), "with great effort, a 
large stone may be thrown to the top of a hill, but with little effort it may be 
toppled over" (Lugs: 17), or even "it makes sense that Nirvava is neither a thing 
nor a non-thing" (MK XXV § 10), with "a 'revaluation of values' is perhaps 
possible for me alone" (E: I § 1), or "I have never been childlike enough" (E: II § 
1). By accepting the existence of Buddhahood, Nagarjuna can actively guide his 
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students through his texts in a manner that is meant to rectify particular piffalls 
experienced on the path. He does not need to justify what he is helping others to 
attain. 
Nietzsche, however, is attempting to assert his views. He thinks that they are 
new and therefore need to be heard. Nietzsche needs hyperbole and constantly 
rests on it for the expression of his ideas. Nietzsche's over emphasis is an 
attempt to have his ideas taken seriously by others. When this did not happen, 
Nietzsche denied that anyone around at the time could possibly understand them 
as can be seen from his comment that Thus Spoke Zarathustra "would raise one 
to a higher level of existence than 'modern' men could attain" if they could 
understand, "that is, to have really experienced" it (E: Ill § 1). It is inconceivable 
of Nietzsche being as devoid of hyperbole as Nagarjuna was. 
The exception here is the Vigrahavyavartani where Nagarjuna refutes particular 
views so that the readers may develop correct thinking while embodying correct 
action. While Nagarjuna argues for a particular position it is still done in a manner 
that is consistent with his role as a teacher rather than arguing merely for the 
sake of his views. Furthermore, the text is set out such that all the objections to 
Nagarjuna are clearly stated at the beginning and are then systematically refuted 
in subsequent sections in the same order the objections were raised. 
Embellishing and emphasizing his answer adds nothing. 
There are many differences between to be seen if the distinction, roughly stated, 
between the realism of Nagarjuna and the idealism of Nietzsche is drawn out. 
This claim is idiosyncratic and we say 'roughly stated' as it would be wrong to call 
Nagarjuna a realist in the usual sense of the term, as it would be equally wrong 
to call Nietzsche an idealist given its usual meaning. Realism and idealism are 
here used as opposites, with the former designating something that has current 
existence and the latter designating something that, while it may potentially come 
into existence, does not currently have existence. While Buddhahood is the 
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pinnacle of Nagarjuna's teaching, and in this sense is an ideal, the existence of, 
and ability to attain to, Buddhahood is real for Nagarjuna. Whereas, Nietzsche's 
Obermensch is a possibility without a reality, and will always remain an ideal. It is 
in this sense that Nietzsche is idealistic, that is, he proposes the pursuit of 
something that, as yet, has no reality. While Nietzsche claims that "no new idols 
are erected by me" (E: P § 2) he also states, in implicitly referring to the 
Obermensch, that "a counterideal was lacking — until Zarathustra" (E: GM). Thus, 
Nietzsche realised his own idealism. If we look further into the works of both 
thinkers, not limiting this analysis to one example, it is possible to see this 
difference arise again and again. From the preceding comments of Nagarjuna, it 
is evident that, irrespective of the moral virtues he discussed, he believes that all 
are attainable for those willing to pursue them. The attainment of each virtue may 
require considerable consistent effort, but, according to Nagarjuna, they are real, 
in as far as there are individuals in existence who embody them. 
Nietzsche's idealism can be seen throughout his work. Nietzsche wrote, "art 
represents the highest task and the truly metaphysical activity of this life" (BTp). It 
is with regard to this task that Nietzsche wrote his first work, describing the 
heights attained in this respect by Greek tragedy. Yet, when he came back to this 
work, he implored the reader that they "ought to learn the art of this-worldly 
comfort first" (BT Criticism § 7) with the imperative 'ought' implying that the 
modern individual needs to relearn something from Greek tragedy that has been 
lost. Nietzsche asserts, "we must hold fast to our luminous guide, the Greeks" if 
the metaphysical heights attained through their art, is to be reattained (BT § 23). 
The potential of art, attained by the Greeks, has been lost and its 
reestablishment remains an ideal. This is another example where Nietzsche's 
idealism remains opposed to Nagarjuna's realism. 
This use of realism or idealism opens up a further difference regarding the time 
when Buddhahood or the Obermensch can be realised. According to Nagarjuna's 
teachings, one is able to strive towards, and come to embody the virtues of, 
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Buddhahood as soon as one is willing to take up the teaching. It follows that it 
would be necessary to find a teacher who has reached the goal, as they are able 
to revive the teaching without innovation. Revival is necessary because it means 
the student can be directed in how to employ the aspects of the teaching in 
accordance with the time and circumstances in which they occur. Innovation is to 
be avoided because it destroys the principles of the teaching through variation 
and deviation. If these requirements are met, then the fruits of Nagarjuna's 
teaching can be realised, irrespective of when and where it occurs. Nietzsche, 
however, looked to the future. Combined with his lack of directives set up to 
achieve Obermensch status, Nietzsche's result is an unfulfilling continuous 
gazing into the future for its realisation. According to Nagarjuna Buddhahood is 
and will be, whereas, for Nietzsche, the Obermensch will be but never is. The 
reality of Buddhahood means that it is achievable whereas the lack of existence 
of the Obermensch means that it will only ever be an ideal. 
The potential existence of the Obermensch may be connected to Nietzsche's 
philosophical predecessors. It is possible to argue that without thinkers such as 
Hegel, Kant, or Schopenhauer Nietzsche could not have grappled with the issues 
he attempted to. An example of this is the overcoming of pessimism, as 
Nietzsche wrote, "I tried laboriously to express by means of Schopenhauerian 
and Kantian formulas strange and new valuations which were basically at odds 
with Kant's and Schopenhauer's spirit and taste" and, after making note of 
Schopenhauer's "resignation", Nietzsche comments "how differently Dionysus 
spoke to me" (BT Criticism § 6). An examination of content reveals and reaffirms 
the championing of ancient Greece, as well as the developing interest in foreign 
religions such as Hinduism and Buddhism. On another level, the pursuit of a 
unified Germany, and the use of war to establish this, is a physical manifestation 
of the unifying of the will to power, and the acknowledgement of the equal value 
of destruction and creation, culminating in the positing of the Obermensch. In 
Nietzsche's time the future existence of a unified Germany, or even a unified 
Europe, is akin to the future existence of an Obermensch. In contrast to this, 
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Nagarjuna is continuing his tradition. While the views refuted with his dialectic 
method are particular to his context, the teachings of Buddhahood, and the 
means of attain to it, are not particular to either Nagarjuna or 2nd century India. 
Thus, there is a real difference in the degree to which Nietzsche and Nagarjuna 
are products of their respective contexts. 
However, to test whether these thinkers are really just products of their contexts 
it is necessary to decontextualise the works of both thinkers. Both Nagarjuna and 
Nietzsche were unique and both provided the groundwork for further inquiries. 
There is a long history in commentaries on Nagarjuna's magnum opus the 
MOlamadhyamakakarik5 and, in this sense, it is necessary that the historical 
context of his works be acknowledged. By uniting dependent arising and 
emptiness Nagarjuna was revolutionary. Buddhism between the time of the 
historical Buddha and Nagarjuna had been in considerable decline. Nagarjuna 
could only be considered a reviver of Buddhism if this were the case. If Buddhism 
as a whole, and its numerous schools individually, had maintained its teaching, 
rather than becoming bogged down in interpretational differences, it would have 
been unnecessary for a revival of any sore. This further shows that Nagarjuna's 
historical context is important. 
Yet, the fact that there has been further fragmentation of the Buddhist teaching, 
into an increasing number of schools, shows that Nagarjuna's ideas could have 
come earlier or later, and still would have had a similar degree of impact. If we 
further decontextualise his works and focus on their content alone, we see that, 
apart from some linguistic nuances particular to his time, Nagarjuna's advice is 
almost as relevant today as it was when it was produced. Thus, it cannot be said 
that Nagarjuna is contained by his context rather there is something timeless 
about his works. 
3  It is only possible to consider Nagarjuna's position a revival if one accepts that his views are 
accurate to the tradition. 
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It cannot be said that Nietzsche, too, is timeless. Admittedly, his ideas have given 
birth to a whole range of new studies, and his influences can be felt in fields as 
disparate as existentialism, post modernism, etymology of social institutions, not 
to mention the array of Nietzsche studies. For any of this to have come about it is 
necessary that Nietzsche occupy his historical context. Nietzsche's work relies so 
heavily on that of his predecessors that it is inconceivable that he could have 
come earlier. It is possible that his philological work could have been produced 
prior to the works of Schopenhauer, but Nietzsche's philosophy would have been 
severely lacking, if evident at all. Without the works of the great pessimist, even 
The Birth of Tragedy could not have been what it was, let alone all of his 'more' 
philosophical books. This overlooks the influence of Wagner, the timely 
introduction of Vedic and Buddhist studies into Europe, and preoccupation with 
the virtues of ancient Greece that are all intimately intertwined with Nietzsche's 
literary output. 
If Nietzsche had arrived later he may have avoided the connection of his work 
with the Nazi ideology, but this is not a given considering the controversy that 
surrounded Heidegger. This would not have necessarily ensured the acceptance 
of his work, as it would still have come into conflict with early twentieth century 
philosophical trends. Being the type of individual he was his work would not have 
been what it is if he had come into contact with thinkers such as Russell and 
Wittgenstein, as he tended to absorb and process the ideas surrounding him into 
his own work. Furthermore, as Thomas (1983: 125) concluded, Nietzsche's 
impact on German culture during the early 20 th century intrudes into both the 
social and political domains, and was "important one way or another, positively or 
negatively", and, we may add, irrespective of whether his ideas were understood 
or not. Even Nietzsche's attack on philology in The Birth of Tragedy "laid the 
foundations for the next generation's attacks on his field" (Marchand 1996: 133) 
In this respect, we must admit that Nietzsche cannot be considered other than a 
product of his time. Nietzsche has fulfilled his pedagogical role in as far as his 
works have been absorbed and have provided the basis for further inquiry 
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without constant reference to his works. Thus, it can be concluded that, in the 
same respect as Nagarjuna being timeless, Nietzsche is altogether timely. This is 
an example of how contextual and decontextual analyses can be combined to 
highlight a real difference. 
The relationship of Nagarjuna and Nietzsche to their respective times opens up a 
real difference in regard to relationship to their respective traditions. Nagarjuna 
was considered "the second Buddha" (Inada 1993: 3, Kalupahana 1991: 2). He 
worked to revive the Buddhist tradition. His teachings were consistent with the 
lessons given by the founder of his religion, as well as those he received the 
tradition from. This consistency is evident from the fact that he "brought to 
maturity the Madhyamika-philosophy which had only been sketched by his 
teacher Saraha" (Walleser 1990: 7). It is noted that he "contradicted the doctrines 
of the Brahmans" (Walleser 1990: 6) and mastered many texts quickly. It is not 
recorded that he contradicted his Buddhist teachers, nor deliberately acted 
contrary to their prescriptions. It is interesting to note that after he succeeded his 
teacher as "High Priest", in order to maintain the purity of the teaching 
"introduced sharp discipline and expelled 8000 monks whose moral purity was 
suspected" (Walleser 1990: 7). 
Nietzsche, on the other hand, directly revolted against his forefathers in 
philosophy. He outgrew Schopenhauer, commenting pejoratively on "how 
differently Dionysus spoke to me [Nietzsche]" in comparison to Schopenhauer 
(BT Criticism § 6). Nietzsche can also be seen as attempting to undermine the 
exalted position held by Socrates within the discipline of philosophy, saying that 
he "recognised Socrates and Plato as symptoms of decay" (17: 39). Yet, 
Nietzsche would see this as being consistent with the tradition of philosophy, as 
he merely continues a trend he noticed amongst the pre-Platonic philosophers 
who were great because they were able to "find their own individual form and to 
develop it through all its metamorphoses to its subtlest and greatest possibilities" 
(PTG § 1). Nietzsche's portrait of the pre-Platonic philosophers makes them 
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appear as if their "unity of style" (PTG § 2) came as a result of conversation that 
developed from Thales, passing through the generations, concluding with 
Socrates, that allowed each of these philosophers to define themselves in 
contrast to their predecessors, without being in conflict with them. While 
Nietzsche would believe that he is consistent with the tradition of philosophy, in 
defining himself by his predecessors, it remains that he is in direct conflict with 
them, and his philosophy is not continuing the tradition of philosophy in the same 
manner as he characterised pre-Platonic philosophy. With this, we must 
conclude that there is a real difference in the manner that Nagarjuna and 
Nietzsche each respond to their tradition and predecessors. 
This chapter has not been an attempt to exhaust the areas of difference. Rather, 
an attempt has been made to show how the proposed comparative method can 
work within a range of areas highlighting real difference. Again perspectivism, 
while implicit, has played an important role. If it was not accepted that all 
potential perspectives existed within common limits, then we could not conclude 
that any of the divergences discussed throughout this chapter constitute any sort 
of difference, let alone real differences. Also, the joint contextual/decontextual 
method of analysis has been deployed to show how it can be used when drawing 
out real differences. 
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Conclusion 
The intention of this work was to develop a method of comparative philosophy 
based on perspectivism and to show its application. A new method is necessary 
because previous methods either rested on a self-refuting assumption or were 
underpinned by the pursuit of an unachievable goal. These flaws inherent within 
previous comparative methods have been shown to result from either the 
acceptance of relativity or the pursuit of objectivity. Relativity and objectivity are 
opposite extremes to which perspectivism, being the middle way, provides the 
solution. Perspectivism, in acknowledging the common ground to all potential 
standpoints while accepting the uniqueness of all actual positions, overcomes 
these flaws and provides a sound and practical foundation from which it is 
possible to examine any number of thinkers across disparate traditions. 
Previous methods of comparative philosophy have taken as their basis either the 
acceptance of relativity or the pursuit of objectivity. Thinkers such as Masson-
Oursel (1926), Pei (1962), and Geertz (1973) accepted relativity without realising 
its self-refuting nature. Panikkar (1989) and Tuck (1990) agreed that the pursuit 
of objectivity is unachievable, yet neither proposed an adequate solution for 
grappling with this issue within the bounds of comparative philosophy. Both 
relativity and objectivity are equally ineffective for fruitfully comparing any 
thinkers or ideas but solutions to either of these issues had not been found. If we 
accept relativity, then we must concede that everything is right according to its 
time and place. Any attempt to examine and evaluate any particular thing in 
terms of another idea or another's views would be futile because they occur in 
different times and different places and have equal validity. On the other hand, if 
an attempt is made to find an objective position from which to compare thinkers 
and ideas then this amounts to trying to find either a non-position to examine all 
other positions, which is unattainable, or an all encompassing position to 
examine the multitude of positions that it contains and, being finite creatures, we 
cannot hope to contain all positions simultaneously. Either there is nothing to 
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compare, as a result of relativity, or there is no position from which to compare, 
as a result of objectivity. Thus, we must conclude that both relativity and 
objectivity are insufficient as a basis for any comparative methodology as both 
forfeit the right to act as a foundation for comparative philosophy. 
To save comparative philosophy from the dilemma of lacking a solid grounding 
on which its practitioners could construct their comparisons perspectivism has 
been proposed. Perspectivism accepts that there is a common domain that all 
that exists partakes in, yet acknowledges that each position within this domain 
will view the domain differently. The existence of a common domain is what 
allows each member of humanity to be justifiably considered human along with 
all others, while the difference in position of each human within the common 
domain means that each individual is unique. The result is that, in any given 
perspective, there is enough that is common that allows it to be compared with 
any other perspective, while allowing for the fact that differences of perspective 
occur due to the uniqueness of each perspective. Thus, perspectivism provides a 
solution to both relativity and objectivity. Comparisons within the domain of 
philosophy can now continue with the knowledge that a solid foundation exists 
from which such comparisons can be made. 
The interesting result of this method is a heightened understanding of difference. 
Difference, according to this comparative method, becomes either superficial or 
real. Superficial differences occur when ideas appear different but further 
examination shows that the ideas examined occupy the same position and serve 
the same function within the work of two or more thinkers. Real differences occur 
when it is evident that the thinkers compared will not reconcile on some aspect of 
their thought according to the position they occupy. An example of how these two 
kinds of difference function is as follows: one thinker posits x and another posits 
not x, they appear to contradict each other, yet it can be shown that x and not x 
function in exactly the same manner and occupy the same position within the 
work of their respective thinkers such that we may say that these two ideas are 
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congruent. To highlight the two kinds of difference we can say that in this 
example there is a superficial difference with regard to content and a real 
difference with regard to context. That is, each thinker is expressing themselves 
according to the culture, time, and discipline that they were writing for, which 
explains the manner that each use to express their ideas, and that the ideas they 
express are the same. The interplay between the two kinds of difference, unique 
to this method, acknowledges that both contextualised and decontextualised 
forms of analysis are of equal value when comparing material. This is because 
each fulfils a role that is not catered for by the other. While Mukerji (1952) and 
Geertz (1973) both raise valid points when considering a contextualised analysis 
and Scharfstein (1989) discussed equally valid points for pursuing a 
decontextualised analysis it must be accepted that each form of analysis, 
independent of the other, does not provide comparative philosophy with all the 
tools required for a full comparison. For this reason a multifaceted approach, akin 
to that proposed by Rosan (1962), has been pursued. From this it should be 
evident that the examination of difference plays a primary role in a comparative 
method founded on perspectivism. 
Included within this work was a case study intended to show the vitality of a 
comparative method based on perspectivism. This examination of the works of 
Nagarjuna and Nietzsche illustrates how this form of comparison aids the 
understanding of the role of both superficial and real differences. By beginning 
the case study with an analysis of superficial difference the intention was to 
probe beyond surface differences to open up the possibility that there may be a 
level of comparison that would otherwise be unconceivable if left unchallenged. 
In doing so it was shown that a strictly one sided analysis, whether 
contextualised or decontextualised, will always be insufficient within the bounds 
of comparative philosophy. This is seen by the fact that little, if any, similarities 
exist between India circa 100 BCE — 250 CE and 19 th century Germany, yet if the 
analysis halted at this conclusion it would miss vital aspects common to both 
bodies of work. By examining superficial differences in depth it was possible to 
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show that, in attempting to exhaust these kinds of differences, there is some 
aspect of the analysis that remains untouched. The possibility of examining the 
similarities and congruencies between intellectual traditions arises when the 
superficiality of many differences is realised. Nietzsche's Obermensch and 
Buddhahood for Nagarjuna may appear as being two different things but by 
conceiving of the possibility that some of their differences are only superficial it 
was possible to show that these ideas have many aspects in common, even the 
possibility that the Obermensch marks a point on the path to Buddhahood. This is 
not to deny real difference, but it is only after an analysis of superficial 
differences and similarities that divergences may be asserted as real. While it 
need not be necessary to separate a comparative analysis, as has been done 
above, it should be remembered that the structure of this work was set out to 
emphasise and aid in the understanding of the proposed method of comparative 
philosophy. 
Comparative philosophy is becoming an evermore-important means to 
understand ourselves, and those around us. We are now at a time when the 
world's traditions and the great thinkers from the history of humanity are available 
at our fingertips like never before. Comparative philosophy provides the tools to 
understand how humanity has differed between cultures and across time, while 
simultaneously bringing to light those common elements that show us that we are 
all human. We can better understand ourselves by understanding those around 
us. While comparative philosophy is well established, its method was never 
clearly outlined and comparative philosophers have only had rusted and dull 
tools. Relativity and objectivity were never the right tools for comparative 
philosophy. Perspectivism, the principles of which have been outlined throughout 
this work, provides comparative philosophy with a set of tools suited specifically 
for its method of analysis. "Principles by their very essentiality are capable on 
ongoing application which no one author can exhaust" (Perry 1995: x) and for 
this reason it was necessary to develop a stable comparative methodology. Thus 
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comparative philosophy may proceed like never before, that is, with all the tools 
necessary to adequately fulfil its function. 
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